Schneider v. Montegari

1

JOSEPH SCHNEIDER, Petitioner, v. ALFRED MONTEGARI, Acting Superintendent, Respondent.

No. 22-CV-550 (HG)

United States District Court, E.D. New York

September 30, 2022

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

HECTOR GONZALEZ, United States District Judge:

Joseph Schneider (“Petitioner”) pled guilty in Kings County Supreme Court to enterprise corruption, promoting gambling in the first-degree, possession of gambling records in the first degree, and conspiracy in the fifth degree. ECF No. 1 at 3.^[1] Petitioner was sentenced to a concurrent term of one to three years of imprisonment for nineteen counts, and a one-year term of imprisonment for one count. Petitioner filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus (“Petition”) claiming violations of his constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment and Articles Four and Six of the United States Constitution. Id at 5. He asks this Court to set aside his conviction and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 1. For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

Between 2014 and 2016 Petitioner and other individuals participated in a large-scale nationwide gambling operation known as the “Mitchnick Enterprise,” which involved illegal operations in Kings County and other locations throughout the country. ECF No. 1-4 at 35. Much of the evidence against Petitioner stemmed from cellular telephone calls and electronic messages that law enforcement intercepted pursuant to eavesdropping warrants. Petitioner and seven other co-defendants were charged with one count of Enterprise Corruption (N.Y. Penal Law § 460.20(1)(a)), fifty-two counts of Promoting Gambling in the First Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 225.20(1)), and one count of Conspiracy in the Fifth Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 105.05(1)). Id at 2.

Petitioner moved to suppress all evidence the prosecution had obtained from the eavesdropping warrants and dismiss the Enterprise Corruption charge against him. ECF No 113; ECF No. 1-14. Petitioner argued that the eavesdropping warrants were improper because Petitioner was a California resident who had never set foot in New York, so the court did not have the authority to issue an eavesdropping warrant against him. ECF No. 1-14 at 11. Petitioner further argued that his due process rights, as well as principles of state sovereignty were violated because he was a California resident-the State of California does not permit eavesdropping warrants for gambling offenses, and federal law does not allow eavesdropping warrants against out-of-state residents. Id. at 13-22. Petitioner finally argued that the New York statute authorizing eavesdropping warrants, (N.Y. Crim Proc. Law § 700), did not permit eavesdropping warrants on out-of-state residents. Id. at 22-28.

The Kings County Supreme Court (“trial court”) denied Petitioner's motion to suppress. ECF No. 1-15 at 3. The trial court held that because the eavesdropping warrant was executed in Kings County, it had the jurisdiction to issue the warrant. Id. Based upon the reading of the statute, the trial court held that an eavesdropping warrant under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 700 is “executed” when a law enforcement officer intentionally overhears a telephonic or telegraphic communication which, in this instance, occurred in Kings County.^[2] Id. at 4. The trial court found that the statute does not improperly give law enforcement nationwide jurisdiction, as Petitioner argued, because law enforcement must demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the eavesdropping warrant and Kings County. Id. at 5.

The trial court cited to both New York and federal law to support its decision. See, e.g., People v. DeLaCruz, 593 N.Y.S.2d 167, 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (“‘[T]o execute' an eavesdropping warrant intercepting a telephone conversation is to order the intentional overhearing or recording of the human voice as it is transferred through the use of wire, cable, or other like communication.”); People v. Perez, 848 N.Y.S.2d 525, 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (“[A]n eavesdropping warrant is ‘executed' when and where telephonic communications are intercepted or electronic communications are acquired.”); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that “interception” occurred at both the site of the target phone and where the communication was first heard); United States v. Kazarian, No. 10-CR-895, 2012 WL 1810214, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 18, 2012) (holding that a federal court has the authority to authorize a wiretap if the court is located where “the to-be-tapped telephone is located” or where “the redirected contents are first heard”). The trial court did not find the fact that California does not permit eavesdropping warrants for gambling crimes to be a valid defense because: (i) all the crimes which were subject to the eavesdropping warrant at issue were alleged to have been committed in Kings County, and (ii) the warrant was executed in Kings County, not in California. Id. at 6.

