Schuyler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.

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KRISTEN SCHUYLER, Plaintiff, v. SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA, Defendant.

No. 20-cv-10905 (RA)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 7, 2023

OPINION & ORDER

RONNIE ABRAMS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Kristen Schuyler brings this action against Defendant Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (“Sun Life”) for long-term disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, Sun Life's motion is granted and Schuyler's motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Beginning in May 2011, Schuyler was employed at Benco Dental Supply Company (“Benco Dental”) as a Territory Sales Representative. Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 21. During the relevant time frame, Benco Dental provided full-time employees with Long Term Disability (“LTD”) insurance coverage under the Benco Dental Supply Company Long Term Disability Plan (the “LTD Plan”). Id. ¶ 5. The LTD Plan is an “employee welfare benefit plan” within the definition of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). Id. ¶ 7. To determine eligibility for LTD benefits, the LTD Plan defined “Totally Disabled” as someone who was “unable to perform one or more of the Material and Substantial Duties of [their] Regular Occupation” for the defined period of time. Id. ¶ 14. Sun Life was the insurer, claim fiduciary, and claims administrator of the LTD Plan. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8-9.

On September 16, 2015, when Schuyler was on a trip in Nashville Tennessee, she fell down a flight of stairs and sustained traumatic brain injuries. Id. ¶¶ 25, 33. She was admitted to the hospital and discharged three days later. Id. ¶¶ 27, 34. Over the next four years, Schuyler sought treatment from multiple doctors and underwent speech therapy, physical therapy, hyperbaric oxygen therapy, and other cognitive therapies in an effort to improve her symptoms. Id. ¶¶ 37-99. Schuyler claims that as of May 23, 2019, she was still suffering from “confusion, difficulty with concentration, memory problems, mental and physical fatigue sleep problems, sensitivity to noise, and sensitivity to light.” Id. ¶ 99. Between September 2015 and May 2019, Schuyler nonetheless continued to work as a Territory Sales Representative at Benco Dental. Def. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 12-18. She last worked at Benco Dental on May 22, 2019, the date she claims marked the “beginning of her disability.” Id.; see also Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶ 159. According to Schuyler, she went on a six-month medical leave “[s]tarting the next day . . . at the direction of my doctors.” Schuyler Aff. ¶ 78. Her “employment relationship with Benco ended at the end of her six-month medical leave period.”^[1] Pl. Response to Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 18.

On May 31, 2019, Schuyler submitted a claim for LTD benefits. Sun Life denied the claim on October 17, 2019, stating, in part that the “information [Sun Life] received was not sufficient to demonstrate that Schuyler is totally disabled, as defined in the group policy.” Id. ¶ 163. On January 14, 2020, Schuyler appealed the denial through an attorney. Sun Life denied the appeal on August 31, 2020. Id. ¶¶ 166, 170.

On December 12, 2019-between the denial of her LTD benefits and her appeal-Schuyler entered into a Separation Agreement and Release with Benco Dental (the “Agreement”). Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 67; see ECF No. 48, Ex. A (“SA”). The Agreement states the following: “Employee of her/his own free will, voluntarily releases . . . any and all known and unknown actions . . . arising out of or in any way connected with Employee's employment with Benco . . . including, but not limited to, any alleged violation of . . . the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (‘ERISA').” SA ¶ 9.

On December 24, 2020, Schuyler filed this action under ERISA challenging the denial of her LTD benefits. The parties now cross-move for summary judgment.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A fact is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” WWBITV, Inc. v. Vill. of Rouses Point, 589 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the Court must view all facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001).

DISCUSSION

Sun Life argues that Schuyler waived any legal claims she may have had under ERISA through the Separation Agreement she signed with Benco Dental. The Court agrees.

