ScOtt v. Macon Bibb Cnty.

1

TERESA J. SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. MACON-BIBB COUNTY, GA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:21-cv-239 (MTT)

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division

March 8, 2023

ORDER

MARC T. TREADWELL, CHIEF JUDGE

Plaintiff Teresa J. Scott brings claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C § 1983 based on alleged racial discrimination by Defendants Macon-Bibb County, Georgia, Andrea Crutchfield and Jody Claborn. Doc. 45. The defendants move to dismiss Scott's complaint. Docs. 38; 46. For the reasons that follow, the defendants' motions (Docs. 38; 46) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Scott, “a black female, is ... employed as an Appraiser II in Defendant [Macon-Bibb County]'s Board of Tax Assessors' Personal Property Division.” Doc. 45 ¶ 10. Scott's allegations of discrimination center around the defendants' failure to reclassify her to the Appraiser III position. Id. ¶¶ 99-109.

“According to [Macon-Bibb County]'s Board of Tax Assessors' personnel policies, an Appraiser I, Appraiser II, or Appraiser III is eligible for reclassification, or promotion, upon their successful completion of the respective prerequisites for the position.” Id. ¶ 20. The qualifications of an Appraiser III include the following:

(1) be not less than twenty-one (21) years of age;

(2) hold a high school diploma or its equivalent;

(3) have the ability to correctly apply the three approaches to valuation in appraising properties within his jurisdiction;

(4) have the ability to organize and direct the activities of subordinate personnel;

(5) have the ability to perform all phases of mass appraisal and revaluation work within his jurisdiction including the ability to develop pricing and valuation schedules for the valuation of all land, improvements and personal property[;] ... [and (6)] successfully complete an examination approved by the Revenue Commissioner.

Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 560-11-2-.25(1)(c), (2) (2016); see also Doc. 45 ¶¶ 23, 47, 95, 96. According to Scott, “[w]hile a promotion is not automatic, there need not be a vacancy in order to be considered; rather, supervisors merely have to make a recommendation, and employees are often promoted within months of meeting the qualifications for the position.” Doc. 45 ¶ 21.

Scott passed the Appraiser I and Appraiser II exams in July 2010. Id. ¶¶ 25, 50. Scott was subsequently reclassified to the Appraiser I position in 2012 and the Appraiser II position in 2015. Id. ¶¶ 46, 50. After Scott passed the Appraiser III exam on February 6, 2018, she became eligible for reclassification as Appraiser III. Id. ¶¶ 97100. In February 2020, Scott's supervisor, Desiree Murray, recommended Scott for reclassification. Id. ¶ 102. Claborn, the Deputy Chief Appraiser, denied the request. Id. ¶ 103. In response, Scott filed a charge of racial discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on August 19, 2020. Doc. 1-2. The charge of discrimination alleged the following:

On or about February 20, 2020, my Supervisor recommended me for reclassification as an Appraisal [sic] III. On February 25, 2020, the reclassification was denied. As of today, no reason was given for the denial. I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my race (African American), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.

Id. On April 15, 2021, the EEOC dismissed Scott's charge and issued a right-to-sue letter providing 90 days for Scott to file suit.^[1]Doc. 1-3. After receiving the right-to-sue letter, Scott timely filed a pro se complaint on July 15, 2021. Doc. 1.^[2]

Scott retained counsel in late August 2021, but counsel did not timely serve Scott's original complaint because he did not read Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Doc. 11 at 2-3. On November 5, 2021, the Court ordered Scott to show cause why the original complaint should not be dismissed for failure to serve. Doc. 5. Before filing a response to the show cause order, Scott's counsel filed, without leave of Court, a first amended complaint on November 17, 2021. Doc. 6. The first amended complaint added new defendants and additional claims well beyond the scope of Scott's EEOC charge. Compare Doc. 1-2 with Doc. 6 ¶¶ 119-22, 149-50, 161. Most notably, the improperly filed first amended complaint alleged the defendants violated Title VII when they failed to timely reclassify Scott to the Appraiser I and Appraiser II positions. Doc. 6 ¶¶ 119-22, 149-50, 161. Scott then filed a response to the show cause order on November 19, 2021. Doc. 11.

The defendants answered the improperly filed first amended complaint and moved to dismiss. Docs. 15; 16. Additionally, the defendants argued the original complaint should be dismissed for failure to serve. Doc. 19 at 3-5. The Court convened a hearing on August 8, 2022 to clarify the case's procedural posture and the scope of Scott's Title VII claims. Doc. 33. At the hearing, it became clear that although Scott was eligible for the Appraiser III position in 2018, she was not denied that position until February 2020. Id.; Doc. 42 at 13:3-14:6. Furthermore, Scott acknowledged in her briefing on the defendants' motion to dismiss that “the crux of [her] claims are that Defendants have continually refused to reclassify and/or promote her [to the Appraiser III position] since she became eligible in 2018.” Doc. 18 at 9. Thus, Scott's improperly filed first amended complaint, which included allegations that the defendants violated Title VII when they failed to timely reclassify her to the Appraiser I and Appraiser II positions, improperly expanded the scope of Scott's charge of discrimination and contradicted Scott's admissions that her claims were limited to the February 2020 failure to reclassify her to the Appraiser III position.

In an effort to bring some clarity to the mess created by Scott's counsel by his failure to serve the original complaint and filing, without leave, an amended complaint attempting to expand the scope of Scott's claims, the Court allowed Scott to amend her original complaint consistent with her charge of discrimination and counsel's admissions. Doc. 34 at 9. In other words, the Court granted leave to amend to allege fully her claims arising from the February 25, 2020 failure to reclassify. Additionally, the Court found that, despite the lack of good cause, an extension of time to serve the original complaint was warranted. Id. at 8.

Scott filed her amended complaint, denominated as her “First Amended Complaint,” on August 19, 2022. Doc. 35. Contrary to the Court's order and counsel's admissions, Scott's first amended complaint once again attempted to assert claims arising from the defendants' failure to reclassify her to the Appraiser I and Appraiser II positions after she passed the requisite exams in 2010. Id. ¶¶ 123, 138, 139.

The Court ordered Scott's counsel to order the transcript of the August 8, 2022 hearing and to show cause why Scott should not be sanctioned and the first amended complaint struck for failure to comply with the Court's instructions. Doc. 41. Scott responded to the show cause order with a proposed “Second Amended Complaint” on October 18, 2022. Doc. 43-1. The proposed second amended complaint removed problematic paragraphs identified in the Court's show cause order but inserted new offending paragraphs that the Court missed. Id. Specifically, Scott alleged a Title VII pay discrimination claim, which had not been included in her EEOC charge, based on the defendants' delay in reclassifying her to the Appraiser I and Appraiser II positions.^[3]Id. ¶¶ 141-43. Because it missed Scott's counsel's latest effort to exceed the scope of the Court's order granting leave to amend, the Court allowed Scott to file her proposed second amended complaint. Doc. 44.

Scott's second amended complaint alleges claims for race discrimination under Title VII (Count 1), pay discrimination under Title VII (Count 2), race discrimination under § 1981 (Count 3), and race discrimination under § 1983 (Count 4). Doc. 45. The defendants move to dismiss again arguing (1) Scott's complaint is a shotgun pleading; (2) Scott's Title VII claims are untimely; (3) Scott failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and (4) Scott failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. Docs. 38-1; 46-1.

II. STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). To avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter ... ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the court [can] draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Factual allegations that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability fall short of being facially plausible.” Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

At the motion to dismiss stage, “all well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” FindWhat Inv. Grp. v FindWhat.com., 658 F.3d 1282, 1296 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But “conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785 F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice...