Scutella v. Erie Cnty. Prison

JHEN SCUTELLA, Plaintiff v. ERIE COUNTY PRISON, et al., Defendants

Case No. 1:19-cv-245 (Erie)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 20, 2020

RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

ECF NO. 30

ECF NO. 38

Pro se Plaintiff Jhen Scutella (Scutella) has sued the Erie County prison, prison officials, and prison health care providers, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. ECF No. 5 (Complaint). All Defendants have moved to dismiss of, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF No. 30; ECF No. 38.

I. Procedural History

When Scutella commenced this action, he was an inmate incarcerated at the Erie County prison (ECP) in Erie, Pennsylvania. ECF No. 3 (IFP application).¹ His Complaint alleged that ECP personnel were deliberately indifferent to his serious dental condition, thereby violating his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. ECF No. 5, p. 2. Scutella asked for equitable relief in the form of an injunction directing ECP personnel to refer him to an oral surgeon or otherprofessional with the equipment and qualifications necessary to assess and, if necessary, treat his condition. See ECF No. 46, p. 1.

The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing during which Scutella testified. Id. Affidavits from Dr. Merski, and ECP Deputy Warden Holman were also entered into the record as were Scutella's ECP dental records. Id. Based on that evidence, the Court determined that Scutella was entitled to injunctive relief. Id. The Court ordered the Defendants to "schedule a consultation with an oral surgeon or other appropriate specialist and arrange necessary transportation for Scutella to that consultation." Id., p. 13. The Defendants were also ordered to file a status report with the Court within three weeks to apprise the Court of the status of their compliance with the order. Id. The Defendants complied with the order, notifying that Court that "[o]n February 12, 2020, the Erie County Prison transported Plaintiff to and from an appointment with Dr. Jeffrey P. Miller at Quad County Oral & Maxillofacial Surgery in Butler, Pennsylvania." ECF No. 51, p. 2.

Irrespective of this Court's order granting Scutella injunctive relief, motions to dismiss the underlying Complaint remain pending. Defendants ECP, Chaffee and Stevens have filed a motion to dismiss, ECF No. 30, and Defendants Wexford Health Services (Wexford), Holby and Bhatti (first identified as "Jane Doe") filed a separate motion seeking dismissal, ECF No. 38. Both sets of Defendants move, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF No. 30; ECF No. 38. Scutella filed a single document, responding to both Defendants' motions. ECF No. 62. The matter is now ready for disposition.

III. Legal Standards

A. Motions to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is not deciding whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits;instead, a plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). A complaint should only be dismissed under Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (rejecting the traditional Rule 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff in making this determination. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).

While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955. See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.").

Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated these three steps:

First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleadedfactual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."

Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937.

B. Pro Se Pleading Standards

Although Scutella is now represented by counsel, all of Scutella's pleadings and other submissions were filed when he was proceeding pro se.² For that reason, the Court will review those filings consistent with the lenient standards for pro se filings described in Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and its progeny. A filing from a pro se litigant is to be "liberally construed" and a "pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89. 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 206 (1976)). Additionally, when considering a motion in a pro se plaintiff's case, a court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Holley v. Dep't of Veteran's Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). Despite this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Phillips v. County of Allegheny has ruled that if a District Court is dismissing a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) in a civil rights case, it must sua sponte "permit a curativeamendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable of futile." 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008).

C. Conversion of a Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment

The Defendants ask the Court, as an alternative to dismissing the case, to grant summary judgment. They repeatedly reference documents attached to and relied on in support of their motions to dismiss, including Scutella's dental records. See, e.g., ECF No. 30-1 through ECF No. 30-6, inclusive; ECF No. 39-1, 39-2. Ordinarily, such documents cannot be examined by a District Court at the motion to dismiss stage because a court "must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." Meyer v. Delaware Valley Lift Truck, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 3d 483, 489 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (quoting Myer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)). This rule ceases to apply, however, if a court "converts" the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). To convert the motion, a court must ensure that "the materials submitted require conversion" and that "the parties ha[ve] adequate notice of the ... court's intention to convert." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec. Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, the decision to convert is entirely discretionary—the Court may simply disregard the extraneous materials and treat the motion to dismiss as a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Zuber v. Boscov's, 2018 WL 2086895, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454 (3d Cir. 1992)). Here, the motion will not be converted, as a discretionary matter. Therefore, only materials properly presented on a motion to dismiss—namely, the Complaint itself—will be considered.

IV. The Complaint

Scutella's Complaint is a model of brevity. It consists of two typed pages and sets out one claim. See ECF No. 5. Accepting, as the Court should, Scutella's allegations as true, the Complaintrelates that during the last week of July, 2019, Scutella began "experiencing pain in the left side of his jaw." Id., ¶ 3. Scutella experienced similar pain years prior while he was incarcerated in a state penitentiary. Id. At that time, prison dentists told him he had an impacted wisdom tooth, which was ultimately extracted. Id. Dentists also...