Schneider v. Hanasab

177 A.D.3d 923

110 N.Y.S.3d 561 (Mem)

Beth SCHNEIDER, etc., Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.Haroon HANASAB, Defendant-Respondent,Town of North Hempstead, Appellant, et al., Defendants.

2018–13167

Index No. 608726/16

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—September 26, 2019

November 20, 2019

Leonard G. Kapsalis, Town Attorney, Manhasset, N.Y. (Amanda Abata and Samantha Rose Flores of counsel), for appellant.

Alpert, Slobin & Rubenstein, LLP (Lisa M. Comeau, Garden City, NY, of counsel), for plaintiff-respondent.

Picciano & Scahill, P.C., Bethpage, N.Y. (Keri A. Wehrheim of counsel), for defendant-respondent.

ALAN D. SCHEINKMAN, P.J., HECTOR D. LASALLE, VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with one bill of costs.

On June 6, 2016, Barry Schneider (hereinafter the decedent), was riding a motorized scooter when he was struck by a vehicle being driven by the defendant Haroon Hanasab at the intersection of Bayview Avenue and Shore Park Road in North Hempstead. As a result of the accident, the decedent sustained injuries which ultimately caused his death.

The plaintiff, the executrix of the decedent's estate, commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries and wrongful death against, among others, the Town of North Hempstead and Hanasab. The plaintiff alleged, inter alia, (1) that Hanasab was negligent in failing to stop at the stop sign on Shore Park Road, and (2) that the Town was negligent in failing to maintain the vegetation in the median island on Shore Park Road, and in placing a stop sign and stop line in such a position that it created a dangerous condition. The Town moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it. The Supreme Court, in effect, denied that branch of the Town's motion, and the Town appeals.

"There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident" ( Cox v. Nunez , 23 A.D.3d 427, 427, 805 N.Y.S.2d 604 ). "[W]here varying inferences as to causation are possible, resolution of the issue of proximate cause is a question for the jury" ( Poveromo v. Town of Cortlandt , 127 A.D.3d 835, 838, 6 N.Y.S.3d 617 ; see Ernest v. Red Cr. Cent. School Dist. , 93 N.Y.2d 664, 674, 695 N.Y.S.2d 531, 717 N.E.2d 690 ). Here, the Town's submissions failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether its alleged negligence in its maintenance of the vegetation in the median island and in its placement of the stop sign and stop line, was a proximate cause of the accident (see Langer v. Xenias , 134 A.D.3d 906, 908, 23 N.Y.S.3d 261 ; Poveromo v. Town of Cortlandt , 127 A.D.3d at 838, 6 N.Y.S.3d 617 ).

Contrary to the Town's contention, it failed to establish its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the basis of qualified governmental immunity. While a municipality will generally be accorded qualified immunity from liability arising out of its planning decisions (see ...