Schneider v. State

2015 Ark. 152

459 S.W.3d 296

Jordan Arie Schneider, Appellant

v.State of Arkansas, Appellee

No. CR–14–1104

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Opinion Delivered April 9, 2015

Norwood & Norwood, P.A., by: Alison Lee and Doug Norwood, Rogers, for appellant.

Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

Opinion

ROBIN F. WYNNE, Associate Justice

Jordan Arie Schneider appeals from his convictions on charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. He argues that the circuit court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized following a stop of his vehicle that he claimed was illegal. Our court of appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court. Schneider v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 711, 452 S.W.3d 601. Appellant petitioned this court for review, which was granted. When we grant a petition for review, we treat the appeal as if it had been originally filed in this court. Fowler v. State, 2010 Ark. 431, 371 S.W.3d 677. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 1–2(e) (2014). We reverse and remand the circuit court's sentencing order and vacate the opinion of the court of appeals.

Appellant pled guilty to charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia in the Benton County District Court. The charges arose from a traffic stop of appellant's vehicle on November 24, 2011. Appellant appealed to the Benton County Circuit Court. In the circuit court, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by police, alleging that the stop of his vehicle was unlawful.

At the suppression hearing, Dustin Wiens with the Rogers Police Department testified that he was at the intersection of North Second Street and Wood Street at approximately 1:00 a.m. on November 24, 2011, when appellant drove past him. He pulled behind appellant and ran the vehicle's license plate. The license plate returned as being registered to a blue 1992 Chevrolet Camaro. Officer Wiens testified that he noticed that the car was red when it passed him and saw that the bumper was black while he was following it. Based solely on the color discrepancy, Officer Wiens stopped the vehicle and made contact with appellant. He testified that he performed the stop in order to investigate further, check the vehicle-identification number, and determine whether the vehicle had been painted or was stolen. Appellant introduced photographs of the vehicle that Officer Wiens described as showing a car with a red door, black bumper, and other parts that were painted blue. Officer Wiens denied seeing any blue on the car before he stopped it. He repeated on cross-examination that the color of the vehicle was the only reason that he initiated the traffic stop.

The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 24.3.¹ He was sentenced to ten days in jail, with seven days suspended, and assessed fines, fees, and court costs on the charge of possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced to ten days in jail, with all ten days suspended, and assessed fines, fees, and costs on the charge of possession of drug paraphernalia. This appeal followed.

When reviewing a circuit court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court conducts a de novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, giving due weight to the inferences drawn by the trial court. Pickering v. State, 2012 Ark. 280, 412 S.W.3d 143. A finding is clearly erroneous, even if there is evidence to support it, when the appellate court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We defer to the circuit court's superior position in determining the credibility of the witnesses and resolving any conflicts in the testimony. Id.

Appellant argues that a discrepancy between the color of a vehicle and the color listed on the registration, standing alone, is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity necessary to justify the stop of his vehicle by Officer Wiens. Pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1 (2014),

[a] law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a misdemeanor involving danger or forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such action is reasonably necessary either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or to determine the lawfulness of his conduct.

“Reasonable suspicion” is defined as a suspicion based on facts or circumstances which of themselves do not give rise to the probable cause requisite to justify a lawful arrest, but which give rise to more than a bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is reasonable as opposed to an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion. Ark. R.Crim. P. 2.1 (2014). Whether there is reasonable suspicion depends upon whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police have “specific, particularized, and articulable reasons indicating that the person may be involved in criminal activity.” Menne v. State, 2012 Ark. 37, at 6, 386 S.W.3d 451, 455 (quoting Malone v. State, 364 Ark. 256, 263, 217 S.W.3d 810, 814 (2005) ).

In making his argument, appellant urges this court to adopt the reasoning utilized by a district of the Florida Court of Appeals in Van Teamer v. State, 108 So.3d 664 (Fla.App.Dist.2013). In Van Teamer, the Florida appellate court held that a discrepancy between the color of a vehicle and the color listed on the registration, standing alone, does not justify a traffic stop. Appellant also directs this court to the decision in United States v. Uribe, 709 F.3d 646 (7th Cir.2013), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that no reasonable suspicion of vehicle theft attached to a completely lawful color discrepancy in the absence of any evidence suggesting otherwise.

In arguing that the decision of the circuit court should be affirmed because the color discrepancy gave rise to a reasonable suspicion...