Sears v. Clark

RICHARD SEARS, Petitioner v. MICHAEL CLARK, et al., Respondents

No. 1:20-cv-02305

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

August 31, 2021

MEMORANDUM

Kane Judge

On December 9, 2020, pro se Petitioner Richard Sears initiated the above-captioned action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 while still incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Albion, Pennsylvania (“SCI Albion”). (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner subsequently notified the Court that he had been released from incarceration and is currently living in Pittsburgh Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 7.) Following Orders to show cause (Doc. Nos. 9, 10) and after receiving two (2) extensions of time (Doc. Nos. 12-15), Respondents filed a response to Petitioner's § 2254 petition on July 28, 2021 (Doc No. 16). Petitioner's § 2254 petition is, therefore ripe for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On July 15, 2015, following a jury trial in the Court of Common Pleas for Northumberland County, Pennsylvania, Petitioner was convicted of possession of unauthorized weapons and possession of weapons or implements for escape. (Doc. No. 16-2.) These charges arose during an incident that occurred while Petitioner was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Coal Township, Pennsylvania (“SCI Coal Township”). (Doc. No. 16-11 at 17-18.) Petitioner represented himself at trial. (Doc. No. 16-2.) Attorney John Broda was appointed as standby counsel. (Doc. No. 16-11 at 2.) Petitioner was convicted of possession of unauthorized weapons and possession of weapons or implements for escape and sentenced on December 7, 2015 to an aggregate of four (4) to ten (10) years' incarceration. (Doc. No. 16-2.) Petitioner subsequently filed post-sentence motions, which the trial court denied. (Id.) Petitioner timely appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. On May 12, 2017, the Superior Court quashed his appeal because Petitioner's brief was defective. (Doc. No. 16-20.) The Superior Court noted that “the nature of [Petitioner's] brief is such that we find our ability to conduct appellate review severely impaired.” (Id. at 3.) Specifically, the Superior Court noted that Petitioner's brief was a “mishmash of repetitive, mostly incoherent rambling in which he repeatedly ma[de] reference to unspecified acts of fraud committed by the judges and attorneys in the matter and accuse[d] them of fabricating unnamed court documents.” (Id.) Petitioner also made multiple references to the Uniform Commercial Code and alleged that the Magisterial District Judge “asserted ‘authority to conduct a criminal action against [him] under a secret jurisdiction known only to judges and licensed attorneys[.]'” (Id.) On January 4, 2018, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Petitioner's petition for allowance of appeal. (Doc. No. 16-21.)

On January 19, 2019, Petitioner filed a pro se Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition. (Doc. No. 16-22.) On February 1, 2019, the PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner. (Doc. No. 16-24.) On March 5, 2019, counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988), alleging that there was no merit to Petitioner's PCRA petition. (Doc. No. 16-25.) On March 7, 2019, the PCRA court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and issued a notice that it intended to dismiss Petitioner's PCRA petition without a hearing. (Doc. No. 16-26.) On March 25, 2019, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and extension of time to file an amended PCRA petition. (Doc. No. 16-27.) On June 19, 2019, the PCRA court denied Petitioner's PCRA petition. (Doc. No. 16-28.)

Petitioner timely appealed to the Superior Court, raising the following issues: (1) his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because the Commonwealth proceeded via a criminal information rather than by seeking an indictment by a grand jury; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the PCRA court erred by failing to grant him leave file an amended PCRA petition in response to the motion to withdraw; and (4) PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assistance. (Doc. No. 16-30 at 3.) While his appeal was pending, Petitioner filed a § 2254 petition with this Court. See Sears v. Clark, No. 1:19-cv-641, 2019 WL 2541643, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 20, 2019). In a Memorandum and Order dated June 20, 2019, this Court dismissed Petitioner's § 2254 petition without prejudice for Petitioner's failure to exhaust his state court remedies. See id. at *3. On April 30, 2020, the Superior Court affirmed the denial of Petitioner's PCRA petition. (Doc. No. 16-30 at 2.) On September 29, 2020, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Petitioner's petition for allowance of appeal. (Doc. No. 2 at 3.) Petitioner subsequently filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on December 9, 2020. (Doc. No. 1.)

B. Petitioner's Habeas Claims

Petitioner raises the following grounds for relief in the instant habeas petition:

1. Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to impartial judges and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from fraud were violated when the state courts included false information in various court documents;

2. Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was charged via a criminal information instead of an indictment issued by a grand jury; and

3. Petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the state courts denied him counsel “despite knowing [he] did not understand the nature of the charges against [him] and/or without there being any evidence of a verbal and written colloquy appearing on the record” indicating that he waived his right to counsel.

(Id.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Habeas corpus is an “‘extraordinary remedy' reserved for defendants who were ‘grievously wronged' by the criminal proceedings.” See Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 468 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 414, 146 (1998)). The exercise of restraint by a federal court in reviewing and granting habeas relief is appropriate due to considerations of comity and federalism. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). “The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional law.” Id. States also have a recognized interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review within the state court system. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 620 (1993).

A district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If a claim presented in a § 2254 petition has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief may not be granted unless:

the adjudication of the claim[] (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Id. § 2254(d).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

The Court must first determine whether Petitioner's grounds for relief presented in his § 2254 petition have been exhausted in the state courts and, if not, whether circumstances exist to excuse Petitioner's procedural default of his claims. Respondents assert that all three grounds for relief raised by Petitioner in his § 2254 petition are procedurally defaulted. (Doc. No. 16 at 5.)

Absent unusual circumstances, a federal court should not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus, unless the petitioner has first satisfied the exhaustion requirement articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). Under § 2254(c), a petitioner will not be deemed to have exhausted his available state remedies if he had the right under the law of the state to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented. See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999). A federal claim may be exhausted either by being raised on direct appeal or presented in post-conviction PCRA proceedings. See id. at 845. In addition, a claim is exhausted when it has been “fairly presented” to the state court. See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). To that end, the federal habeas claim “must be the substantial equivalent of that presented to the state courts.” See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). The petition must do so “in a manner that puts [the respondents] on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” See Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 725 (3d Cir. 2005). “The Supreme Court has instructed that a claim is not ‘fairly presented' if the state court ‘must read beyond a petition or brief . . . in order to find material' that indicates the presence of a federal claim.” Collins v. Sec'y of Pa. Dep't of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 542 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004)). Moreover, a habeas corpus petitioner has the burden of proving the exhaustion of all available state remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Overall, the exhaustion requirement advances the goals of comity and federalism while reducing “piecemeal litigation.” See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180 (2001).

“When a claim is not exhausted because it has not been ‘fairly presented' to the ...