Schreckenbach v. Tenaris Coiled Tubes, LLC, CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:11-cv-4065

TONY SCHRECKENBACH, Plaintiff

v.TENARIS COILED TUBES, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:11-cv-4065

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

SIGNED: January 16, 2013

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

("Defendant's Motion") (Doc. No. 24) and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc No. 27). After considering both Motions, all responses and replies, and the applicable law, the Court concludes that Defendant's Motion should be GRANTED and Plaintiff's Motion to Strike should be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Tony Schreckenbach ("Plaintiff" or "Schreckenbach") brings this suit for unpaid overtime wages earned by the Plaintiff when he worked for the Defendant Tenaris Coiled Tubes, LLC ("Defendant" or "Tenaris"). Plaintiff's claims arise under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). 29 U.S.C. §201 et. seq. ¶ 2.) Defendant manufactures coiled tubing in a range of grades and sizes to be used in onshore and offshore drilling environments. (Doc. No. 1 [Amended Complaint], ¶ 14.) Tenaris manufactures coiled tubing that is a continuous length of pipe that is wound on a spool for transportationpurposes (Doc. No. 24-1 [Affidavit of Felix Diaz], ¶ 3.) After the tubing is manufactured in Tenaris' Mill Department, it is wound onto a spool by the Service Department. (Id. at ¶ 4.) The Service Department runs twenty-four hours per day, typically five days a week (Id. at ¶ 5.) The hourly employees in the Service Department work twelve hour shifts (from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., or from 6 p.m. to 6 a.m.) The Service Manager, the Assistant Service Manager, and Service Coordinator are the only salaried employees in the Service Department. The Service Manager supervises a salaried Assistant Service Manager, who also works during the day, and a salaried Service Coordinator (Schreckenbach), who worked at night. (Id. at ¶ 6.)

Defendant employed Plaintiff from March 2005 until June 30, 2011. During his night shift positions, Plaintiff was employed as Shift Leader II, Production Supervisor, and Night Service Coordinator. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 16; see also Doc. No. 24-5, at 15 [Profile for Tony Schreckenbach].) Although Schreckenbach's titles changed during his time at Tenaris, his duties or responsibilities as the manager for the night shift did not change. (Tony Schreckenbach Dep. 54:9-14, October 23, 2012.) While Schreckenbach was on the night shift, he was supervised by Rodney Bond, John Carroll, and after 2008, Felix Diaz. (Schreckenbach Dep. 51:7-25-26:5.) During most of the time that Plaintiff worked on the night shift, he was supervised by Felix Diaz. (Doc. No. 25-1, ¶ 4.) The salaried employees, including Diaz and Schreckenbach, did not work twelve hour shifts, but worked variable hours depending on the demand of the job. (Id. at ¶ 6.) Schreckenbach typically arrived at the plant anywhere between 3 p.m. in the afternoon and 8 p.m. in the evening, and left work between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m in the morning." (Doc. No. 24-6—24-29 [Gate Log].)

Plaintiff moved to the day shift in October 2010, and worked for the Production and Planning Department under James Hyde. (Doc. No. 25-2, ¶ 16.) During the first three months on the day shift, Plaintiff worked on a scheduling program for the service department, which consisted of his entering information into an excel document. (James Hyde Dep. 19:5-16, November 3, 2012; Doc. No. 25-2, ¶ 16.) Plaintiff later undertook a range of other duties on the day shift, including inventory and distribution of strip inventory and string designs. (Hyde Dep. 14:4-21.) Plaintiff also spent one month in 2011 working with outside vendors, scheduling trucks to bring material to the plant. (Id. 15:9-16.)

Plaintiff alleges that he routinely worked more than forty hours per week for Defendant, but Defendant did not pay Plaintiff for his hours of work in excess of forty at one and a half times his regular rate, as required by FLSA for non-exempt employees. 29 U.S.C.A. § 207 (2)(c) (¶ 22). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant misclassified him as an exempt employee and he seeks to recover overtime. Plaintiff claims that Defendant knowingly, willingly, and/or with reckless disregard carried out its illegal pattern or practice regarding overtime compensation. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, back pay, liquidated damages, attorney's fees, and taxable costs of court pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for Defendant's willful failure to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff in the course of his employment with the Defendant.

