Case Law Scott v. Scott

Scott v. Scott

Document Cited Authorities (14) Cited in (8) Related

Troy L. Booher, Julie J. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Karra J. Porter, Kristen C. Kiburtz, Salt Lake City, Frederick N. Green, Sandy, for appellee

Associate Chief Justice Lee authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Pearce, Justice Petersen, and Judge Pohlman joined.

Having recused himself, Justice Himonas does not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge Jill M. Pohlman sat.

Associate Chief Justice Lee, opinion of the Court:

¶1 This is the second time that Jillian Scott has asked this court to reverse a lower court decision terminating her right to alimony on the basis of her alleged cohabitation. When the case first came to this court, Jillian's right to alimony had been terminated under Utah Code section 30-3-5(10) —a statute that then provided that an alimony order "terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person."1 See Scott v. Scott (Scott I ), 2017 UT 66, ¶ 3, 423 P.3d 1275. We interpreted the statute to "require[ ] the paying spouse to establish that the former spouse is cohabiting at the time the paying spouse files the motion to terminate alimony." Id. ¶¶ 10, 33. And we reversed a decision terminating Jillian's right to alimony to the extent it relied on this statute, concluding that Jillian was not cohabiting with her ex-boyfriend at the time the motion to terminate was filed (even if she had been cohabiting previously). See id. ¶¶ 1, 21, 21 n.5, 23, 33.

¶2 On the heels of this decision, Jillian's ex-husband filed a new motion to terminate Jillian's right to alimony under the terms of the couple's divorce decree, which provided that her alimony would terminate "upon " her "cohabitation." (Emphasis added.) And the district court granted that motion. We now uphold that decision. The subtle distinction between the wording of the statute and the divorce decree makes all the difference. Jillian may not have been cohabiting at the time Bradley filed his motion. But there is ample evidence to support the district court's determination that she had cohabited previously. And that triggered termination of Bradley's alimony obligations under the decree. We affirm on that basis, while rejecting Jillian's assertions that there could be no cohabitation here because she and her ex-boyfriend had no shared legal domicile and did not have a common residence for a sufficient period of time.

¶3 In so doing we reiterate that "a marriage-like cohabitation relationship is difficult to define with a hard-and-fast list of prerequisites." Myers v. Myers , 2011 UT 65, ¶ 24, 266 P.3d 806. And we hold that the district court is entitled to substantial deference in its fact-intensive determination on the existence of such a relationship. We reverse on one minor point, however, concluding that Jillian was entitled to an award of her costs on her prior appeal.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

¶4 Jillian and Bradley Scott married in 1979. During their marriage, the couple amassed a level of personal wealth that allowed them to "live[ ] a lifestyle beyond even the imagination of most of humanity." But they ultimately ended up divorcing in 2006 after Jillian walked in on Bradley with another woman.

¶5 The divorce decree obligated Bradley to pay Jillian $6,000 per month after they separated in 2006. But it also provided that Bradley's alimony obligation would terminate "upon the remarriage or cohabitation" of Jillian. From the time of the divorce until 2018, the Utah Code provided that "[a]ny order" requiring "a party [to] pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person." See UTAH CODE § 30-3-5(10).

¶6 In October 2008, Jillian began dating James Okland. Their "intimate" and "exclusive" relationship was a serious one that involved celebrating holidays, traveling, and otherwise spending a significant amount of time together. But their relationship was atypical in many ways.

¶7 Okland's immense personal wealth allowed the couple to enjoy a lavish lifestyle very different from that of most people. When the couple began dating, Okland owned at least two homes—one in Salt Lake City, Utah (his primary residence) and one in Sun Valley, Idaho.2 He later purchased an additional home in Rancho Santa Fe, California. Okland also had access to a private jet and owned multiple vehicles, including a Porsche that he later had shipped to the Rancho Santa Fe house. Though Jillian had her own condominium in Salt Lake City, she spent the majority of her time traveling with Okland or at one of his homes. During the relationship, the couple took approximately thirty-six trips together. These trips included work trips for Okland as well as many trips to Okland's homes, where they would stay for a week or more at a time. In light of the couple's frequent vacationing and traveling, Jillian arranged to have all but her junk mail delivered electronically.

¶8 Jillian spent upwards of eighty percent of her time traveling with Okland or in one of his homes. She accompanied him on work trips. The couple celebrated holidays and special occasions together, including Okland's retirement (a twenty-five-day cruise) and Jillian's daughter's high school graduation (a trip to Hawaii). Okland also gave Jillian's daughter $5,000 as a graduation gift.

