Schmitz v. Alamance-Burlington Bd. of Educ.

THERESA SCHMITZ, Plaintiff, v. ALAMANCE-BURLINGTON BOARD OF EDUCATION,d/b/a ALAMANCE-BURLINGTON SCHOOL SYSTEM, Defendant.

1:18CV910

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

February 26, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Before this court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 8), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff is a former elementary school teacher employed by Defendant, the Alamance-Burlington Board of Education. Plaintiff's complaint includes three counts: (1) associational discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) retaliation under the ADA; and (3) wrongful termination in violation of North Carolina Public Policy. (Complaint ("Compl.") (Doc. 5).) Defendant filed a Brief in Support of its Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 9), and Plaintiff filed a Response and then an Amended Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, (Docs. 13, 14). The issue is now ripe for ruling. For the reasons set forth herein, this court will grant Defendant's motion as to Counts Two and Three, but will deny the motion as to Count One.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are alleged in the complaint and taken as true.

A. Factual Background

Theresa Schmitz ("Plaintiff") is a resident of Wake County, North Carolina. (Compl. (Doc. 5) ¶ 3.) The Alamance-Burlington Board of Education ("Defendant") is a corporate body solely based and operating in Alamance County, North Carolina. (Id. ¶ 4.) Defendant employs more than 500 employees and is a covered entity under the ADA. (Id. ¶ 5.) This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(4) and 1367. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).

Defendant hired Plaintiff in late October 2016 to teach fourth grade at an elementary school in Snow Camp, North Carolina. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges that she performed satisfactorily throughout her first months, receiving positive feedback. (Id. ¶ 7.) In November 2016, her son was diagnosed with a brain tumor and required emergency surgery. (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff alleges she returned to work on November 29, 2016,after her son's surgery on November 23. (Id.) Plaintiff's son was diagnosed with neurofibromatosis Type 1 ("NF1"), a disease also known as von Recklinghausen's Disease. (Id. ¶ 9.) NF1 is a rare genetic disorder that causes tumors and growths in certain parts of the body; it negatively affected Plaintiff's son's ability to see, think, and learn. (Id.) Plaintiff's son was unable to walk or care for himself following surgery. (Id.) Plaintiff's son requires regular screenings and chemotherapy as a result of the disease. (Id.)

After returning to work on November 29, Plaintiff asked her Principal, Mark Gould, for permission to leave work at 2:30 p.m. each day to care for her son. (Id. ¶ 11.) Though classes ended at 2:30 p.m., teachers were expected to stay until 3:15 p.m. each day. (Id.) Principal Gould allowed Plaintiff to leave at 2:30 p.m. for one week, from November 29 until December 5. (Id.)

On or about December 5, Plaintiff took her son to the doctor to have his stitches removed; at that appointment, the doctor informed Plaintiff that her son would not be able to return to school for several weeks. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff emailed Principal Gould following that meeting, explaining the situation and asking for permission to leave at 2:30 p.m. for another week. (Id. ¶ 13.) Principal Gould responded that he could not talk about it at that moment because he was busy, butthat he would discuss it with Plaintiff the next day. (Id.) Plaintiff never heard from Principal Gould, but she still left 2:30 p.m. the next day, December 6. (Id. ¶ 14.) Later that day, Principal Gould emailed Plaintiff to ask why she had not been at bus duty at 2:30 p.m. that day. (Id.) "Plaintiff replied that she had explained her situation with her son and thought it was okay to leave at 2:30 p.m. When she received no response back, she became very concerned." (Id.) Plaintiff told Principal Gould that she would not be at work on December 7. (Id.)

