Schofield v. Rafley, Inc.

305 A.3d 652

222 Conn.App. 448

Lydia SCHOFIELD

v.RAFLEY, INC., et al.

(AC 45220)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued September 18, 2023

Officially Released November 21, 2023

Mathew Olkin, Willimantic, for the appellant (substitute plaintiff).

Peter J. Murphy, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher E. Engler, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

Elgo, Suarez and Seeley, Js.

ELGO, J.

[1] ₄₅₀This action sounding in breach of contract and employment discrimination follows a prior action commenced in 2017 between the same parties that involved similar claims (2017 action). See Schofield v. Rafley, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-17-6078256-S, 2020 WL 3441246 (May 14, 2020). The substitute plaintiff, Andrea Sadler, executor of the estate of Lydia Schofield (decedent),¹ now appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the ₄₅₁defendants, Rafley, Inc. (Rafley), Joseph Mason, and Karen Mason.² On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) dismissed the decedent’s employment discrimination count as untimely and (2) granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Rafley on the breach of contract count.³ We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. For approximately two decades, the decedent owned and operated an automobile maintenance and repair shop in Windsor Locks known as Chief Automotive. At all relevant times, Joseph Mason and Karen Mason were principals of Rafley, a Connecticut business that operated automobile maintenance and repair shops in Windsor Locks and Enfield. In early 2014, Joseph Mason and Karen Mason met with the decedent to discuss her potential employment with Rafley due to the pending closure of Chief Automotive. At a subsequent meeting on March 15, 2014, Joseph Mason and Karen Mason presented the decedent with a written employment agreement, which the decedent signed on that date. On March 31, 2014, the decedent began her employment with Rafley and received a copy of Rafley’s ₄₅₂employee handbook. Both the written employment agreement and the employee handbook stated that the decedent was an at-will employee.

[2–4] On July 15, 2016, the decedent filed an employment discrimination complaint (2016 complaint) against Rafley with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (commission). On February 14, 2017, the commission issued a release of jurisdiction over that complaint. On May 9, 2017, the decedent commenced the 2017 action against the defendants. In her operative complaint in that action, the decedent alleged, inter alia, employment discrimination on the basis of the decedent’s "gender identity or expression" and breach of contract. With respect to the latter, the decedent alleged that the defendants had breached an oral employment agreement entered into by the parties.⁴ In response, the defendants filed an answer and several special defenses.⁵ In particular, the defendants alleged, as a special defense to the breach of contract count, that, "[o]n or about March 15, 2014, the [decedent] and [Rafley] entered into a written employment agreement that contained all essential terms and conditions of employment" and that the decedent had "signed this written employment agreement voluntarily and of her own free will." In her reply, the decedent admitted the truth of those allegations.⁶ A certificate of closed pleadings was filed on January 8, 2018.

₄₅₃Following the commencement of the 2017 action, the decedent remained in the employ of Rafley for more than one year. On March 22, 2018, Rafley suspended the decedent "for having accidentally damaged a vehicle she had been working on." Rafley thereafter terminated the decedent’s employment on May 14, 2018, after she allegedly "forgot to fully tighten the lug nuts on [a wheel] of the vehicle she was working on." In response, the decedent filed another complaint with the commission on May 27, 2018 (2018 complaint), in which she alleged that her employment had been wrongfully terminated in retaliation for bringing the 2017 action. On November 5, 2018, the commission issued a release of jurisdiction over the 2018 complaint.

On November 20, 2018, the decedent requested leave from the court in the 2017 action to file an amended complaint for the purpose of adding "an additional count" of employment discrimination based on the defendants’ purported retaliatory discharge of the decedent due to the filing of the 2017 action, arguing that such a claim was "reasonably related to the allegations of the operative complaint …." The defendants filed an objection to that request, in which they argued that it was untimely and prejudicial, as the discovery period had closed and a motion for summary judgment currently was pending before the court. By order dated December 20, 2018, the court sustained that objection, thereby denying the decedent’s request to amend her complaint.⁷ The decedent elect- ed not to challenge the propriety of that determination by way of appeal.