An individual may contractually waive legal claims under ERISA as long as the waiver was “knowing and voluntary.” Laniok v. Advisory Comm. of Brainerd Mfg. Co. Pension Plan, 935 F.2d 1360, 1367 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Finz v. Schlesinger, 957 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1992); Sharkey v. Ultramar Energy Ltd., 70 F.3d 226, 231 (2d Cir. 1995). “The validity of an individual's waiver of [ERISA] benefits is subject to closer scrutiny than his or her waiver of general contract claims,” and the Second Circuit has “required close inspection of the totality of circumstances surrounding a waiver of ERISA benefits.” Finz, 957 F.2d at 81. Accordingly, in Laniok, the Second Circuit identified six factors that a court should consider when determining if a plaintiff waived her ERISA claims knowingly and voluntarily:

1) the plaintiff's education and business experience, 2) the amount of time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement before signing it, 3) the role of [the] plaintiff in deciding the terms of the agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted with an attorney, as well as whether an employer encouraged the employee to consult an attorney and whether the employee had a fair opportunity to do so[,] and 6) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceeds employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law.

Laniok, 935 F.2d at 1368 (quoting Bormann v AT&T Commc'ns, Inc., 875 F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 1989) (applying the same six factors to waiver of an Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim)). This list is “not exhaustive,” and “the absence of a single factor is not necessarily dispositive.” Id. (quoting Bormann, 875 F.2d at 403 & n.1).^[2] Here, the factors weigh decidedly in Sun Life's favor. With respect to the first factor, Schuyler is a well-educated individual with extensive business experience. She holds a bachelor's degree in Business Administration and Marketing from Kent State University, and an MBA from Cleveland State University. Pl. 56.1 Statement ¶¶ 241-42. She was employed as a Territory Sales Representative at Benco Dental for around eight years. In that role, she “managed all Benco Dental sales for a territory of over 250 dentists,” id. ¶ 244, and her role also involved work with “contracts,” Schuyler Aff. ¶ 7.^[3] In addition, Schuyler worked as a real estate agent from at least 2016 to 2020. Pl. Response to Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 15.

As for the second factor, the Agreement plainly states that “Employee has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to consider this Agreement,” SA at 1, and further provides that “Employee . . . has been provided adequate time to consider this Agreement, (in excess of 14 days),” SA ¶ 11.

Schuyler had possession of the Agreement for twenty days before signing it, which she does not contend was an insufficient amount of time. See Schuyler Aff. ¶ 83; Def. 56.1 Statement ¶ 67. The Agreement also provides that “Employee may revoke this agreement for a period of 7 days after it has been executed,” which further extended the amount of time Schuyler had to consider its terms. SA ¶ 11; see Linder v. BYK-Chemie USA, Inc., 2006 WL 648206, at *8 (D. Conn. Mar. 10, 2006) (noting that the plaintiff had “seven days after executing the release to revoke his election”); De Pace v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 257 F.Supp.2d 543, 556 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (same).

With respect to the third factor, Schuyler personally negotiated an increase in the Agreement's compensation from $19,584.06 to $25,000.00. See Schuyler Aff. ¶ 84 (“I asked for an increased amount in exchange for releasing claims against Benco.”); id. ¶¶ 83, 86. She also negotiated other terms of the agreement, including an extension of her health insurance coverage and mutual non-disparagement language. ECF No. 39, Ex. 54; see Frommert v. Conright, 535 F.3d 111, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2008) (reversing the district court's decision not to enforce the ERISA release in part because “[s]ome Plaintiffs-Appellees even modified the terms of the release forms with which they had been presented before signing them”), rev'd & remanded on other grounds, 559 U.S. 506 (2010); He v. Cigna Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. & Cornell Univ., 2017 WL 4350570, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2017) (“Dr. He personally negotiated the release, convincing Cornell to double its original offer.”).

The fourth and fifth factors weigh even more heavily in favor of Sun Life's position. The Agreement expressly states, in two separate places, that it releases any claims under ERISA. Under the section titled “Releases,” the Agreement reads: “Employee of her/his own free will voluntarily releases . . . any and all known and unknown actions, causes of actions, suits . . . arising out of or in any way connected with Employee's employment with...