Sealey v. Olszewski

WANDA SEALEY, Plaintiff, v. D. OLSZEWSKI, D. SPEYER, K. OLIVER,R. RATAJCZAK, and SERGEANT OSBORNE,¹ Defendants.

14-CV-3S

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

December 28, 2015

DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, pro se plaintiff Wanda Sealey alleges that the defendant corrections officers illegally denied her access to the Wyoming Correctional Facility by subjecting her to harassing and abusive security-screening procedures when she tried to visit her inmate brother. Sealey contends that Defendants violated her First, Fourth,² Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She brings her claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.

Presently before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Sealey's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket No. 6.) For the following reasons,Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part, and Sealey will be directed to file an Amended Complaint.

II. BACKGROUND

The following facts, drawn from Sealey's complaint, are assumed true for purposes of Defendants' motion.

Sealey is an African-American woman who resides in Niagara Falls, New York. (Complaint, ¶ 2.) Defendants are Caucasian correctional officers employed at Wyoming Correctional Facility ("Wyoming") in Attica, New York. (Complaint, ¶¶ 3, 8.) Sealey's brother is an inmate at Wyoming. (Complaint, ¶ 9.)

On December 21, 2013, Sealey and her sister Mildred Sealey went to visit their brother at Wyoming. (Complaint, ¶ 9.) When Sealey and her sister arrived at the security post, Defendants told Sealey that she could not enter the visiting area wearing Spandex pants. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) Sealey told Defendants that this was her first visit to Wyoming and that she was unfamiliar with the visiting procedures. (Complaint, ¶ 15.) Sealey then changed into an extra pair of pants that Mildred Sealey had in her car, returned to the security post wearing the new pants, and then set off the metal detector when she passed through it. (Complaint, ¶ 10.)

After the metal detector signaled, Defendant Olszewski told Sealey that she could not enter the visiting area unless she removed the new pants she had just changed into. (Complaint, ¶ 10.) He also told Mildred Sealey, who had already successfully passed through the security post, to proceed to the visiting area. (Complaint, ¶ 12.) Before she did so, however, Mildred Sealey gave Sealey a long overcoat, which Mildred Sealey had previously passed through the metal detector.(Complaint, ¶ 11.) Mildred Sealey then went to the visiting area as directed. (Complaint, ¶ 13.)

Meanwhile, Sealey went into a bathroom, took off her pants, put on the overcoat (with only underwear on underneath), and emerged to try to clear security for a third time. (Complaint, ¶¶ 11-13, 25.) She was the only visitor in the security-post area. (Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 16.) Sealey placed the pants in a bin and proceeded through the metal detector, which once again signaled. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Knowing that Sealey had no pants on under her overcoat, Defendant Olszewski told Sealey to remove her coat or she could not enter the visiting area. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Defendants did not use an available handheld metal detector to inspect Sealey, despite Defendant Olszewski knowing that only the buckle of the coat was setting off the metal detector. (Complaint, ¶ 14.)

Sealey refused to remove her coat, because doing so would have left her "virtually naked." (Complaint, ¶ 13.) Instead, Sealey got dressed and left the facility. (Complaint, ¶ 13.) As she departed, "Defendants were all laughing and treating [Sealey] with great disrespect, ridicule, and appeared intent on gaining sexual gratification in abusing her." (Complaint, ¶¶ 13, 16.)

III. DISCUSSION

Cognizant of the distinct disadvantage that pro se litigants face, federal courts routinely read their submissions liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 596, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). SinceSealey is a pro se litigant, this Court has considered her submissions and arguments accordingly.

Sealey's first, second, and sixth claims pertain to her allegations that Defendant's violated her right to visit her brother. Sealey's first claim is that Defendants violated her right to association under the First Amendment (Complaint ¶ 25); her second claim is that Defendants violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment (Complaint, ¶ 21); her sixth claim is that Defendants violated her Equal Protection and Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Complaint, ¶ 25). Sealey brings these claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Sealey's third claim, which she also brings under 42 U.S.C. §1983, is that Defendants violated her Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. (Complaint, ¶ 22.)

Sealey's fourth and fifth claims allege that the way in which Defendants treated her at the security post violated her right to equal protection of the laws. Sealey's fourth claim is that Defendants violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by acting in concert, motivated by "racial, invidious discrimination animus," to deny her equal protection of the laws. (Complaint, ¶ 23.) Sealey brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. §1985 (3). Her fifth claim is that Defendants knew about the conspiracy alleged in her fourth claim but neglected or refused to prevent the harm caused by that conspiracy. Sealey brings this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

Sealey's seventh claim is that Defendants, while acting as employees of the State of New York, intentionally or negligently injured her, thereby giving rise to a tort claim against the State of New York. (Complaint, ¶ 26.)

In addition, Sealey's complaint alleges a Fourth Amendment unreasonable-search claim, brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, as recognized in Judge Curtin's Order. (See Order, Docket No. 3.)

Defendants move to dismiss each of Sealey's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, under Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A. Rule 12 (b)(6) Standard

Rule 12 (b)(6) allows dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b)(6). Federal pleading standards are generally not stringent: Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of a claim. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). But the plain statement must "possess enough heft to show that the pleader is entitled to relief." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

When determining whether a complaint states a claim, the court must construe it liberally, accept all factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007). Legal conclusions, however, are not afforded the same presumption of truthfulness. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ("the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.")

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1945 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Labels, conclusions, or "aformulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists when the facts alleged allow for a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct charged. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. The plausibility standard is not, however, a probability requirement: the pleading must show, not merely allege, that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950; FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Well-pleaded allegations in the complaint must nudge the claim "across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

A two-pronged approach is thus used to examine the sufficiency of a complaint, which includes "any documents that are either incorporated into the complaint by reference or attached to the complaint as exhibits." Blue Tree Hotels Inv. (Can.), Ltd. v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 369 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2004). This examination is context specific and requires that the court draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. First, statements that are not entitled to the presumption of truth, such as conclusory allegations, labels, and legal conclusions, are identified and stripped away. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. Second, well-pleaded, non-conclusory factual allegations are presumed true and examined to determine whether they "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. "Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," the complaint fails to state a claim. Id.

In pro se actions, the United States Supreme Court has rejected the idea that the plausibility standard requires amplification with factual allegations to render the claim plausible. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). In Erickson, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of a prisoner's EighthAmendment claim, holding that the court of appeals had "depart[ed] from the liberal pleading standards" of Rule 8(a). Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2200). Although the Court did not clarify when the plausibility standard requires factual amplification, it noted that "a pro se complaint however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50...