Sedarous v. Henry Ford Health Sys.

MINA SEDAROUS, Plaintiff, v. HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM d/b/a HENRY FORD HOSPITAL, Defendant.

Civil Case No. 2:19-cv-12525

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

July 27, 2020

Honorable Linda V. Parker

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF NO. 14)

Plaintiff Mina Sedarous initiated this lawsuit against Defendant Henry Ford Health System, averring that Henry Ford Health terminated his employment as a Pharmacy Supervisor because of a wrist injury that impaired his ability to drive to work. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (ECF No. 1 at Pg. ID 3-7.) Currently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 14.) The motion has been fully briefed. (ECF Nos. 17, 19.) For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's motion.

BACKGROUND

Henry Ford Health employed Plaintiff as a pharmacist, and later a Pharmacy Supervisor, beginning September 15, 2008 until March 5, 2019. (ECF No. 1 at Pg. ID 2). On January 24, 2019, Plaintiff suffered a closed fracture of his right wrist during an accident unrelated to his job duties. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that "[t]his injury caused [him] to be unable to perform manual tasks and work; to wit, he could not drive, and this restriction impaired his ability to work." (Id.) Attached to its reply brief, Henry Ford Health provides a note from a physician that states in relevant part: "[p]lease allow patient to work remotely from home for the next 3 weeks as much as he can tolerate." (ECF No. 19 at Pg. ID 110.)

On or about January 28, Plaintiff disclosed his injury and provided "medical documents . . . supporting the limitation on Plaintiff's ability to drive while in recovery" to Henry Ford Health and requested to work from home. (ECF No. 1 at Pg. ID 2.) Henry Ford Health denied the request. (Id.) Plaintiff lodged the same request two weeks later and Henry Ford Health, again, denied it. (Id.) Two weeks after that, on March 4, Plaintiff requested a medical leave of absence and began using "personal time . . . while simultaneously working from home." (Id. at Pg. ID 2, 4.) Henry Ford Health verbally discharged Plaintiff effective March 5, "claiming that he had violated [the] terms of his employment." (Id. at Pg. ID 3-4.)

Plaintiff timely filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for discrimination and received a right to sue letter. (Id.) On August 28, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging (i) disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (ii) disability discrimination in violation of Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act ("PDCRA"); and (iii) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). (Id. at Pg. ID 3-7.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but it must contain more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint does not "suffice if it tenders 'naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

As the Supreme Court provided in Iqbal and Twombly, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted astrue, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard "does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct]." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a "plausible" claim, the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This presumption is not applicable to legal conclusions, however. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668. Therefore, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

APPLICABLE LAW & ANALYSIS

Disability Discrimination

"The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities in regard to hiring, advancement, discharge, or other terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Manigan v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 385 F. App'x 472, 475 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bratten v. SSI Servs., Inc., 185 F.3d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1999)). "[T]he [ADA] . . . and thePWDCRA share the same purpose and use similar definitions and analyses, and [Michigan state] courts have relied on the ADA in interpreting the PWDCRA." Anderson v. Detroit Transp. Corp., 435 F. Supp.3d 783, 798 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Chiles v. Mach. Shop, Inc., 606 N.W.2d 398, 405 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)).

"To prove a prima facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled, (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of a position, with or without an accommodation, and (3) he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability." Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419, 433 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 1105 (6th Cir. 2008)). Here, the parties dispute the first two elements of the disability discrimination claim.

(A) Is Plaintiff Disabled?

The ADA defines "disability" as: (i) "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities," (ii) "a record of such an impairment," or (iii) "being regarded as having such an impairment[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). In the present case, the first and third definitions are at issue.

(i) Did Plaintiff Have a Physical Impairment That Substantially Limited One orMore Major Life Activities?

Henry Ford Health argues that "the only limitation of activity [Plaintiff] alleges is an inability to drive." (ECF No. 14 at Pg. ID 55.) Henry Ford Healthasserts that—contrary to Plaintiff's contention (ECF No. 17 Pg. ID 96)—"[d]riving is not a major life activity." (ECF No. 14 at Pg. ID 55 (emphasis in original).)

Plaintiff provides no support for his contention that driving is a major life activity as contemplated by the ADA. Indeed, while the Sixth Circuit has not opined on the issue, other Circuits considering the issue have uniformly concluded that driving is not a major life activity. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 368 F. App'x 136, 140 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 5, 2010); Winsley v. Cook Cty., 563 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2009); Kellogg v. Energy Safety Servs. Inc., 544 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1167 (2009); see also Morey v. McDonald's Corp., No. 18 C 1137, 2020 WL 2542161, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2020) ("[T]he [2008] ADAAA [] amended the list of activities expressly identified as major life activities and elected not to include driving among them, despite the fact that multiple Courts of Appeals had already held that driving was not a major life activity. . . . Furthermore, the EEOC's current ADA regulations do not list driving as a major life activity."). Plaintiff provides no reason for this Court to disagree.

Notably, driving is not the only activity Plaintiff claims his wrist injury impaired: he also claims that "[his] [driving] restriction impaired his ability to work." (ECF No. 1 at Pg. ID 2.) Indeed, "the inability to drive nevertheless could create a disability if it caused an impairment of a major life activity," such asworking. Winsley, 563 F.3d at 604; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining "disability" as "a physical . . . impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities"); see also Tinsley v. Caterpillar Fin. Servs., Corp., 766 F. App'x 337, 341(6th Cir. 2019) (noting "work" as a major life activity). "EEOC regulations explain that a plaintiff cannot claim a disability by simply '[d]emonstrating a substantial limitation in performing the unique aspects of a single specific job.'" Booth v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 927 F.3d 387, 394 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 454 (2019), reh'g denied, 140 S. Ct. 927 (2020) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. (2016)). Instead, an individual who asserts he is disabled because he cannot perform the major life activity of "working" must show that "the impairment substantially limits . . . [his] ability to perform a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes." Tinsley, 766 F. App'x at 342 (first alternation in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630 Appendix).

Here, Plaintiff does not include any such factual allegations in his Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that he was an excellent employee who could meet the demands of his job even after the wrist injury, with the exception that he could not drive for a short period of time. (See ECF No. 1 at Pg. ID 4.) When alleging that "a newly assigned supervisor . . . objected to the long standing practice" of allowing him to work from home, (id.), Plaintiff merely "point[s] to one job that he[could not] perform," Booth, 927 F.3d at 394. He does not allege that his condition precluded him from working in a class or broad range of jobs.

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