₄₅₄A trial on the 2017 action was held over the course of six days in the summer of 2019. As the court noted in its memorandum of decision, "at the time of final argument on the briefs … the [decedent] conceded that [the employment discrimination count] should be dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence." With respect to the breach of contract count, the court concluded that, "based on all the admissible evidence presented at trial, the court rejects the [decedent’s] claim that she had an oral agreement with the defendants that predated the written agreement of March 15, 2014." The court, therefore, rendered judgment in favor of the defendants on all counts of the decedent’s complaint. The decedent did not appeal from that judgment.

On May 23, 2019, while the 2017 action was pending, the decedent commenced the present action against the same three defendants. In her operative complaint, the decedent alleged, inter alia, breach of contract on the part of Rafley and employment discrimination against all defendants.⁸ In response, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the employment discrimination count as untimely. By memorandum of decision dated October 6, 2020, the court granted that motion. The defendants then filed an answer and special defenses to the operative complaint, in which they alleged that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the decedent’s breach of contract claim.

On May 21, 2021, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment that was accompanied by a memorandum of law and several exhibits, including copies of the written employment agreement, Rafley’s employee ₄₅₅handbook, the decedent’s signed acknowledgement of her receipt of that handbook, and the court’s May 14, 2020 memorandum of decision in the 2017 action. Although the decedent filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment, she did not submit an affidavit or any documentary evidence. The court heard argument from the parties on September 20, 2021, and thereafter issued a memorandum of decision in which it concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to any of the remaining claims. The court thus rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, and this appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly dismissed the employment discrimination count of the complaint as untimely. We disagree.

[5, 6] Whether a party’s claim is barred by a statute of limitations is a question of law over which our review is plenary. See Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Cooperman, 289 Conn. 383, 407–408, 957 A.2d 836 (2008); Sean O'Kane A.I.A. Architect, P.C. v. Puljic, 148 Conn. App. 728, 734, 87 A.3d 1124 (2014). The motion to dismiss in the present case was predicated on the decedent’s failure to comply with the mandate of General Statutes § 46a-101 (e), which requires any person who has obtained a release of jurisdiction from the commission to commence an action in the Superior Court "not later than ninety days after the date of the receipt of the release from the commission." As this court recently observed, § 46a-101 (e) "is a mandatory time limita- tion" with which a plaintiff must comply. Sokolovsky v. Mulholland, 213 Conn. App. 128, 146, 277 A.3d 138 (2022).

It is undisputed that the decedent commenced the present action on May 23, 2019, more than six months after she received a release of jurisdiction over the 2018 ₄₅₆complaint from the commission. The present action, therefore, is untimely under § 46a-101 (e). The plaintiff does not suggest otherwise in this appeal.

[7] Instead, the plaintiff argues that the "reasonably related" exception applies under the facts of the present case, arguing that her claim of retaliatory termination was reasonably related to the substance of the 2016 complaint. Her contention reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of that exception.

[8] As our Supreme Court has explained, General Statutes § 46a-100 "creates a cause of action in the Superior Court" for claims alleging a discriminatory employment practice. Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 400, 968 A.2d 416 (2009). Pursuant to § 46a-101 (a), "[n]o action may be brought in accordance with [§] 46a-100 unless the complainant has received a release from the commission in accordance with the provisions of this section." Accordingly, parties alleging a discriminatory employment practice are statutorily obligated to exhaust their administrative remedies before the commission and secure a release therefrom as a prerequisite to the commencement of an action in the Superior Court.

[9–12] The reasonably related doctrine invoked by the plaintiff is an exception to the exhaustion requirement. See Williams v. New York City Housing Authority, 458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006); Ware v. State, 118 Conn. App. 65, 83, 983 A.2d 853 (2009). When applicable, it excuses a party’s failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. As the United States Court of Appeals for the...