Seay v. Okla. Bd. of Dentistry

JOSEPH P. SEAY, D.D.S., MS, and LOIS JACOBS, D.D.S., MS., Plaintiffs, v. OKLAHOMA BOARD OF DENTISTRY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. CIV-17-682-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

April 21, 2020

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Permanent Injunctive Relief [Doc. No. 50] filed by Plaintiffs Joseph Seay and Lois Jacobs. Defendants have filed a Response [Doc. No. 57], to which Plaintiffs' have replied [Doc. No. 60]. Defendants filed a subsequent Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 61]. Plaintiffs filed a Response [Doc. No. 64] in opposition, to which Defendants replied [Doc. No. 65].

BACKGROUND

This dispute involves a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action filed against, inter alia, the Oklahoma Board of Dentistry ("Defendant Board"). Plaintiffs are dentist anesthesiologists who both hold advanced degrees. Plaintiffs' Motion [Doc. No. 50] Exs. 3, 5. They are licensed as general dentists, although their practice is focused exclusively on providing anesthesia services. Plaintiffs' Motion at 3.

Sections of the Oklahoma Dental Act and Dental Board rules prohibit Plaintiffs from advertising to the public as specialists, as these do not recognize Plaintiffs' field as a specialty and thereby preclude them from obtaining a specialty license. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 328.22 (A)(2). If Plaintiffs advertise as specialists without holding a specialty license, they would be in violation of the law. OKLA. STAT. TIT. 59 § 328.22 (A)(10), (11). Plaintiff Seay has filed an application for a specialty license, and that application has not yet been considered. Any relevant undisputed facts will be set forth in the analysis below.

STANDARD OF DECISION

Declaratory Judgment Act

Under Declaratory Judgment Act, a court "may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such a declaration" where a party files "an appropriate pleading." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); accord Kunkel v. Continental Casualty Co., 866 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 1989). The Federal Rules "govern the procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment under [the Act]." FED. R. CIV. P. 57. As such, "the requirements of pleading and practice in actions for declaratory relief are exactly the same as in other civil actions." Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2010). When faced with a motion for declaratory judgment, courts therefore often construe the motion as a motion for summary judgment on a declaratory judgment action. See e.g., Kam-Ko Bio-Pharm Trading, 560 F.3d 935, 943 (9th Cir. 2009) (upholding the district court's decision to construe a motion for declaratory judgment as a motion for summary judgment).

Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). When a summary judgment motion is filed, "[t]he court views the record and draws all favorable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment may be granted where the undisputed material facts establish that one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A material fact is one which may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs move the Court to enter a declaratory judgment finding that the subject statutes and rules are unconstitutional, both on their face and as applied, and enjoin Defendants from enforcing the same.¹ Defendants counter with a motion for summaryjudgment arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a constitutional violation, that, in any case, the action is time barred, and that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

The Court herein interprets these filings as cross-motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allegations. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phillips, No. CIV-17-1237-C, 2018 WL 2976435, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 13, 2018) (Cauthron, J.) ("When faced with a motion for declaratory judgment, courts therefore often construe the motion as a motion for summary judgment on a declaratory judgment action."); Miller v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1204, 1207 (D.N.M. 2018) ("[T]he Court construes the parties' cross-motions for declaratory judgment as cross-motions for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment."); Doe v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Craig Cty., No. 11-CV-0298-CVE-PJC, 2012 WL 2872790, at *3 (N.D. Okla. July 12, 2012) ("In effect, plaintiff's motion for a declaratory judgment is a motion for summary judgment on his request for a declaratory judgment.").

I. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges Plaintiffs have been deprived of their constitutional rights by those acting under color of state law.

The Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 19] challenges as unconstitutional—facially and as applied—the Specialty License section of the Oklahoma Dental Act, and certain rules and regulations of Defendant Board, specifically OAC 195:10-9-2. See Amended Complaint at 2 ¶ 2. Plaintiffs state four causes of action: (1) Deprivation of Property and Liberty Interests Without Due Process of Law; (2) Equal Protection; (3) Freedom of Speech; (4) Restraint of Trade in Violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-26. Plaintiffs point to thefollowing instances of unconstitutional conduct, which they allege are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

(1) Defendant Board refused to consider Plaintiff Seay's application for a specialty license on June 16, 2017.

(2) "[O]n June 25, 2015, the Board sent a letter to Oklahoma dentists who contracted for [Plaintiff Seay's] services. These letters resulted from the improper requirement to disclose every dentist office where Plaintiff provided his services." Amended Complaint at 11.

(3) That "[Defendant] Board's decision to amend the statute and rule after the Court of Appeals' decision in 1993,² is a knowing and willful violation of the Plaintiffs' constitutional right to speech." Amended Complaint at 15.

The Amended Complaint states the constitutional challenges are brought under the United States and Oklahoma constitutions. Id. at 3. The first three causes of action, to the extent they allege violations of the United States Constitution and federal law, are actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. Plaintiffs' action is time barred, and as such, summary judgment in Defendants' favor is appropriate.

Section 1983 provides a federal civil remedy for the "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution [and certain other federal laws]" by any person acting under the color of law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because"[t]here is no applicable federal statute of limitations relating to civil rights actions brought under section[ ] 1983," courts borrow the limitations period for such claims from the "state where the cause of action arose." Crosswhite v. Brown, 424 F.2d 495, 496 (10th Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Lawson v. Okmulgee Cty. Criminal Justice Auth., 726 F. App'x 685, 690 (10th Cir. 2018).

The Tenth Circuit has determined that every § 1983 claim is "in essence an action for injury to personal rights." Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 651 (10th Cir. 1984). Thus, the Court must apply the most analogous Oklahoma statute, which provides a two-year limitations period. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) ("Civil actions . . . can only be brought within [two years] after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards ... for injury to the rights of another.").

Defendants contend, and Plaintiffs agree, that the limitations period is governed by Oklahoma law, 12 OKLA. STAT. tit. § 95 (A)(3). They disagree, however, as to the date of accrual.

Even though the limitations period for § 1983 claims is borrowed from state law, the question of when a cause of action accrues under § 1983 remains one of federal law. See Lawson, 726 F. App'x at 690. It is well settled that a "civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Baker v. Bd. of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 632 (10th Cir. 1993). The injury in a § 1983 claim is the violation of a constitutional right, and such claims accrue "when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights have been violated." See Lawson, 726F. App'x at 690. To determine the accrual date, the Court must first identify the alleged constitutional violations and then determine when they occurred. See id.

Plaintiffs allege that their claims are not time barred only because of the continuing violations doctrine.

There is some dispute over whether the continuing violations doctrine applies to § 1983 suits. Burkley v. Corr. Healthcare Mgmt. Of Oklahoma, Inc., 141 F. App'x 714, 716 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005) (collecting and comparing Tenth Circuit authority); see Graham v. Taylor, 640 F. App'x 766, 769 (10th Cir. 2016) (noting that the Tenth Circuit has never formally adopted the doctrine in the context of § 1983 actions); see also Mercer-Smith v. N.M. Children, Youth & Families Dep't, 416 Fed. App'x. 704, 712 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) ("[T]he doctrine of continuing violations does not apply to § 1983 claims.").

District courts in the Tenth Circuit have repeatedly declined to apply the doctrine, given the lack of support from the Tenth Circuit. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Claremore, No. 18-CV-269-GKF-FHM, 2019 WL 3482965, at *8 (N.D. Okla. July 31, 2019) ("several district courts in this circuit have [] held that the doctrine of continuing violations does not apply to § 1983 claims")(collecting cases); Griffin v. Gorman, No. 17-CV-03019-MSK-KMT, 2019 WL 4464021, at...