Sease v. Comm'r of Corr.

212 Conn.App. 99

274 A.3d 129

Antwan SEASE

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 44160

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 16, 2021

Officially released April 26, 2022

Vishal K. Garg, West Hartford, for the appellant (petitioner).

James M. Ralls, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese Hodge, state's attorney, and JoAnne Sulik, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Cradle, Clark and Flynn, Js.

FLYNN, J.

Sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal process. Gardner v. Florida , 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S. Ct. 1197, 51 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1977). In United States v. Pinkney , 551 F.2d 1241, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court held that "the first step toward assuring proper protection for the rights to which defendants are entitled at sentencing is recognition by defense counsel that this may well be the most important part of the entire proceeding." Before this court is the appeal of the petitioner, Antwan Sease, following the habeas court's denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner raises three principal issues on appeal: (1) the court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal; (2) his right of due process was violated by the prosecuting authority's knowing presentation of false testimony at his criminal trial; and (3) the court improperly denied his claim that his right to effective assistance of trial counsel at sentencing was violated. We make no determination as to whether the petitioner prevails on his third claim, but we conclude that the habeas court improperly denied his petition for certification to appeal, and remand the matter to the habeas court for additional factual findings regarding the performance prong of his ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing claim. We leave the petitioner's second claim to another day in light of our remand order on his third claim.

For our purposes here, the underlying facts can be summarized from this court's opinion affirming the judgment of his conviction in State v. Sease , 147 Conn. App. 805, 83 A.3d 1206, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 932, 87 A.3d 581 (2014), as follows. On October 3, 2009, the petitioner met with another man, Quan Morgan. Id., at 807, 83 A.3d 1206. Each armed himself with a .38 caliber handgun that the petitioner had provided. Id. At approximately 2:30 a.m., the petitioner and Morgan walked to the rear of a club on Main Street in Hartford where they robbed two men in the presence of several witnesses. Id., at 807–808, 83 A.3d 1206. The petitioner walked up to a car in which the victim, Edward Haslam, was seated. Id. After telling Haslam to " ‘empty your [f—] pockets,’ " the petitioner fatally shot Haslam in the chest. Id., at 808, 83 A.3d 1206. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (2) and 53a-48. The petitioner was sentenced to thirty years’ incarceration for felony murder, twenty years’ incarceration for robbery, and ten years’ incarceration for conspiracy to commit robbery, which sentences were to run consecutively to each other, for a total effective sentence of sixty years’ incarceration. A total effective sentence of sixty years imprisonment is equivalent to a life sentence. See General Statutes § 53a-35b.

In 2016, the petitioner commenced the present habeas action. In the operative third amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed in 2018, the petitioner alleged in count three that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for several reasons, including failing to investigate adequately the petitioner's mental health history and failing to present such evidence adequately as mitigation at sentencing.

In denying the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the habeas court determined that the two mental health records offered by the petitioner at the habeas trial did not "materially expand" on the information that had been presented to the sentencing court in the presentence investigation report and, therefore, the petitioner had failed to prove that there was any reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different had his trial counsel provided those mental health records to the sentencing court. The court concluded that no prejudice to the petitioner had been established. The court did not address the issue of deficient performance. The petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the habeas court denied. This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

We first address the habeas court's denial of the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal. "Faced with the habeas court's denial of certification to appeal, a petitioner's first burden is to demonstrate that the habeas court's ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. ... A petitioner may establish an abuse of discretion by demonstrating that the issues are debatable among jurists of reason ... [the] court could resolve the issues [in a different manner] ... or ... the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. ... The required determination may be made on the basis of the record before the habeas court and the applicable legal principles." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction , 285 Conn. 556, 564, 941 A.2d 248 (2008), quoting in part Simms v. Warden , 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994).

"In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner's underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner's appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review the petitioner's substantive claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria ... adopted by this court for determining the propriety of the habeas court's denial of the petition for certification. Absent such a showing by the petitioner, the judgment of the habeas court must be affirmed."

Taylor v. Commissioner of Correction , 284 Conn. 433, 449, 936 A.2d 611 (2007).

We conclude on the basis of our review of the petitioner's substantive claims on the merits that he has demonstrated that the court abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal. The record in the present case reveals an unusually troubled, traumatic, and extensive mental health history, significant parts of which were not also in the presentence investigation report. The petitioner had both audio and visual hallucinations throughout his life, was professionally diagnosed with schizophrenia, psychotic disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder, and he was prescribed a variety of psychiatric medications including Risperdal, Ritalin, Risperidone, and Trazodone. For reasons that follow, we conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition for certification to appeal. His ineffective assistance of counsel claim involves issues that are debatable among jurists of reason, are such that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner and raise questions that deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Simms v. Warden , supra, 230 Conn. at 616, 646 A.2d 126. Although the petitioner has surmounted that hurdle, we note on the basis of our review of the record that it would be premature to proceed to the final step wherein this court would decide whether the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on the merits. It is premature because findings are necessary from the habeas court about whether the petitioner's trial counsel rendered constitutionally deficient performance. We defer our decision with respect to whether the judgment of the habeas court should be reversed on the merits until we have reviewed the habeas court's findings that we order in our remand.

We next turn in our analysis to the petitioner's claim that the habeas court improperly denied his claim that his right to effective assistance of trial counsel had been violated. The petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to properly investigate and to adequately present evidence of the petitioner's mental health history in mitigation at the sentencing hearing.¹ The habeas court noted that among the petitioner's claims was that his trial counsel "failed to investigate and use the petitioner's mental health background as mitigation at sentencing." We see two aspects to the petitioner's claim. One is the alleged failure to investigate further. The other aspect is the failure of trial counsel to use all of the petitioner's mental health history that was presented to the habeas court as mitigation at sentencing. Because both aspects of this claim concern the petitioner's mental health records, the effectiveness of trial counsel at sentencing, and involve arguments that are linked in that they both involve some of the same facts, we will treat them together.

Our review of the petitioner's sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim is guided by the factors set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). "A convicted [petitioner's] claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction ... has two components. First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel's performance was deficient. ... Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. ... Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the...