Scott v. Tonkin

TONIA SCOTT, Plaintiff, v. RAYMOND TONKIN, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 20-CV-5412

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DECEMBER 9, 2020

MEMORANDUM

ROBRENO, J.

Plaintiff Tonia Scott, a prisoner currently confined at the Norristown State Hospital in connection with criminal charges pending against her in Pike County, filed this civil action against Pike County District Attorney Raymond Tonkin and Jessica Keith, identified in the Complaint as the CEO of Norristown State Hospital. For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss Scott's Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), as legally frivolous and for failure to state a claim.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS¹

Scott has been charged with numerous offenses, including aggravated assault, terrorism, criminal trespass, defiant trespass, firearms offenses, simple assault, and harassment, in three separate criminal matters pending before the Court of Common Pleas for Pike County, Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth v. Scott, Docket Nos. CP-52-CR-0000096-2020, CP-52-CR-0000211-2020, CP-52-CR-0000687-2019 (C.P. Pike). The docket sheets for these mattersreflect that Scott was recently found incompetent to stand trial and committed to the Norristown State Hospital for treatment.² See id.

Scott's claims in the instant matter concern her prosecution in Pike County and her related confinement at the Norristown State Hospital. Scott identifies herself as the Principal Chief of the Saw Creek and Pine Ridge Indian communities. (ECF No. 2 at 5.)³ Scott alleges that on November 18, 2019, she and "tribal officials were illegally and unlawfully arrested by over twenty (20) Pennsylvania State Police Officers on the Pike County Land recorded Indian Title of Pine Ridge" upon which the officers were allegedly trespassing. (Id.) She alleges that District Attorney Tonkin initiated false charges against her to "extort" her "into the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's civil and criminal jurisdiction." (Id. at 3.) That allegation appears to be predicated on Scott's assertion that "the Saw Creek and Pine Ridge Indian Communities Tribal Government has Not contracted with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for Assumption by State of Criminal Jurisdiction." (Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).) In short, she believes that the Pike County Court of Common Pleas lacks jurisdiction to prosecute her for the crimes with which she is charged.

As a result of the charges, Scott claims she has been falsely imprisoned in two institutions, the Pike County Correctional Facility ("PCCF")⁴ and Norristown State Hospital, where she has been held since October 14, 2020. (Id. at 3.) Scott alleges that she is being held at Norristown State Hospital without her consent or a contract. (Id.) She also claims she lost unspecified personal property when it was unlawfully seized by the Pennsylvania State Police. (Id. at 5.)

Scott indicates that she is bringing constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.⁵ (Id. at 3.) She seeks the following injunctive relief: (1) suspension of the all criminal charges; (2) release from custody/"restrain[t]" of her imprisonment at Norristown State Hospital; and (3) "an injunction to have her personal property returned to her that was unlawfully and illegally seized by the Pennsylvania State Police." (Id. at 5 & 14.) Scott subsequently submitted numerous exhibits and letters, which pertain to proceedings in her Pike County criminal casesand reassert that she is being held at Norristown State Hospital without her consent, and a brief in support of her Complaint.⁶ (ECF Nos. 4-10 & 12.)

Prior to filing her Complaint in this Court, Scott filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In evaluating that petition, Judge Kane dismissed without prejudice any claims Scott raised on behalf of others, dismissed Scott's claims challenging the conditions of confinement at PCCF without prejudice to her raising those claims in a separate lawsuit, and directed Scott to file an amended petition. See Scott v. Pike Cty. Corr. Facility, Civ. A. No. 20-828, 2020 WL 5548721, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2020). Scott filed an amended habeas petition, which Judge Kane ultimately dismissed without prejudice because Scott "failed to demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances necessary for the Court to excuse her failure to exhaust and adjudicate her claims for relief on the merits." Id. at *3.

Following the dismissal of her habeas petition, Scott was transferred to Norristown State Hospital. She thereafter filed the instant lawsuit and an identical lawsuit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which Judge Kane dismissed upon screening for the following reasons. See Scott v. Tonkin, Civ. A. No. 20-02067, 2020 WL 6940828, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2020). First, the court concluded that to the extent Scott sought release from custody, such relief was not available to her in a § 1983 action. Id. at *3. Second, the court concluded that it could not intervene in Scott's pending criminal cases. Id. at *3-*4 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). Third, the court dismissed any claims raised pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 and § 242because neither of those statutes creates a civil cause of action. Id. at *4. Fourth, the court rejected Scott's request for an injunction against the officers who seized her property because she had not named those officers as defendants and, in any event, failed to allege that she had taken advantage of available state procedures or that those procedures were defective. Id. Fifth, the court concluded that Tonkin was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Id. Finally, the court dismissed Scott's claims against Keith without prejudice to Scott's ability to pursue those claims in her instant lawsuit, where venue over those claims was proper. Id. at *5.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Scott seeks to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter but, as she is a prisoner for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), she was required to submit a certified copy of her prison account statement from any facility in which she was confined for the six-month period prior to filing her Complaint. Id. § 1915(a)(2). Regardless, in Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 660 (3d Cir. 2019) (en banc), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit announced a "flexible approach" that permits the screening of complaints filed by prisoners pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915A even if the prisoner has neither paid the fees nor been granted in forma pauperis status.

Section 1915A requires that the Court "review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In doing so, the Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion thereof that "is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Id. § 1915A(b)(1). A complaint is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact," Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), and is legally baseless if it is "based on anindisputably meritless legal theory." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1995). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). As Scott is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her allegations liberally. Higgs v. Att'y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Seeking Release and Dismissal of Criminal Charges

The primary gist of Scott's Complaint is that she seeks release from Norristown State Hospital and/or dismissal of the charges pending against her in Pike County on the basis that the Commonwealth lacks jurisdiction over her because of her Native American heritage and/or the status of the land upon which she was arrested. In other words, she is challenging the legality of her custody, which is based on the pending criminal charges in Pike County. When a prisoner "is challenging the very fact or duration of h[er] physical imprisonment, and the relief [s]he seeks is a determination that [s]he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, h[er] sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). A request for dismissal of criminal charges is akin to a request for release so that relief, too, is only available through a habeas petition. See Jaffery v. Atl. Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 695 F. App'x 38, 41-42 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) ("[T]o the extent Jaffery seeks dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, such relief is only available through a writ of habeas corpus."); Duran v. Weeks, 399 F. App'x 756, 759 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ("[T]o the extent that Duran is seeking dismissal of the charges against him as a result of constitutional violations, he is essentially asking for relief only available through habeas corpus.").

In any event, the Court will abstain from interference in Scott's state criminal proceedings. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court "established a principle of abstention when federal adjudication would disrupt an ongoing state criminal proceeding." Yang v. Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 2005); see also PDX N., Inc. v. Comm'r N.J. Dep't of Labor & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871, 882 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that Younger applies when the underlying state case is a criminal prosecution). Younger abstention "is premised on the notion of comity, a principle of deference and 'proper respect' for state governmental functions in our federal system." Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, ...