Scott v. Planning Bd. of Lakeville

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RICHARD SCOTT & others^[1] v. PLANNING BOARD OF LAKEVILLE & others^[2] (and a companion case^[3]).

Nos. 22-P-1024, 22-P-1026

Appeals Court of Massachusetts

November 29, 2023

Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass.App.Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass.App.Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, Rhino Capital Advisors, LLC (Rhino), obtained a special permit and site plan approval (the permits) from the town of Lakeville's planning board (board) for construction of a 402,500 square foot warehouse and 130 loading docks to operate twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, on property that formerly housed the Lakeville State Hospital (the project). The site is located partially in a business zoning district and partly in a residential zoning district; neither allows warehouses. Two residential neighbor groups appealed from the board's decision to the Land Court and following a view, a judge granted summary judgment to the neighbor groups and annulled the permits.^[4] Rhino appeals contending that the project qualifies for the permits because the property at issue is within the town's "Development Opportunities Overlay District" (DO District). However, the town failed to amend the zoning map to show the DO District, and did not otherwise delineate the boundaries of the DO District or designate specific parcels to be included. With this in mind and based on the plain language of the DO District, we reject Rhino's theory that the DO District applies to all of the property in the town. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

Background.

Because both parties parse the wording of the DO District section of the bylaw and seek to apply different rules of construction, we set forth the provisions in some detail. The DO District was adopted at a town meeting on June 4, 2012, adding section 7.9 to the town's zoning bylaw (bylaw). On the same evening, and immediately prior to adopting the DO District, the town voted to accept the provisions of G. L. c. 43D and approved the filing of an application with the "Interagency Permitting Board" for designation of the Lakeville State Hospital site as a priority development site.^[5]

Pursuant to Section 7.9.1 of the bylaw,

"The purpose of the Development Opportunity (DO) District is to authorize the innovative use of certain portions of a defined overlay district for activities appropriate to large land areas by the issuance of a special permit with safeguards and conditions to prevent detrimental effects and impact upon neighboring properties, natural resources and upon the Town of Lakeville as a whole. The intent of the DO District is to provide opportunities for economic development expansion in a planned multi-use district while protecting the natural resources of the Town. The Development Opportunities District is an overlay district superimposed over those underlying districts as shown on the zoning map of the Town of Lakeville." (emphasis added).

Section 7.9.3.2 provides that no DO District "special permit shall be granted unless the total land area, including streets of the subject property consists of twenty-five or more acres." Uses allowed by special permit in the DO District include manufacturing and industrial, high technology, warehouses, wholesale distribution centers, public service facilities, transportation terminal, office and medical buildings, schools, retail sales facilities, theaters, restaurants and other places of public assembly.

It is undisputed that the DO District is not shown on the zoning map and that the zoning map was not amended to show the boundaries of the DO District. Indeed, there is no reference to the DO District on the zoning map. The board concluded that the DO District "is a designated overlay district in the Lakeville Zoning Bylaw that applies to land within the Town consisting of a total land area, including streets, of twenty-five or more acres." The judge concluded however, that although the town properly enacted the DO District, it "is not effective with respect to any particular land unless and until a zoning map amendment, or other zoning enactment designating land to be included in the district, is adopted." Accordingly, he annulled the permits.

Discussion.

1. Standing.

The judge concluded that almost all of the parties in the two neighbor groups have standing either because they are parties in interests and Rhino did not refute their standing, or because they affirmatively demonstrated their standing.^[6] On appeal, none of the parties makes an argument as to standing and we discern no reason to disturb the judge's detailed findings and conclusion on that issue. See Davenport v. Planning Bd. of Dennis, 76 Mass.App.Ct. 221, 224 n.10 (2010).

See also 81 Spooner Rd., LLC v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Brookline, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 233, 242 n. 22 (2010) (that one plaintiff was aggrieved person is "sufficient to permit an appeal from the board's decision").

2. Interpretation of the DO District.

"We review interpretations of zoning bylaws de novo and according to traditional rules of statutory construction." Pinecroft Dev., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of West Boylston, 101 Mass.App.Ct. 122, 128 (2022). While we generally defer to a local board's reasonable interpretation of its own zoning bylaw, an "incorrect interpretation of a statute . . . is not entitled to deference." Shirley Wayside Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Appeals of Shirley, 461 Mass. 469, 475 (2012). Similarly, we give no deference to unreasonable interpretations of a bylaw. See Perry v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Hull, 100 Mass.App.Ct. 19, 23 (2021). "An interpretation of a bylaw provision is unreasonable if it is inconsistent with that provision's purpose or the bylaw as a whole." Pinecroft Dev., Inc., supra.

We note that "[t]he construction of a statute which leads to a determination that a piece of legislation is ineffective will not be adopted if the statutory language 'is fairly susceptible to a construction that would lead to a logical and sensible result.'" KCI Mgt., Inc. v. Board of Appeal of Boston, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 254, 259-260 (2002), quoting Adamowicz v. Ipswich, 395 Mass. 757, 760 (1985). Here, the town's adoption of the DO District was effective to create the DO District, but the town did not take the necessary steps to define the limits of the DO District on the zoning map or otherwise assign any specific property to it. See Cerel v. Natick, 2 Mass.App.Ct. 822 (1974) (where town adopted planned cluster development district without amending zoning map, town "simply intended to create a new type of district to which land could subsequently be assigned by amendment of the zoning map . . . pursuant to a separate vote of the town meeting").

Notwithstanding, Rhino contends that the bylaw is ambiguous because the clause in the purpose section of the DO District provisions, "superimposed over those underlying districts as shown on the zoning map," could be interpreted either to mean that the DO District is superimposed over all of the underlying districts shown on the zoning map or, as the judge found, over only the underlying districts shown on the zoning map as included in the DO District. "When ascertaining ambiguity, 'we do not read words in isolation and out of context'" (citation omitted). Matter of Leo Kahn Revocable Trust, 102 Mass.App.Ct. 38, 42 (2022). "It is axiomatic that we are to 'look to the language of the entire [bylaw], not just [textual snippets], and attempt to interpret all of its terms harmoniously to effectuate the intent of the [town meeting]'" (quotation omitted). Commonwealth v. Graziano, 96 Mass.App.Ct. 601, 605 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Mogelenski, 466 Mass. 627, 641 (2013).

Rhino contends that reading the provisions of the DO District together compels the conclusion that the DO District was intended to "create a townwide overlay district superimposed over all underlying districts shown on the Zoning Map." Rhino asserts that the only criterion is a "dimensional requirement" that the lot consist of at least twenty-five acres. We conclude, to the contrary, that when the bylaw's "language is read in context of the remainder of [the DO District] -- its meaning is reasonably plain:" the limits of the DO District were to be reflected on the zoning map. Commonwealth v. Kiago, 101 Mass.App.Ct. 717, 736 (2022).

Several aspects of the DO District's purpose clause support our conclusion that the extent of the DO District would be defined and that the areas of the town that would be part of the DO District would be designated on the zoning map.^[7] For example, the first sentence of the purpose clause provides that specified DO District uses would be allowed in "certain portions of a defined overlay district" (emphasis added). Calling it a "defined overlay district" is inconsistent with the suggestion that the town intended that the DO District would overlay the entire town and is consistent with the intention that the extent of the overlay district would be delineated or precisely stated. And, even if we were to accept that "certain portions" refers to the twenty-five acres parcel requirement, there...