Schwartz v. Middletown City Sch. Dist.

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GREGORY R. SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff, v. MIDDLETOWN CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, and RICHARD DELMORO, Defendants.

No. 23-CV-1248 (KMK)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

March 25, 2024

Gregory R. Schwartz Sarasota, FL Pro se Plaintiff.

Howard M. Miller, Esq., Jacqueline Giordano, Esq., Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC Garden City, NY, Counsel for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

KENNETH M. KARAS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Gregory R. Schwartz (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, brings this Action against the Middletown City School District (the “District”) and its former superintendent Richard DelMoro (“DelMoro” collectively, “Defendants”), alleging discrimination based on Plaintiff's disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, et seq. and the New York Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), New York Executive Law § 296. (See generally Am. Compl. (Dkt. No. 9).) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion To Dismiss. (See Not. of Mot. (Dkt. No. 15).) For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The following facts come from the Amended Complaint and are assumed true for the purposes of this Motion.

In 2019, Plaintiff was employed as a tenured social studies teacher with the Middletown City School District (the “District”). (See Am. Compl. ¶ 1.)^[1] He alleges that, since 2012, he has suffered from a disability related to a heart condition. (Id. ¶ 3.) That disability apparently did not affect his ability to teach, at least until the COVID-19 Pandemic.

Middletown public schools closed in March 2020, causing Plaintiff to teach remotely for the rest of the 2019-2020 school year. (Id. ¶ 4.) When the 2020-21 school year rolled around, Plaintiff believed that his heart condition would inhibit his ability to teach in-person, so he asked the District for a remote teaching accommodation. (Id. ¶ 5.) He submitted that request on August 3, 2020, after which he supplemented with a doctor's note explaining that it would be too risky to return in person given his heart condition. (See id. ¶¶ 7, 20.)^[2]

On August 14, 2020, the District informed Plaintiff that the Superintendent (Defendant DelMoro), denied his request. (Id. ¶ 8.) The District explained that it did not have telework accommodations available and asked Plaintiff to either report to work or take unpaid leave. (Id.)^[3] The District also informed Plaintiff that he would not be able to use his accrued sick or leave time to offset a portion of his unpaid leave. (Id. ¶ 10.)

Through September 2020, Plaintiff continued to go back and forth with the District. Specifically, he made several suggestions for remote accommodations including teaching students out on medical leave and writing curricula. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) In his Opposition, Plaintiff states that at least two teachers with his same license had such positions, which he terms a “Teacher [o]n Special Assignment,” or TOSA. (Pl's Mem. 13.)^[4] The District, however, rejected those suggestions and placed Plaintiff on unpaid leave. (See Am. Compl. 11.)

On November 4, 2020, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging a failure to accommodate his disability. (Id. ¶ 13.) The resulting EEOC proceeding led to a mediation between Plaintiff and the District, scheduled for January 2021. On January 6, 2021, a week before the mediation, the District reached out to Plaintiff with an offer to teach remotely through June 2021, the end of the spring semester. (Id. ¶ 17.) Plaintiff, however, declined that offer because it would have reduced his average yearly earnings and therefore could have reduced his yearly pension payouts. (Id. ¶ 18.)

In September 2021, Plaintiff requested and accepted an unpaid leave of absence for the 2021-22 school year after the District did not offer a remote accommodation. (Id. ¶ 20.)^[5] He then resigned in September 2022. (Id. ¶ 21.) Finally, the EEOC closed Plaintiff's case on November 15, 2022, and issued a right-to-sue letter. (Id. ¶ 22.)

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this Action on February 10, 2023. (See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1).) On March 23, 2023, Defendants filed a pre-motion letter in anticipation of moving to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 6.) Plaintiff responded requesting an opportunity to amend, (Dkt. No. 7), which the Court granted, (see Endorsed Ltr. (Dkt. No. 8)).

Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on April 14, 2023, (Am. Compl.), and Defendants renewed their request to file a motion to dismiss on April 20, 2023, (Dkt. No. 10). In lieu of a pre-motion conference, the Court adopted a briefing schedule. (See Order (Dkt. No. 11).) After an extension, (Dkt. No. 14), Defendants filed the instant Motion on June 12, 2023. (Not. of Mot.; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. (“Defs' Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 17); Giordano Aff.) Plaintiff filed his Opposition on July 13, 2023, (Pl's Mem. of Law In Opp. to Mot. To Dismiss (“Pl's Mem.”) (Dkt. No. 18)), and Defendants filed their Reply on July 26, 2023, (Reply Mem. of Law (“Defs' Reply”) (Dkt. No. 19)).

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

The Supreme Court has held that although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of [its] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Indeed, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). Instead, a complaint's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Although “once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” id. at 563, and a plaintiff must allege “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” id. at 570, if a plaintiff has not “nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[] complaint must be dismissed,” id.; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))); id. at 678-79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).

“[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and “draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff,” Daniel v. T & M Protection Resources, Inc., 992 F.Supp.2d 302, 304 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing Koch v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 699 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 2012)). Additionally, “[i]n adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a district court must confine its consideration to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Leonard F. v. Isr. Disc. Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Wang v. Palmisano, 157 F.Supp.3d 306, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (same). However, when the complaint is filed by a pro se plaintiff, the Court may consider “materials outside the complaint to the extent that they are consistent with the allegations in the complaint,” Alsaifullah v. Furco, No. 12-CV-2907, 2013 WL 3972514, at *4 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2013) (quotation marks omitted), including “documents that a pro se litigant attaches to his opposition papers,” Agu v. Rhea, No. 09-CV-4732, 2010 WL 5186839, at *4 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010) (italics omitted), and “documents either in [the plaintiff's] possession or of which [the] plaintiff[ ] had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit,” Chambers, 282 F.3d at 153 (quotation marks omitted).

Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court must “construe[] [the plaintiff's] [complaint] liberally and interpret[] [it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggest[s].” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).^[6] However, “the liberal treatment afforded to pro se litigants does not exempt a pro se party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Bell v. Jendell, 980 F.Supp.2d 555, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Caidor v. Onondaga County, 517 F.3d 601, 605 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to comply with them.” (italics and citation omitted)).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff alleges claims for failure to accommodate and discrimination under the ADA and NYSHRL. (See generally Am. Compl.) Up front, the Court notes-and Plaintiff concedes-that there is no individual liability under...