Schalamar Creek Mobile Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Adler

SCHALAMAR CREEK MOBILE HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC.,on behalf of the homeowner members in its representative capacityand on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated,SHERRY ATWOOD, JAMES DRISKELL, DON GLEDHILL,LINDA GLEDHILL, BARB GRIFFIN, JOETTE KELLY,CATHY LISKA, Plaintiffs-Appellants,PHIL FEATHERBAY, Plaintiff, v. STEVEN ADLER, LORRAINE DEMARCO, R. SCOTT PROVOST,CHARLES CROOK, MARTI NEWKIRK, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-13415

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

May 7, 2021

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

Non-Argument Calendar

D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-00291-TPB-AEP Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida

Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Schalamar Creek Mobile Homeowner's Association, Inc. and seven residents of Schalamar Creek Golf Mobile Home Park appeal the district court's summary judgment for the defendants, the owners and operators of the mobile home park, on their claims that the defendants violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Schalamar Creek's owners and operators because the residents and the homeowner's association did not have standing to pursue their claims. We agree with the district court that the residents did not have standing to bring the RICO claims and affirm summary judgment for the owners and operators. Although we disagree with the district court that the homeowner's association did not have standing to bring an Americans with Disabilities Act claim, we still affirmbecause there is no summary judgment evidence that the proposed modifications to Schalamar Creek's clubhouse were "readily achievable."

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Schalamar Creek is a mobile home community located in Polk County, Florida, designed for adults fifty-five or older. Like many mobile home parks, Schalamar Creek offers amenities for its residents. It has a golf course, a driving range, several pools, a lounge, and a clubhouse. The clubhouse, built in 1989, is a three-story building with its own amenities. There is a restaurant on the first floor. On the second floor, there is a large event space and a bank. The rent deposit box is also located on the second floor. The third floor houses offices for Schalamar Creek's management. The golf course, driving range, restaurant, bank, and lounge are open to the public.

Schalamar Creek is owned by Osprey Links, LLC, a subsidiary of Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. The park is operated and managed by Murex Properties, LLC. Schalamar Creek's residents are represented by the homeowner's association, which is authorized by statute to act as their representative in matters relating to Schalamar Creek's operations. See Fla. Stat. § 723.075(1) ("[T]he association shall become the representative of all the mobile home owners in all matters relating to this chapter, regardless of whether the homeowner is a member of the association.").

In Florida, the Mobile Home Act governs the relationship between the residents and the owners and operators of mobile home parks. See Fla. Stat. § 723, et. seq. Schalamar Creek's residents own their mobile homes, but pursuant to the Act they lease the land beneath their homes from Schalamar Creek's owners. As required by the Act, these leases incorporate a prospectus—a disclosure document that contains information about the rents and fees applicable to the property. See id. § 723.012 (discussing the required contents of a prospectus). The prospectus also "delineates the basis for, and the procedure governing, future rent increases." See Herrick v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. Regul., Div. of Fla. Land Sales, Condos. & Mobile Homes, 595 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining the purposes and contents of a mobile home park prospectus). When someone buys a mobile home from an existing resident, the Act gives him or her the right to assume the seller's existing lease and the applicable prospectus. Fla. Stat. § 723.059 ("The purchaser of a mobile home who intends to become a resident of the mobile home park in accordance with this section has the right to assume the remainder of the term of any rental agreement then in effect between the mobile home park owner and the seller and may assume the seller's prospectus."). It is this right that gives rise to this appeal.

In 2019, the homeowner's association and seven residents of Schalamar Creek sued the owners and operators for violating RICO and the Americans withDisabilities Act. The residents alleged that the defendants acted as an "enterprise" for the "shared common purpose of defrauding" the residents through the "forced surrender" of the residents' rights to assume their sellers' prospectuses. They alleged that the defendants fraudulently induced prospective sellers whose properties were governed by an older, more favorable prospectus to adopt the P6 prospectus¹ using bribes, misrepresentations, and other incentives via the mail or wires, in violation of 18 U.S.C. sections 1341 and 1343. The residents alleged that: (1) they were injured by the defendants' actions because they were forced to pay a higher rental price than they would have paid under the pre-existing prospectus, and (2) they were deprived of their statutory right to assume their sellers' existing prospectus.

The homeowner's association also alleged that Murex Properties (Schalamar Creek's operator), Steven Adler (the president and chief executive officer of Murex Properties), and Northwestern Mutual (Schalamar Creek's indirect owner), violated the Americans with Disabilities Act because some of the common areas of Schalamar Creek were not accessible to disabled residents. In particular, they pointed to obstacles at the clubhouse that made it inaccessible to residents who were "elderly persons" with "mobility, balance, gait, vision, and hearing difficulties."

The defendants moved for summary judgment. As to the RICO claims, they argued that the residents did not have standing because they purchased properties already subject to the P6 prospectus, so the alleged scheme did not cause their injury. As to the Americans with Disabilities Act claim, they argued that the homeowner's association did not have associational standing because the residents would not have standing and the claim was not "germane" to the purpose of the homeowner's association. The defendants also argued, as to the Americans with Disabilities Act claim, that there was no summary judgment evidence that the proposed modifications to the clubhouse were "readily achievable."

The district court granted summary judgment for the owners and operators. As to the RICO claims, the district court found that the residents did not have standing to pursue their claims related to the P6 prospectus because "none of the [residents] [were] resale purchasers forced to accept the P6 [p]rospectus at closing." As to the Americans with Disabilities Act claim, the district court found that the homeowner's association did not have associational standing under Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). The district court explained that an association only has standing to sue on behalf of its members when (1) "its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own rights," (2) "the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose," and (3) "neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation ofindividual members in the lawsuit." The district court found that the homeowner's association had "not identified any members that would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right," and that the homeowner's association could not, as a matter of law, establish that the Americans with Disabilities Act claim was germane to its purpose.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

When a district court dismisses a claim for lack of standing, we review de novo the court's legal conclusions and its factual findings for clear error. ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 557 F.3d 1177, 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2009). "The party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] must present specific facts in support of its position and cannot rest upon allegations or denials in the pleadings." Martin v. Com. Union Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 235, 238 (11th Cir. 1991). "[W]e may affirm [a district court's] judgment on any ground that finds support in the record." Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

As they did before the district court, the residents argue that they have standing to bring their RICO claims because they were injured by the defendants' fraudulent scheme to induce sellers to adopt the P6 prospectus. As to the Americans with Disabilities Act claim, the homeowner's association argues that it hasassociational standing because: (1) members of the homeowner's association would individually have standing, and (2) advocating for the interests of disabled members is related to the homeowner's association's purpose.

RICO Claims

The residents argue that the district court erred in finding that they lacked standing to bring their RICO claims because the defendants' fraudulent scheme to convince sellers to adopt the P6 prospectus indirectly injured them. We begin with the elements of standing and the basis for the residents' RICO claims.

To establish Article III standing, a litigant "must prove (1) an injury in fact that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision." Jacobson v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). At the summary judgment stage, plaintiffs cannot rest on "mere allegations, but must set forth by affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts,' which for purposes of the ...