Scott v. Clark

JOSEPH SCOTT, Plaintiff v. MICHAEL CLARK, MELINDA ADAMS, VALERIA KUSIAK,KEVIN LANZT, CARL FRANZ, and STEVEN REILLY, Defendants

Case No. 1:19-cv-00169 (Erie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

July 28, 2020

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

ECF NO. 24

I. Recommendation

This matter was referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation in accordance with the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, and Local Civil Rule 72.D. It is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. Introduction

Defendants Michael Clark, Melinda Adams, Valeria Kusiak, Kevin Lanzt, Carl Franz, and Steven Reilly (collectively, DOC Defendants) have moved to dismiss Plaintiff Joseph Scott's Amended Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 24. Scott, an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Albion, began this litigation with the filing of a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which this Court granted. See ECF No. 1, ECF No. 2. His original complaint was filed some time later. ECF No. 7. He then filed an Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading. ECF No. 10. Scott's claims arise from injuries he sustained when he was assaulted by another inmate. Scott has filed a Response in Opposition to the DOC Defendants' motion to dismiss. ECF No. 29. The matter is now ready for disposition.

III. Standards

A. Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not deciding whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; instead, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint should be dismissed only under Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). A court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff in making this determination. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009); U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed.2d 209 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must a court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. See also McTernan v. City ofYork, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.").

Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:

First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937.

Thus, when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff may offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. See id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000). In short, a motion to dismiss should not be granted if a party alleges facts, which could, if established at trial, entitle him to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8, 127 S. Ct. 1955.

B. Pro Se Litigants

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must employ less stringent standards in considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged.Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). Despite this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996). Finally, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Phillips v. County of Allegheny has ruled that if a District Court is dismissing a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in a civil rights case, it must sua sponte "permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

IV. Discussion

A. Factual Background

Adhering to these principles then, the following recitation of the facts assumes the truth of the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint. Scott is currently incarcerated at SCI-Albion. While speaking to family members on the telephone, Scott was approached from behind and attacked by another inmate. ECF No. 10, ¶ 11. He was stabbed "multiple times in the face, head, neck, back, and chest." Id. ¶ 12. Scott's injuries were so severe that surgery was necessary to remove part of a pen from his face. Id. He asserts that he was dissuaded from making a report about this assault because "no staff was at their post on the block. They were all relaxing in the control booth, while block out was going on." Id. ¶ 13. Scott "was seen by medical and was informed that inmate Stratton Peay DP-4246 was the person who assaulted me." Id. ¶ 15. Along with his other injuries, the medical department diagnosed Scott with a concussion. Id. ¶ 16.

As for his assailant, Scott asserts that "[i]nmate Peay was placed in a part of the Restricted Housing Unit called the D.T.U. at least twice within the sixty days preceding this incident" for"assaultive behavior."¹ Id. ¶ 19. He also claims that "Inmate Peay is said to have forty-three (43) prior assaults and defendant's (sic) had foreknowledge that putting inmate Peay on the RTU that (sic) it would endanger all inmates on that unit because the RTU is a block for inmates who need more support and protection." Id. ¶ 20.

B. Legal Claims

Although Scott's Amended Complaint does not invoke a specific constitutional provision, the Court construes his allegations as raising claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint raise an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim (id. ¶ 23); an Eighth Amendment failure to train claim (id. ¶ 22); and a state-created danger claim brought under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process guarantee (id. ¶¶ 20-21, 24). Each of these claims will be discussed individually, beginning with the failure to protect claim.²

C. The Amended Complaint States a Plausible Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claim.

"[T]he Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause imposes on prison officials 'a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.'" Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 - 67 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1976, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). Prison officials must take reasonable measures to do so. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833, 114 S. Ct. at 1976. "Being violendy assaulted in prison is simply not 'part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society." Id. at 834, 114 S. Ct. at 1977 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)). Still, prison officials do not incur constitutional liability for every injury suffered by a prisoner. Id.

Two factual scenarios can give rise to a failure to protect claim in an inmate-on-inmate assault case. First, such claims may arise where prison officials fail to respond to a particularised threat. Second, a failure to protect claim can also arise when a prisoner is assaulted as a result of conditions or practices dangerous to all prisoners or an identifiable group of them. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843. Scott alleges the second type of case because he makes no allegation of a particularized threat from inmate Peay. Instead, the Amended Complaint assert that...