¶9 The two spent more than just time together. They also spent money together. Jillian was an authorized user on Okland's credit cards. And Jillian made good use of these cards, paying for necessities such as groceries, gas, and lodging, as well as wedding gifts, Christmas and birthday gifts, and presents for grandchildren.

¶10 In 2010, around the time Jillian's daughter moved to southern California for college, the couple began looking to acquire a home in Rancho Santa Fe, California. While Okland ended up financing the purchase, both "shared [in the] decisions regarding the selection and ultimate purchase of the home," and viewed the home as a joint acquisition. Jillian hired the real estate agent, and she was charged with locating a home to her liking. In August 2010, she wrote to the agent and said that the house "ha[d] [her] name all over it!," while noting that Okland "still want[ed] to look at the covenant and get a feel for everything." The next month, she wrote that they were "looking for a really good buy!!!" She also explained that Okland was "very conservative with his money" and commented that he had said that they "pa[id] cash for everything."3 She also wrote that "it's really up to James at this point" and noted that she had told him that she "want[ed] to grow old" in Rancho Santa Fe with him and "[h]e [had] agreed!" About a month later, Okland made an offer on behalf of both of them, stating: "Jill and I would like to offer $2,125,000 all cash and close within 15 days." (Emphasis added.)

¶11 In February 2011 (after Okland had purchased the home), the couple flew to Rancho Santa Fe in Okland's plane. Okland also had his Porsche shipped there. The real estate agent noted that Jillian "act[ed] like a spouse" as she decorated and replaced furniture in the home. Jillian had several personal items shipped to the home on Okland's dime, including paintings, Italian tables, dining room cabinets, bedroom chairs, ottomans, a wooden desk, a game table and chairs, Navajo rugs, and three stone cheetahs. Both Jillian and Okland had keys and full access to the home, and Jillian participated in decisions about who else should have a key. Okland also gave Jillian "family status" at the community country club—a move that required him to represent that the couple was "living together and maintaining a common household."

¶12 There is no indication, however, that Okland viewed the new home as his primary residence. He arranged to have his bills associated with that property sent to Salt Lake and testified that he viewed the Rancho Santa Fe home as a vacation property. Jillian, conversely, put her Salt Lake condominium up for sale.

¶13 Despite access to Okland's substantial financial resources, Jillian was loath to "give up [her] alimony," which she described on one occasion as her "extra ‘fun money.’ " And fear of losing out on that cash flow may have been a factor in the couple putting off marriage. As she wrote to a friend, "[w]e have talked about marriage but I am not ready to give up my alimony."4 The record also suggests that the couple may have openly told others that they remained unmarried only because they didn't want Jillian to lose her alimony. And while Okland did not recall ever proposing or telling others that the alimony was what stood in the way of their marriage, he did testify that he had purchased a diamond for Jillian. He also acknowledged that his memory was imperfect.

¶14 Jillian's relationship with Okland eventually fell apart. Around the beginning of April 2011, Okland left Rancho Santa Fe and returned to Salt Lake. He then abruptly ended the relationship by leaving Jillian a voice message.

¶15 Like many breakups, this one left an ex-partner upset and disoriented. In an email to Okland shortly after the breakup, Jillian wrote "I just don't understand how this happened. ... You buy a dream home for us to share our lives in. ... We decorate it with my furniture .... You then voice mail me it's over with no explanation. My dream has now become a nightmare[;] I wish I never shared Rancho Santa Fe with you." She said that she was "sad, really sad, [and] confused." In a later email she called Okland a "DREAM STEALER," a "needy user," and a "Spineless Snake."

¶16 Like their relationship, however, their breakup was also singular in many ways. Because Jillian had contracted a dangerous staph infection following a breast augmentation surgery that Okland had paid for (a $17,000-plus bil...

4 cases
Document | Utah Supreme Court – 2022
N. Monticello Alliance, LLC v. San Juan Cnty.
"...2002 UT 77, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1267 ("We may affirm the court of appeals’ decision on any ground supported in the record."); Scott v. Scott , 2020 UT 54, ¶ 30, 472 P.3d 897 (noting that "[a]s an appellee," a party "had the prerogative of identifying alternative grounds for affirmance"). We decli..."
Document | Utah Supreme Court – 2021
Croft v. Morgan Cnty.
"...application, we "cite to the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the events giving rise to [the] suit." Scott v. Scott , 2020 UT 54, ¶ 1 n.1, 472 P.3d 897 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).2 "When reviewing a rule 12(b)(6) mo..."
Document | Utah Court of Appeals – 2021
Sanders v. Sanders
"...court's order on an alternative ground that is apparent from the record, "[b]ut we ha[ve] no obligation to do so." Scott v. Scott , 2020 UT 54, ¶ 31, 472 P.3d 897. Kristine asserts that Travis's motion was a motion to reconsider simply because his "second Rule 60 motion asserted the same gr..."
Document | Utah Court of Appeals – 2024
Kinsey v. Kinsey
"...determination of a mixed question of fact and law that is entitled to substantial deference on appeal." Scott v. Scott, 2020 UT 54, ¶ 34, 472 P.3d 897. But to the extent that determination turns on the interpretation of a statute, the "proper interpretation and application of a statute is a..."

