Scutt v. Dorris

JASON SCUTT, Plaintiff, v. KELLI DORRIS; XIAYIN (GAOQUIANG) LIN; and CHARLENE CHEN, Defendants.

CIV. NO. 20-00333 JMS-WRP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII

December 14, 2020

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, ECF NO. 8

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 2, 2020, pro se Plaintiff Jason Scutt ("Plaintiff") filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC")¹ against Defendants Kelli Dorris ("Dorris"), Xiayin (Gaoquiang) Lin ("Lin"), and Charlene Chen ("Chen") (collectively, "Defendants") alleging discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq. ECF No. 8. Based on the following, the court DISMISSES the FAC with leave to amend.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Complaint

Plaintiff's original Complaint alleged an FHA claim against Defendants based on Plaintiff's status as a "transgender/LGBTQIA+" and "disabled" person. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff sought relief in the form of an injunction preventing Defendants from evicting Plaintiff and damages of at least $100,000. Id. at PageID ## 6-7.

On September 10, 2020, this court dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim (the "September 10 Order"). ECF No. 7. The September 10 Order explained that Plaintiff failed to "allege facts beyond the mere accusation of discrimination . . . [that] show[] a causal relationship between any specific Defendant's conduct and Plaintiff's status as a transgender/LGBTQIA+ and/or disabled person." Id. at PageID # 74. That is, the Complaint:

fail[ed] to allege any facts whatsoever showing that Lin and Chen's conduct was because Plaintiff is transgender/LGBTQIA+ and/or disabled. In short, the Complaint fail[ed] to allege facts showing what role each Defendant ha[d] in connection with Plaintiff's housing ^[] and what exactly each Defendant did to prevent Plaintiff from exiting her apartment and/or otherwise discriminate against her in the use or enjoyment of her apartment.

Id. at PageID # 75 (footnote omitted). In addition, the September 10 Order explained that "[i]f Dorris is not, in fact, Plaintiff's landlord, Dorris may not beliable under the FHA. Id. n.4 (citing Hoostein v. Mental Health Ass'n (MHA), Inc., 98 F. Supp. 3d 293, 297-98 (D. Mass. 2015) (holding that "Plaintiffs lack a cause of action under [§§ 3604 & 3617] of the FHA against . . . tenants . . . and any other individuals or entities who do not actually own [the relevant property]").

Because Plaintiff had subsequently moved out of the apartment, the court explained that her claim for injunctive relief was moot. Id. at PageID ## 75-76. Plaintiff was granted leave to amend to allege, if possible, "factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible FHA discrimination claim for damages." Id. at PageID # 76. The court instructed Plaintiff that if she chose to amend, she must, in part, "explain, in clear and concise allegations, what each defendant did (or failed to do) and how those specific facts create a plausible claim for relief in reference to a specific cause of action." Id. The court further explained that an amended complaint "may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint." Id. at PageID # 77.

B. FAC²

Plaintiff then filed a four-page amended complaint to which she attached a 42-page Exhibit A, comprised of various documents that both supportand supplement the amended complaint. ECF Nos. 8, 8-1. For screening purposes, the court construes these documents together as the FAC. The FAC is rather confusing and includes many irrelevant allegations. Nevertheless, as best the court discerns, the FAC alleges that Lin and Chen were Plaintiff's landlords and Dorris was another tenant in the building where Plaintiff lived. See ECF No. 8 at PageID # 83 (alleging that "[l]andlords employed Dorris" to post Notice to Vacate on Plaintiff's door); Ex. A, ECF No. 8-1 at PageID # 98 (notice identifying Lin and Chen as "Landlords"), id. at PageID # 99 (note signed by Dorris at "landlord's request"); id. at PageID # 102 (email describing Dorris as Plaintiff's "abusive neighbor downstairs"); but see id. at PageID ## 103, 110 (emails referring to Dorris as Plaintiff's landlord); id. at PageID # 118 (email stating that Dorris "may or may not be the landlord").