On March 6, 2018, Petitioner pled guilty to seventeen counts of Promoting Gambling in the First Degree (N.Y. Penal Law §225.10(1)), one count each of Enterprise Corruption (N.Y. Penal Law §460.20(1)(a)), Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 225.20(1)), and Conspiracy in the Fifth Degree (N.Y. Penal Law §105.05(1)). ECF No. 1 at 3. On May 30, 2018, Petitioner was sentenced to a concurrent prison term of one to three years for each of the Promoting Gambling in the First Degree charges (N.Y. Penal Law §225.10(1)), the Enterprise Corruption charge (N.Y. Penal Law §460.20(1)(a)), and Possession of Gambling Records in the First Degree (N.Y. Penal Law § 225.20(1)) as well as one year for the Conspiracy in the Fifth Degree charge (N.Y. Penal Law §105.05(1)). Id. at 2

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Appellate Division, Second Department (“Appellate Division”). Petitioner raised four claims, two of which now serve as grounds for habeas relief. ECF. No. 1-4. The Appellate Division upheld the judgment of conviction on October 16, 2019, stating that the trial court had the jurisdiction to issue eavesdropping warrants to intercept communications made outside New York State for the purpose of investigating crimes in New York and such warrants do not constitute an extraterritorial application of state law. See People v. Schneider, 112 N.Y.S.3d 248, 250-51 (N.Y.App.Div. 2019). The Appellate Division agreed with the trial court's analysis that the eavesdropping warrants were validly executed in Kings County because law enforcement intercepted the communications in Kings County. Id.; see also N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 700.05(4), 700.05(3)(a), 700.35(1).

Petitioner sought leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court: (i) erred and acted beyond the scope of its authority when it issued eavesdropping warrants for a California resident who had not committed crimes in New York, and, (ii) violated the Due Process Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Separate Sovereigns Doctrine. ECF No. 1-8. On January 5, 2020, leave was granted. See People v. Schneider, 141 N.E.3d 467 (N.Y. 2020). On June 3, 2021, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. See People v. Schneider, 173 N.E.3d 61, 203 (N.Y. 2021). The Court of Appeals held the eavesdropping warrants were executed in the geographical jurisdiction where law enforcement officers intercepted the communications, and that the warrants were executed within the trial court's judicial district. Id. The Court of Appeals interpreted N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §700, stating that “the statute makes plain that a warrant is ‘executed' at the time when and at the location where a law enforcement officer intentionally records or overhears telephonic communications and accesses electronic communication targeted by the warrant.” Id. at 196. The Court of Appeals asserted that it is not the communication carriers who execute the warrant. Id. at 199 (“An eavesdropping order may direct communications service providers to furnish the applicant information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the interception ....”) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals also held that their interpretation was in line with federal court precedent that a district court has jurisdiction to issue an eavesdropping warrant under federal eavesdropping statutes if the point of interception is located within the territorial boundaries of the district court issuing the warrant (the “listening post rule”).^[3] Id. at 200-01, 203; see also Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 136; United States v. Jackson, 849 F.3d 540, 551-52 (3d. Cir. 2017). The Court of Appeals further held that Petitioner's claim that the warrants violated his Constitutional rights as a California resident were without merit. Id. at 203.

Petitioner applied to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. On October 12, 2021, the application was denied. Schneider v. New York, 142 S.Ct. 344 (2021). Petitioner now seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that: (i) Petitioner's due process rights were violated when the Kings County Supreme Court judge issued an extraterritorial wiretap order, and (ii) the Kings County Supreme Court violated the Supremacy Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Separate Sovereigns Doctrine when it authorized the eavesdropping warrant because the warrant would not have been permitted under California's state statutes for eavesdropping. ECF No. 1-1 at 1, 7, 16.^[4]

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Deferential Review Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA” or “Act”)

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