Secret v. Virginia

Nicholas Charles Secret, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of Virginia, Respondent.

1:19cv1386 (LO/TCB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

June 26, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Virginia inmate Nicholas Charles Secret ("Secret" or "petitioner") filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the validity of his convictions—entered in the Circuit Court of Louisa County—of arson and attempted murder in the first degree. See Dkt. No. 1. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss and Rule 5 Answer, supported by a legal brief. See Dkt. Nos. 4-6. Petitioner, despite having been provided the notice required by Local Civil Rule 7(K) and Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975) [Dkt. No. 7], did not file an opposition to respondent's motion. For the reasons explained below, respondent's motion to dismiss will be granted, and Secret's petition for writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed.

I. Background

On January 30, 2015, in the Circuit Court of Louisa County, a jury convicted Secret of one count of arson and nine counts of attempted first-degree murder. Record No. 170540, p. 569. On June 20, 2015, the trial court sentenced petitioner to twenty-three years' incarceration. Id. at p. 571. This conviction and sentencing represented the culmination of events that began to transpire approximately a year-and-a-half earlier.

In September 2013, petitioner met Paxus Calta, a member of the "Acorn Community," an intentional community then consisting of approximately thirty individuals. Id. at pp. 739-40. Calta invited Secret to come to Acorn as a guest and did not specify any particular end-date with regard to petitioner's invitation. Id. at p. 740. The majority of the individuals at Acorn resided in a dwelling known as "Heartwood," a dormitory-style building that contained bedrooms, an office, a kitchen, and a dining room. Id. Although petitioner attended meetings and ate some of his meals there, while "guesting" at Acorn, petitioner resided not in Heartwood, but in a tent on the community's grounds. Id.

After a week at Acorn, Secret requested to extend his stay and to remain in the community as an intern. Id. After initially deferring a decision with respect to petitioner's request, the Acorn community eventually "looked at [their] numbers [and] realized [they] weren't going to have bedrooms for [Secret] and some other people after Thanksgiving." Id. Consequently, "[Calta] told [Secret] that he was going to have to find someplace else to go just before Thanksgiving." Id. Calta also advised Secret that he was "making members feel uncomfortable [because] his behavior had been somewhat odd and that if his behavior [did not improve] he would have to leave immediately rather than just before Thanksgiving." Id.

Two weeks later, on the morning of October 12, 2013, Calta was using a computer in the office on the first floor of Heartwood when he smelled smoke; he then discovered a fire burning in the kitchen. Id. at pp. 740-41. Calta and another Acorn member yelled to the occupants of Heartwood that the building was on fire. Id. at p. 741. All of the occupants escaped without serious injury. Id. At trial, the identities of at least nine individuals who were in Heartwood at the time of the fire were established. Id. As those individuals exited Heartwood, they detected gasoline or diesel fuel spread throughout the building; Calta, for instance, found fuel cans in the residence and carried them outside. Id. After the fire was extinguished, the residents of theAcorn Community conducted a headcount and determined that everyone was accounted for with the exception of petitioner.

Special Agent Peter Lazear of the Virginia State Police investigated the Heartwood fire and opined at petitioner's trial that the blaze was not the result of an accident. Id. Instead, spread throughout the residence, Lazear found traces of gasoline, containers full of diesel fuel and paint thinner, as well as "a heavy petroleum distillate." Id. Taking into account the "depositing of soot from very thick, heavy dark smoke that ... was starting to move into the center of the structure," Lazear concluded that the fire would have "engulf[ed]" the entire structure had it not been successfully extinguished.

Lazear also conducted interviews with Acorn members on the day of the fire and learned of Secret's "odd" behavior and sudden absence. Id. at p. 742. On that basis, Lazear designated Secret a suspect in the investigation. Id. Due to Secret's absence, however, Lazear left Acorn without speaking to him. Id. Later that night, though, Lazear received word that Secret had returned to Acorn. Id. Lazear accordingly ventured back to Louisa County and met Secret and another state police official at the County Sheriff's Office. Id.

Lazear and Secret spoke in an interview room for approximately thirty minutes before the topic of the fire arose. Id. at p. 743. Lazear then asked petitioner, "what about Acorn made you start the fire in the kitchen this morning?" Id. Approximately ten minutes later, Secret stated, "I dumped a whole bunch of fuel in there, then threw a thing full of lit matches into some of the fuel." Id. Only then did Lazear Mirandize petitioner. Id. Petitioner, though, waived his rights and continued to speak with Lazear. Id. Over approximately the next thirty minutes, Secret "provided detailed inculpatory statements about his actions in setting fire to Heartwood." Id. Secret was arrested and later indicted. Id.

Petitioner subsequently filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all of the statements—pre- and post-Miranda—that he made to Lazear at the Sheriff's Office. Id. The trial court granted the motion with respect to petitioner's pre-Miranda statements but denied the motion with respect to the statements petitioner made following provision of Miranda warnings. Id. at p. 747. Consequently, several of petitioner's self-incriminating statements were introduced against him at trial. See, e.g., id. at pp. 394-395. The jury ultimately convicted petitioner of arson of an occupied dwelling and nine counts of attempted murder. Id. at p. 748.

II. Post-Conviction Procedural History

Following his conviction, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the verdict, renewing his argument that his post-Miranda statements should have been suppressed and asserting that there was insufficient evidence to convict him with respect to his specific intent as to each of the counts of attempted murder. Id. at p. 748. The trial court denied the motion as to both issues. Id. Secret then appealed the rulings to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, where he additionally raised an argument that the trial court erred in refusing to present a proffered jury instruction related to the intent necessary to prove an attempted crime. Id.; Record No. 0853-15-2, p. 38. The state appellate court found no error and thus affirmed the convictions. Record No. 0853-15-2, pp. 77-97. The Supreme Court of Virginia then awarded an appeal. See id. at p. 121. There, petitioner did not renew his assignment of error regarding the jury instruction. See Record No. 170540. On October 11, 2018, a unanimous Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed petitioner's convictions. Id.

Finally, on October 8, 2019, Secret filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Dkt. No. 1. In it, he raises the following three claims, verbatim:

1. The petitioner's constitutional rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments and as enunciated in Miranda, Siebert and Elstad, were violated by the use of an illegal two-stepinterrogation and the Virginia Supreme Courts appeal denial was contrary to clearly established federal law and was also unreasonable in light of the facts presented.

2. The petitioner's constitutional rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments were violated when the Commonwealth failed to prove, at trial, the requisite intent and the Virginia Supreme Court's appeal denial was contrary to federal law and was also unreasonable in light of the facts presented.

3. The petitioner's constitutional rights under the 5th and 14th Amendments were violated by the trial court's refusal to properly instruct the jury as to intent and the Virginia Supreme Court's appeal denial was contrary to clearly established federal law and was also unreasonable in light of the facts presented.

Dkt. No. 1-1, p. 10.

III. Standard of Review

To obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must demonstrate that he or she is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). But the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") limits a federal court's authority to grant habeas relief. Pursuant to AEDPA, when a state court has addressed the merits of a claim raised in a subsequent federal habeas corpus petition, the reviewing federal court may not grant the petition on that particular claim unless the state court's adjudication was (1) contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The question, then, "is not whether a federal court believes the state court's determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold." Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).

A state court's decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the United States Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme] Court has on a set of materiallyindistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). A federal court should grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause if it finds that the state court "identifies the correct governing...