Seaton v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc.

GABRIEL SEATON, Plaintiff, v. BLACK & DECKER (U.S.), INC., Defendant.

Case No. 2:20-CV-124

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE

April 13, 2021

Judge Collier

Magistrate Judge Wyrick

MEMORANDUM

Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment by Defendant Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc. (Doc. 19.) Plaintiff Gabriel Seaton has filed a response (Doc. 25), and Defendant has replied (Doc. 26). For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART and will DENY IN PART Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19).

I. BACKGROUND

On June 6, 2019, Plaintiff purchased a battery-powered hedge trimmer, manufactured by Defendant, from a hardware store in Greeneville, Tennessee. Plaintiff had "a good respect for different machinery and tools" (Doc. 25-2 at 2), although he had never assembled or operated a hedge trimmer.

After purchasing the hedge trimmer, Plaintiff began to assemble it at home. He unpacked the hedge trimmer's box, which was taped and sealed, and removed the box's contents to the kitchen counter. The box's contents included the hedge trimmer, a hand guard, and a shield for the blades, as well as an instruction manual. The instruction manual included several warnings, including not to touch the hedge trimmer blades, but did not warn the user that the hedge trimmer's battery was already attached and charged. There was no warning regarding the battery on the outside of the hedge trimmer's box. Plaintiff was not aware the battery was already attached to the hedge trimmer.

Having placed the box's contents on the kitchen counter, Plaintiff decided the hedge trimmer would be more stable, and avoid scratching the countertop, if he placed a towel underneath it. To do so, Plaintiff picked up the hedge trimmer, placing his left hand on the blades and his right hand on the handle. Plaintiff then lifted the hedge trimmer from the counter and accidentally pressed two switches located on the handle, which turned the hedge trimmer on. When the hedge trimmer turned on, its blades lacerated Plaintiff's left hand. Plaintiff immediately threw the hedge trimmer back onto the counter and pulled his fingers from the blades. He went to the emergency room where he received treatment for his injuries. Later on, Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Benjamin Rogozinski for the injuries to his hand.

On June 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendant in the Circuit Court for Greene County, Tennessee. (Doc. 1-1.) Plaintiff asserts claims for negligence, implied warranty of fitness, implied warranty of merchantability, and strict liability under Tennessee law. (Id.) On June 16, 2020, Defendant removed the case to this Court based on diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.)

The deadline for Plaintiff to make any expert disclosures was originally November 16, 2020. (Doc. 15.) On November 13, 2020, Plaintiff moved to continue this deadline, stating he needed to take Defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to decide if an expert was needed. (Doc. 16.) The Court denied Plaintiff's request, finding Plaintiff's reasons for an extension failed to establish good cause to amend the scheduling order. (Doc. 17.)

Defendant has moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 19.) Plaintiff has filed a response (Doc. 25), and Defendant has replied (Doc. 26). The motion for summary judgment is now ripe.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden to demonstrate no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court should view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, "the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). Indeed, a "[plaintiff] is not entitled to a trial on the basis of mere allegations." Smith v. City of Chattanooga, No. 1:08-cv-63, 2009 WL 3762961, at *2-3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2009) (explaining the court must determine whether "the record contains sufficient facts and admissible evidence from which a rational jury could reasonably find in favor of [the] plaintiff"). In addition, should the non-moving party fail to provide evidence to support an essential element of its case, the movant can meet its burden of demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact exists by pointing out such failure to the Court. Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir. 1989).

At summary judgment, the Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in addressing a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 255.If the Court concludes a fair-minded jury could not return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record, the Court should grant summary judgment. Id. at 251-52; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves for summary judgment on three grounds: Plaintiff's failure to establish one element of his products-liability claims, Plaintiff's comparative fault, and that certain categories of Plaintiff's claims for damages cannot succeed in the absence of expert testimony.

A. Products-Liability Claims

The parties agree that Tennessee law, particularly the Tennessee Products Liability Act (the "TPLA"), applies to this case. (See Doc. 22 at 5; Doc. 25 at 4.) The TPLA does not impose liability on "[a] manufacturer or seller of a product . . . for any injury to a person . . . caused by the product unless the product is determined to be in a defective condition or unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(a) (emphasis added). A prima facie products-liability claim therefore exists if the plaintiff shows three elements: "(1) the product was defective and/or unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defect existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control, and (3) the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the defective product." Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 483 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation omitted). These elements are the same regardless of the legal theory or theories on which the plaintiff relies. See Tatham v. Bridgestone Ams. Holdings, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 734, 749 (Tenn. 2015).

Defendant moves for summary judgment based only on Plaintiff's alleged failure to establish the first element of his TPLA claims, that is, that the hedge trimmer was either defectiveor unreasonably dangerous.¹ (Doc. 22 at 5-10.) Both alternatives—defective condition and unreasonably dangerous—are addressed in turn.

1. Defective Condition

The TPLA defines "defective condition" as "a condition of a product that renders it unsafe for normal or anticipatable handling and consumption." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-102(2). The plaintiff has the burden to identify a product's alleged defect. Langford v. Gatlinburg Real Estate & Rental, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051 (E.D. Tenn. 2007). There are several types of defects under Tennessee law. Design and manufacturing defects are commonly alleged, but "the plaintiff can also assert that the product suffers from a warnings defect." Lee v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 596 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1127 (M.D. Tenn. 2009); see also Spier v. Coloplast Corp., 121 F. Supp. 3d 809, 817 (E.D. Tenn. 2015) ("[A] warnings defect claim is simply another species of strict products liability, along with manufacturing and design defect claims."); King v. Danek Med., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 429, 443-44 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing failure-to-warn defect claim).

Defendant asserts Plaintiff has failed to identify a defect in the hedge trimmer (Doc. 22 at 6-7), but the Court disagrees. As Plaintiff's Complaint and summary-judgment response demonstrate, Plaintiff has identified a warnings defect in the hedge trimmer. See Lee, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 1127. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the hedge trimmer was defective based on its lack of warning that the battery was attached and partially charged. (Doc. 25 at 8-13.) Thus, summary judgment is not appropriate based solely on Plaintiff's alleged failure to identify a defect. However, to the extent Plaintiff's TPLA claims are based on a design or manufacturing defect, theCourt will GRANT IN PART Defendant's motion (Doc. 19), as Plaintiff fails to identify such a defect.

This determination does not end the Court's inquiry. "A manufacturer is not required to design a product that is perfect, accident-proof, or incapable of causing injury." Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 282 (Tenn. 2005). An injury itself is not proof of a defect. Shoemake v. Omniquip Int'l, Inc., 152 S.W.3d 567, 573 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). For example, "a knife is not defective simply because if the user's hand slips, the blade will cut his or her hand." Privette v. CSX Transp., Inc., 79 F. App'x 879, 886 (6th Cir. 2003). Instead, "[e]stablishing this element requires only proof, in a general sense and as understood by a layman, that 'something was wrong' with the product.'" Browder v. Pettigrew, 541 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tenn. 1976) (quoting Scanlon v. Gen. Motors Corp., 326 A.2d 673, 677-78 (N.J. 1974)).

Defendant asserts there is no evidence to establish anything was wrong with the hedge trimmer, in light...