Schaeffer v. JBS Carriers, Inc.

JULIENNE SCHAEFFER Plaintiff, v. JBS CARRIERS, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 19-cv-01406-NYW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

December 1, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang

This matter comes before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment (or "Motion") filed by Defendant JBS Carriers, Inc. ("Defendant" or "JBS"). [#53, filed May 7, 2020]. Pursuant to the Order of Reference dated June 7, 2019 [#19], this civil action was assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for all purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73; D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.2. Plaintiff Julienne Schaeffer ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Schaeffer") has responded to both the Motion and the associated Statement of Undisputed Facts [#59; #63] and Defendant has replied [#61]. This court finds that oral argument will not materially assist in the disposition of the instant Motion. Being fully advised of the premises, this court respectfully GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

On February 21, 2019, Ms. Schaeffer initiated this action against her former employer, JBS, in the District Court for Weld County, Colorado. [#6]. Defendant subsequently removed the action to the District of Colorado on May 16, 2019, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367, 1441, and 1446. See [#1]. Following a Motion to Dismiss filed by JBS [#13, filed May 23, 2019], Ms. Schaeffer filed an Amended Complaint as a matter of right [#27, filed July 18, 2019], and a Second Amended Complaint on July 31, 2019, see [#30], which remains the operative pleading in this action. In the Second Amended Complaint, Ms. Schaeffer asserts eight counts against JBS for sex discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3; the Equal Pay Act (or "EPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); and Colorado's Anti-Discrimination Act ("CADA"), Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 24-34-401, et seq. See generally [#30]. Specifically, Ms. Schaeffer asserts claims under Title VII for sex discrimination on the bases of wage-discrimination ("Claim I") [id. at ¶¶ 78-85] and discriminatory pay practices ("Claim II") [id. at ¶¶ 86-92]; under the EPA for unequal pay ("Claim IV") [id. at ¶¶ 102-08] and retaliation ("Claim V") [id. at ¶¶ 109-116]; pursuant to CADA for sex discrimination on the bases of wage-discrimination ("Claim VI") [id. at ¶¶ 117-23] and discriminatory pay practices ("Claim VII") [id. at ¶¶ 124-31]; and for unlawful retaliation pursuant to Title VII ("Claim III") [id. at ¶¶ 93-101] and CADA ("Claim VIII") [id. at ¶¶ 132-40].

Defendant filed its Amended Answer and Counterclaims on January 3, 2020. [#43]. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff impermissibly forwarded sensitive employee information from her work email to her personal email in contravention of JBS's Employee Handbook on at least 185 occasions [id. at 21-29], and asserts three counterclaims against Plaintiff: (1) conversion [id. at ¶¶ 33-41]; (2) civil theft [id. at ¶¶ 42-53]; and (3) breach of contract [id. at ¶¶ 54-62].

The Parties proceeded through discovery and, on May 7, 2020, JBS filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment. See [#53]. In moving for summary judgment in its favor on all eight of Plaintiff's claims, JBS contends that Plaintiff "has no competent evidence supporting even a prima facie case under any of her eight legal theories." [Id. at 1]. Ms. Schaeffer disagrees, arguing that genuine disputes of material fact remain and warrant a trial on all eight of her claims. [#59]. JBS also asserts that there are no genuine disputes of material fact as to its three counterclaims and itis entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [#53 at 1, 23-25]. Ms. Schaeffer counters that JBS has failed to meet its burden and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. [#59 at 12-15].

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567, 569 (10th Cir. 1994). "A 'judge's function' at summary judgment is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or, conversely, is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. See also Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000); Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (10th Cir. 1987). A fact is "material" if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable party could return a verdict for either party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing First Nat. Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10thCir. 2002). However, the nonmovant "may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of [the] pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Conclusory statements based merely on speculation, conjecture, or subjective belief are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Bones v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). The nonmoving party's evidence must be more than "mere reargument of [its] case or a denial of an opponent's allegation" or it will be disregarded. See 10B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2738 at 356 (3d ed. 1998). Ultimately, however, the court may not enter summary judgment unless Defendant carries its burden under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (10th Cir. 2002). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The following undisputed material facts are drawn from the record before the court. In some instances, a party has disputed the proffered material fact, but an examination of the record finds that such dispute is not properly supported by evidence in the record. Where that is the case, the court has noted the dispute and its analysis.

