Scott v. Rochester Gas & Elec.

333 F.Supp.3d 273

Massie L. SCOTT, Plaintiff,

v.ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC, Defendant.

6:17-CV-06476 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed September 21, 2018

Prathima C. Reddy, The Reddy Law Firm LLC, Buffalo, NY, for Plaintiff.

Leslie Prechtl Guy, Hinman, Howard & Kattell, LLP, Binghamton, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Massie L. Scott ("Plaintiff") asserts various claims against Defendant Rochester Gas & Electric ("Defendant") arising out of his employment relationship. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 3-6). Plaintiff alleges Defendant discriminated against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. ("Title VII") and the New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law § 290 et. seq. ("NYSHRL"). (Id. at ¶¶ 23-28).

Presently before the Court are Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims as time-barred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 3) and Plaintiff's request for sanctions (Dkt. 12). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion to dismiss and Plaintiff's request for sanctions are both denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the complaint and from documents integral thereto¹ —namely, the parties' submissions regarding the timeliness of Plaintiff's Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") charge. As required on a motion to dismiss, the Court treats Plaintiff's factual allegations as true.

I. Factual History

Plaintiff has worked for Defendant's Field Collections Department since June 2009. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 7). On March 16, 2015, Plaintiff began an apprentice program for a position in the Line Department. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-8). All the foremen supervising Plaintiff during his apprenticeship were Caucasian. (Id. at ¶ 9). One of these supervisors informed Plaintiff and his co-workers that "blacks" are not allowed as lineman and made it clear Plaintiff would not pass the apprentice program. (Id. at ¶ 10). The foremen spoke derogatorily about and to Plaintiff, excluded him from activities, and refused to supervise him when he worked on dangerous equipment. (Id. at ¶¶ 13, 15-16). Plaintiff and another minority coworker complained to Department Supervisor Mary Jo Klemmer on various occasions about this behavior, but she never took remedial action. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12).

Despite this treatment, Plaintiff's work was rated above-average throughout the course of the apprenticeship. (Id. at ¶ 17). Defendant's regional operations director informed Plaintiff that he had advanced in the apprenticeship program. (Id. at ¶ 18). However, on September 11, 2015, two nights before Plaintiff was scheduled to begin his next assignment, Klemmer informed Plaintiff that he was being removed from the program because the supervising foremen had instructed her to do so. (Id. at ¶ 19). Plaintiff was terminated from the program and removed to his previous position at the collections department. (Id. at ¶ 20). Plaintiff contends that his termination from the apprenticeship program was based on unlawful racial animus. (Id. at ¶ 24).

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff alleges that he filed charges of discrimination against Defendant with the EEOC and the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"). (Id. at ¶ 22). On April 6, 2016, the EEOC received an intake questionnaire form ("Questionnaire") submitted by Plaintiff. (Dkt. 11 at 11-19, 25-29). The Questionnaire asks the applicant to provide certain information, such as the applicant's name, the name of the offending organization, what happened to the applicant, and why the applicant thought the action was discriminatory. (Id. at 5-6). The Questionnaire also asks the applicant to check a box indicating what the applicant would like the EEOC to do with the information. (Id. at 8). Box 1 states, "I want to talk to an EEOC employee before deciding whether to file a charge. I understand that by checking this box, I have not filed a charge with the EEOC. I also understand that I could lose my rights if I do not file a charge in time ." (Id. ). Box 2 reads, "I want to file a charge of discrimination, and I authorize the EEOC to look into the discrimination I described above. I understand that the EEOC must give the employer ... that I accuse of discrimination information about the charge, including my name. " (Id. ). In Plaintiff's submission to the EEOC, he named Defendant as the offending organization, he detailed his experience during Defendant's apprentice program, and he checked Box 2. (Dkt. 11 at 11-19).

On September 8, 2016, the EEOC filed a form titled "Charge of Discrimination" that Plaintiff had filled out and submitted to it. (Dkt. 3-3 at 7-8). On that form, Plaintiff signed a line indicating he wanted the charge filed with the "EEOC and the State or local agency ...." (Id. at 7). Defendant was notified of the charge on November 29, 2016. (Id. at 2-4). On April 21, 2017, the EEOC issued a dismissal and notice of rights to Plaintiff. (Dkt. 3-4 at 3).

Plaintiff commenced this action on July 17, 2017. (Dkt. 1). Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on September 21, 2017. (Dkt. 3). On October 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion and in support of his request for sanctions. (Dkt. 12). Defendant replied in support of the motion to dismiss on October 31, 2017. (Dkt. 14).

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court generally may only consider "facts stated in the complaint or documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference." Nechis v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc. , 421 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 2005). However, "[e]ven where a document is not incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint ‘relies heavily upon its terms and effect,’ which renders the document ‘integral’ to the complaint." Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. , 282 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel Co. , 62 F.3d 69, 72 (2d Cir. 1995) ). A court should consider the motion "accepting all factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Ruotolo v. City of New York , 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). To withstand dismissal, a plaintiff must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; see also Nielsen v. Rabin , 746 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2014) ("The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement .... A well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) ).

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (alteration and citations omitted). Thus, "at a bare minimum, the operative standard requires the plaintiff to provide the grounds upon which his claim rests through factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Goldstein v. Pataki , 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

II. Plaintiff's EEOC Charge

A. The Parties' Positions

Defendant argues Plaintiff did not file a timely charge with the EEOC, and that his claims are consequently time-barred and should be dismissed. (Dkt. 3-4 at 3). Defendant asserts the controlling period for filing a claim with the EEOC in this case was 180 days because "there is no evidence that the Plaintiff filed a charge with any local or state agency." (Id. ). Defendant further asserts that the only charge filed by Plaintiff in this case was the Charge of Discrimination the EEOC received from Plaintiff on September 8, 2016, and that because the alleged discrimination occurred on September 11, 2015, Plaintiff's charge was not timely filed and his complaint should be dismissed. (Dkt. 3-4 at 4).²

Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss, contending that he filed his EEOC charge in a timely fashion. (Dkt. 12 at 8-13). Plaintiff argues a 300-day filing period applies in this case and therefore the last day to file his charge with the EEOC was on July 7, 2016. (Id. at 9-11). Plaintiff further contends the Questionnaire he submitted to the EEOC on April 5, 2016 (well before the 300-day limitation period), qualifies as a charge, and therefore his charge was timely filed and his claim should be allowed to proceed. (Id. at 11, 15-16).

B. Whether the 180-Day or 300-Day Limitations Period Applies to Plaintiff's Charge

Title VII prohibits discriminatory employment practices by an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). As a precondition to bringing a Title VII suit against a defendant in federal court, a plaintiff must file a charge of employment discrimination against the defendant with the EEOC or an authorized state agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 ; Shah v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv. , 168 F.3d 610, 613 (2d Cir. 1999) ("A Title VII claimant may bring suit in federal court only if he has filed a timely complaint with the EEOC ....").

Title VII implements a deadline of 180-days from the date of the alleged event for a claimant to file a charge of unlawful employment practice with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). This deadline is extended...