On or around July 1, 2020, Plaintiff applied in state court for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") against Dorris, claiming in part that Dorris would not "allow[] [Plaintiff] to leave the common area exit," and had "behaved violently," causing Plaintiff to be afraid. Id. at PageID # 129. The FAC alleges that Dorris then "used the [TRO] to block the exit with her body and vehicle thereby requiring Plaintiff to walk within 10 feet of her just to leave the building." ECF No. 8 at PageID # 83. As Plaintiff explained in emails dated July 23, 2020, Plaintiff "can exit physically, but it would be in violation of the terms of [the]restraining order;" that is, Plaintiff "[c]an't physically leave via the only legal exit to [her] apartment, without 'approaching [Dorris]' or otherwise violating the court restraining order, and [Dorris] has made it clear that [Plaintiff does] NOT have her permission at any time to use the common exit, nor to enter thereafter." ECF No. 8-1 at PageID ## 112, 115. By note also dated July 23, 2020, at "landlord's request," Dorris granted Plaintiff permission to "exit the unit, includ[ing] the common area, Garage and drive way . . . from 07/24/2020-09/06/2020." Id. at PageID # 99. Dorris' note permits Plaintiff only to exit the building and states that if Plaintiff uses the exit for others, Dorris' permission will end and she will "exercise [her] legal rights." Id.

The FAC alleges that around this time, Dorris "began to [make] . . . anti-Semitic statements." ECF No. 8 at PageID # 83. In an email dated July 19, 2020, Plaintiff states that Dorris "uses the word 'kike'³ frequently in conversation." ECF No. 8-1 at PageID # 103. And although Plaintiff does not specify whether she is Jewish, the FAC also alleges that in December 2019, Plaintiff received noise complaints while "listening to Hannukah music." ECF No. 8 at PageID # 84.

The FAC alleges that "acting as agent and on behalf of the building's owner," Dorris enforced "cleanliness in the common area," "noise complaints," and served and signed for mail belonging to the owner and tenants. Id. at PageID # 83.

The FAC alleges that "Plaintiff's trans/LGBT status would have been known . . . by her dress, appearance and shared laundry facilities where clothing belonging to the building's tenants is commonly in view of the other tenants." Id. at PageID # 84. Plaintiff "witnessed Dorris and other[s] . . . walk by and observe [Plaintiff] doing laundry in the common area" where they "must have reasonably seen or been aware of clothing and underwear contrary to typical 'Male' gender expectations." Id.

The FAC further alleges that "Landlords employed [Dorris] to" post a Notice to Vacate on Plaintiff's front door. Id. at PageID # 83. The Notice to Vacate from Lin and Chen, dated July 24, 2020, gave Plaintiff "45 days," or until "September 6th, 2020," to move out, stated that Plaintiff's failure to do so would "force [Lin and Chen] to exercise [their] legal rights," and waived fines or penalties if Plaintiff chose to move out sooner. ECF No. 8-1 at PageID # 98. That same day, Chen sent a copy of the Notice and Dorris' note (regarding permission to exit the unit) to Plaintiff via email. Id. at PageID # 124. In her email message, Chen stated that she would also send copies of these documents to Plaintiff via textand by delivery. Id. After receiving the Notice to Vacate, Plaintiff allegedly experienced unspecified "intensified Civil harassment," resulting in "an actual deadline to leave of more like three days." ECF No. 8 at PageID # 84.

The FAC alleges that Defendants' "harassment and eviction" of Plaintiff "were a direct result of [Defendants'] beliefs or opinions of both non-Christian and/or trans/LGBT" people. Id. at PageID # 85 (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, Plaintiff claims that in violation of the FHA, Defendants took "unreasonable actions . . . to remove a tenant based on objections to her LGBT status and . . . religious beliefs." Id. Plaintiff seeks damages of $300,000 "to relocate and for emotional pain and physical stress caused as a direct result of the discrimination." Id. at PageID # 86.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The court must subject each civil action commenced pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the dismissal of any complaint that is "frivolous or malicious; . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or . . . seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "not only permits but requires" the court to dismiss sua sponte an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state aclaim); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding that "the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners").

To state a claim, a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the court must set conclusory factual allegations aside, accept non-conclusory factual allegations as true, and determine whether these allegations state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). A complaint that lacks a cognizable legal theory or alleges insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory fails to state a claim. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).

A district...