1. JBS is a multi-state, regional truckload carrier with several distinct departments to facilitate its trucking operations, [#53 at ¶ 1; #53-16 at ¶¶ 2-3; #63 at ¶ 1], including the Safety Department, which is tasked with ensuring JBS drivers operate in accord with federal and state trucking industry standards; collecting accident information in order to submit insurance claims; and handling workers' compensation claims, [#53 at ¶ 1; #53-16 at ¶ 4; #63 at ¶ 1].

2. On May 2, 2013, JBS hired Ms. Schaeffer as a Risk Specialist/Safety Coordinator within its Safety Department. [#53 at ¶ 2; #36 at ¶¶ 3-4; #63 at ¶ 2].

3. Ms. Schaeffer worked in the Safety Department for the duration of her employmentwith JBS. [#53 at ¶ 2; #53-1 at 204:23-205:11; #63 at ¶ 2].¹

4. When Ms. Schaeffer began working at JBS, she was supervised by Linda Lindsey ("Ms. Lindsey"). [#53 at ¶ 6; #53-1 at 204:8-15; #53-16 at ¶ 6; #63 at ¶ 6].

5. Ms. Lindsey reported to Randy Kopecky ("Mr. Kopecky"), the Safety Director hired concurrently with Ms. Lindsey and Dan Wiita ("Mr. Wiita"), another Safety Department employee. [#53 at ¶ 7; #53-1 at 90:10-92:1, 213:4-16; #63 at ¶ 7].

6. After Mr. Kopecky terminated his employment as Safety Director in November 2013, Ms. Lindsey temporarily assumed many Safety Director duties. [#53 at ¶ 8; #53-1 at 216:12-15, 223:17-224:7; #53-5 at ¶ 21; #63 at ¶ 8].

7. As a result, Ms. Lindsey began training Ms. Schaeffer on procedures for filing workers' compensation claims, which had previously been among Ms. Lindsey's duties. [#53 at ¶ 8; #53-1 at 223:17-224:7; #53-5 at ¶ 21; #63 at ¶ 8]. Ms. Schaeffer began performing some of Ms. Lindsey's former duties. [#59 at ¶ 5; #59-3 at 223:17-224:23; #61 at ¶ 9].

8. In January 2014, Ms. Lindsey resigned from her position with JBS. [#53 at ¶ 9; #53-1 at 225:25-226:1; #63 at ¶ 9]. At the time of her resignation, Ms. Lindsey was making $59,999.68 per year. [#53 at ¶ 9; #53-16 at ¶ 7; #63 at ¶ 9].

9. Ms. Schaeffer assumed all of Ms. Lindsey's duties, in addition to performing her own duties, after Ms. Lindsey left JBS. [#59 at ¶ 6; #59-3 at 224:8-23; #61 at ¶ 9].

10. In March 2014, Mark Respass ("Mr. Respass") was hired as Safety Director, thereby becoming Ms. Schaeffer's supervisor. [#53 at ¶ 10; #53-1 at 89:4-5, 216:18-22, 223:17-25; #61 at ¶ 10].

11. In June 2014, Mr. Respass promoted Ms. Schaeffer. [#53 at ¶ 11; #53-6 at ¶¶ 5-8; #53-7].

12. Ms. Schaeffer was told that she was taking Ms. Lindsey's former role. [#59 at ¶ 10; #59-1 at ¶ 1; #61 at ¶ 10].

13. Ms. Schaeffer's promotion included a pay increase from her initial salary of $26,000 to $35,000 per year. [#53 at ¶ 12; #53-7; #63 at ¶ 12].

14. Mr. Respass set Ms. Schaeffer's salary, the amount of which was based on funds available in the Safety Department budget and Mr. Respass's desire to reward Ms. Schaeffer's "excellent work." [#61 at ¶ 16; #53-6 at ¶ 19].

15. All positions at JBS, including the Safety Assistant Manager position, have a presumptive minimum and maximum pay range assigned to the position; these pay ranges are set based on a variety of factors,...