Defendant is not moving for summary judgment for the entire time that Plaintiff was on the job. Rather, Defendant believes exemptions to FLSA apply during the entirety of the night shift, during the first three months of Plaintiff's day shift, after Schreckenbach was transferred to the Production and Planning Department, and duringthe one-month period in 2011 when Schreckenbach was responsible for scheduling the delivery of materials to the plant.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted where a party establishes that there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law entitles the party to judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no actual dispute as to any material fact of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), Willis v. Roche Biomed. Lab., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

Furthermore, the summary judgment standard "provides that the mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; Rule 56 requires that the fact dispute be genuine and material." Willis, 61 F.3d at 315. First, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law are material." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Second, a dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). While all justifiable inferences should be drawn in the nonmovant's favor, conclusory affidavits will not suffice to create or negate a genuine issue of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991); Shaffer v. Williams, 794 F.2d 1030, 1033 (5th Circ. 1986).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike

Before considering the merits of Defendant's motion, the Court considers Plaintiff's Objections and Motion to Strike Defendant's Summary Judgment Evidence. Plaintiff objects to paragraph 7, 10, and 13 of Felix Diaz's declaration, and paragraph 5 of Laura Vandyk's declaration. The Court finds the paragraphs to be competent summary judgment evidence, and thus overrules Plaintiff's objections and denies his Motion to Strike.

Plaintiff objects that in paragraph 7 Felix Diaz states that Schreckenbach "did not work a strict twelve hour shift like the hourly employees." (Doc. No. 24-2, ¶ 7.) Plaintiff argues that, because Diaz did not work the same shift as Schreckenbach, he was not in a position to see the hours that Schreckenbach worked. Diaz does not purport to have personal knowledge of the hours Schreckenbach worked because he did not monitor his hours. (Doc. No. 24-2, ¶ 7.) However, Diaz did not need to work the same shift to know that Schreckenbach's job did not require a strict twelve hour shift. Diaz's declaration makes it clear that he was aware the Service Manager, Assistant Service Manager, and night Service Coordinator did not work twelve-hour shifts like the hourly employees. Id. Diaz anticipated Schreckenbach to work fewer hours if his workload was light, and expected to stay longer if the work required it. Id at ¶7. Furthermore, Schreckenbach does not contest that he worked varying hours. For example, Plaintiff introduces evidence in his Response to the Defendant's Motion that he worked from 4:00 to 5:00 p.m. until midnight, depending on the day. (Gustavo Tapia Dep. 26:3-9, October 11, 2012.) Additionally, Defendant presents the security gate records to establish Schreckenbach's varying work hours. (Doc. No. 24-6 to 29.) Because Diaz had sufficient personal knowledge of Schreckenbach's job to conclude he worked varying hours, and becausethere is no dispute that Schreckenbach did not work a strict twelve hour shift, the Court overrules Plaintiff's objection to this paragraph.

Plaintiff next objects to paragraph 10 of Diaz's declaration, where Diaz states that the spooling schedule "frequently has to be adjusted during the night shift due to unforeseen developments, such as urgent customer orders received during the night or production line malfunctions." (Doc. No. 24-2, ¶ 10.) Once again, Plaintiff objects that Diaz was not present during the night shift and thus not able to witness changes being made to the spooling schedule. However, Schreckenbach's own declaration is that he communicated with Diaz about making changes to the spooling scheduling during the night. (Doc. No. 25-2, ¶ 9.) Additionally, Diaz would create the spooling schedule before the start of every night shift, and if any issues came up, Schreckenbach would have to wait for Diaz to come back in the morning (Id. at ¶ 9; Doc. No. 24-2, at ¶ 10.) Based on this evidence, the Court finds Diaz had personal knowledge of the spooling schedule, and Plaintiff's objection is overruled.

Plaintiff also objects to paragraph 13, where Diaz states his knowledge of the discipline Schreckenbach administered to other employees. But Schreckenbach's declaration confirms that he had communications with Diaz about corrective actions that Schreckenbach took on the night shift, and it was Diaz who wrote down these reprimands. (Doc. No. 25-2, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's objection on this point is overruled as well.

Finally, Plaintiff objects to a portion of Laura Vandyke's declaration. Vandyk is the Compensation Manager for Tenaris, and oversees compensation and benefits. (...