On December 7, Plaintiff contacted Defendant's human resources ("HR") department to explain the situation with her son and to express concern that Principal Gould was "bullying her and retaliating against her for caring for her disabled son." (Id. ¶ 15.) The HR department responded that day and told Plaintiff she was not permitted to leave at 2:30 p.m., but instead would have to take leave in half-day increments. (Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges she asked HR why she could not work until 2:30 and have her pay prorated for the final forty-five minutes of the day, but she received no response. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that she was treated differently in this regard, because "other employees not associated with a disabled family member were regularly permitted to take sick leave inless-than-half-day increments on temporary bases." (Id. ¶ 30.)¹ Still, Plaintiff complied with HR's instruction and took leave in half-day increments from December 5 until December 16. (Id. ¶ 16.) After December 16, 2016, Plaintiff alleges she did not request, nor did she take any other time off to care for her son. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that Principal Gould began a course of retaliation against her starting in mid-December 2016 and carrying into February 2017. (Id. ¶ 17.) This alleged retaliation, which Plaintiff characterizes as "nitpicking," allegedly resulted in Plaintiff being held to a higher standard than other teachers. (Id. ¶ 18.) Plaintiff was placed on a performance improvement plan ("PIP") on or about March 14, 2017. (Id. ¶ 20.) Plaintiff alleges this PIP entailed a lot of busy work, was based on misstated facts about her performance, and was another example of how she was held to a higher standard than other teachers. (Id. ¶¶ 20-21.)

Nonetheless, Plaintiff successfully completed her PIP. (Id. ¶ 21.) Plaintiff also alleges she was performing satisfactorilyin April 2017; to support this contention, Plaintiff excerpts the following portion from one of her performance reviews:

[Ms. Schmitz] has very capably taught math, reading, social studies, and science.

Ms. Schmitz is to be commended for her professionalism, concern for her students, and quality of instruction. She plans well and works diligently at being organized. Her preparation each day is thorough and the results, evident. Her assignments and assessments are well-conceived, quickly corrected, and promptly returned. I have found Ms. Schmitz to be uniquely resourceful and adaptive.

Student respect is obvious in her classroom. She deeply cares about her students and they look to her for approval and guidance. Her approach to teaching has generated a warm and close rapport with her classes as well as our faculty.

Ms. Schmitz has the skills to be an outstanding teacher. . . .

(Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff alleges that the report was written at some point during April 2017. (Id.)

Despite those positive developments, on May 12, 2017, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with Principal Gould and HR. (Id. ¶ 23.) Waiting for her in the meeting was a pre-drafted letter of resignation for her to sign, effective at the end of the school year. (Id.) Plaintiff was told to sign the letter, or she would be "put on a list she did not want to be on." (Id.) Plaintiff alleges this list was "presumably a list of terminated employees or employees who were not eligible for hire" withinNorth Carolina's school systems. (Id.) Plaintiff was told she had to sign and "turn in" the letter. (Id.) Plaintiff does not expressly allege that she signed the letter, but she does allege that she was "forced to resign," (id. ¶ 30), and that she was "constructively terminated," (id. ¶ 24).

Plaintiff alleges she was retaliated against in the form of changes to her schedule and responsibilities, being placed on a PIP, being forced to resign, and other, smaller acts. (Id. ¶ 30.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a timely Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and received a right-to-sue letter on July 14, 2018, or later. (Compl. (Doc. 5) ¶ 26.) Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court of Guilford County, North Carolina, on October 5, 2018. (Id. at 1.) The complaint contains three counts. First, Plaintiff claims she was discriminated against because of her association with her disabled son. (Id. ¶¶ 27-31.) Plaintiff alleges that the discriminatory acts included disparate treatment and termination "because of anticipated future leave requirements." (Id. ¶ 30.) Second, Defendant claims she was retaliated against for opposing activity she reasonably believed to be in violation of the ADA. (Id. ¶¶ 33-37.) Third and finally, Plaintiff brings a state lawclaim, alleging that her termination was in contravention of the public policy of North Carolina as stated in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 143-422.2, 95-28.1A, and 115C-302.1, as well as 16 N.C. Admin. Code § 6C.0402. (Id. ¶¶ 38-42.)

Defendant timely removed the complaint to this court on October 30, 2018. (Petition for Removal (Doc. 1).) Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 8), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, (Doc. 8), as well as a supporting brief. (Def.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Br.") (Doc. 9).) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, (Doc. 13), and then quickly filed an amended response. (Am. Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Am. Resp.") (Doc. 14).) Defendant did not file a reply.²

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face if "the plaintiff pleads...