Try vLex and Vincent AI for free

Start a free trial
2 books and journal articles
Document | Núm. 54-4, January 2021 – 2021
Review of the Year 2021 in Family Law: Getting Back to Normal
"...family law arbitration. 120. See, e.g. , Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 177–80 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020). 121. See, e.g. , Scott v. Scott, 472 P.3d 897, 900 (Utah 2020). 122. Sinda , 949 N.W.2d at 179–80. 123. Scott , 472 P.3d at 907 (ex-wife sharing residence for 42 days was sufficient to ter..."
Document | Núm. 54-4, January 2021 – 2021
Review of the Year 2020 in Family Law: COVID-19, Zoom, and Family Law in a Pandemic
"...family law arbitration. 120. See, e.g. , Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 177–80 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020). 121. See, e.g. , Scott v. Scott, 472 P.3d 897, 900 (Utah 2020). 122. Sinda , 949 N.W.2d at 179–80. 123. Scott , 472 P.3d at 907 (ex-wife sharing residence for 42 days was sufficient to ter..."

Try vLex and Vincent AI for free

Start a free trial

Experience vLex's unparalleled legal AI

Access millions of documents and let Vincent AI power your research, drafting, and document analysis — all in one platform.

Start a free trial

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
2 books and journal articles
Document | Núm. 54-4, January 2021 – 2021
Review of the Year 2021 in Family Law: Getting Back to Normal
"...family law arbitration. 120. See, e.g. , Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 177–80 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020). 121. See, e.g. , Scott v. Scott, 472 P.3d 897, 900 (Utah 2020). 122. Sinda , 949 N.W.2d at 179–80. 123. Scott , 472 P.3d at 907 (ex-wife sharing residence for 42 days was sufficient to ter..."
Document | Núm. 54-4, January 2021 – 2021
Review of the Year 2020 in Family Law: COVID-19, Zoom, and Family Law in a Pandemic
"...family law arbitration. 120. See, e.g. , Sinda v. Sinda, 949 N.W.2d 170, 177–80 (Minn. Ct. App. 2020). 121. See, e.g. , Scott v. Scott, 472 P.3d 897, 900 (Utah 2020). 122. Sinda , 949 N.W.2d at 179–80. 123. Scott , 472 P.3d at 907 (ex-wife sharing residence for 42 days was sufficient to ter..."

Try vLex and Vincent AI for free

Start a free trial

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex
4 cases
Document | Utah Supreme Court – 2022
N. Monticello Alliance, LLC v. San Juan Cnty.
"...2002 UT 77, ¶ 11, 52 P.3d 1267 ("We may affirm the court of appeals’ decision on any ground supported in the record."); Scott v. Scott , 2020 UT 54, ¶ 30, 472 P.3d 897 (noting that "[a]s an appellee," a party "had the prerogative of identifying alternative grounds for affirmance"). We decli..."
Document | Utah Supreme Court – 2021
Croft v. Morgan Cnty.
"...application, we "cite to the version of the statute that was in effect at the time of the events giving rise to [the] suit." Scott v. Scott , 2020 UT 54, ¶ 1 n.1, 472 P.3d 897 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).2 "When reviewing a rule 12(b)(6) mo..."
Document | Utah Court of Appeals – 2021
Sanders v. Sanders
"...court's order on an alternative ground that is apparent from the record, "[b]ut we ha[ve] no obligation to do so." Scott v. Scott , 2020 UT 54, ¶ 31, 472 P.3d 897. Kristine asserts that Travis's motion was a motion to reconsider simply because his "second Rule 60 motion asserted the same gr..."
Document | Utah Court of Appeals – 2024
Kinsey v. Kinsey
"...determination of a mixed question of fact and law that is entitled to substantial deference on appeal." Scott v. Scott, 2020 UT 54, ¶ 34, 472 P.3d 897. But to the extent that determination turns on the interpretation of a statute, the "proper interpretation and application of a statute is a..."

Try vLex and Vincent AI for free

Start a free trial

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant

  • Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database

  • Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength

  • Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities

  • Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

vLex