Seeds v. Lucero

Page 1261

177 F.Supp.2d 1261

Robert SEEDS and Laura Seeds, Plaintiffs, v. Richard LUCERO, individually and in his official capacity, The City of Espanola, John Lenssen, individually and in his official capacity, Anthony VanderVossen and Kathy Vandervossen, and Six Unknown Employees of the City of Espanola, Defendants.

No. 00-1341 BB/LFG.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

December 21, 2001.

Scott F. Voorhees, Santa Fe, NM, for Plaintiffs.

Frank T. Herdman, Santa Fe, R. Galen Reimer, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

OPINION

BLACK, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 95 and 98) on the plaintiffs' complaint (Doc. 1), wherein the plaintiffs allege that private citizens conspired with public officials to deprive them of certain constitutional rights, engage in malicious abuse of process, and inflict emotional distress upon them. The Court has examined the parties' submissions and the relevant legal authorities, and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' constitutional claims and, therefore, those claims will be DISMISSED with prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state claims and, therefore, those claims will be REMANDED to the First Judicial District Court, County of Rio Arriba, State of New Mexico.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Robert Seeds and Laura Seeds ("Seeds") commenced this suit in the First Judicial District Court, County of Rio Arriba, State of New Mexico, seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New Mexico common law. Defendants Richard Lucero, John Lenssen, and the City of Espanola (collectively, "City Defendants") removed this action to the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

The Seeds live and reside in the City of Espanola ("City"). (See Seeds' response brief, exhibits 1 and 18.) The property upon which they reside ("Seeds Property") is located in an area that is zoned residential. (See VanderVossens' opening brief, exhibit 12.) Even though the Seeds Property is zoned residential, they individually own and operate two towing businesses within the confines of the property pursuant to a special exception Mr. Seeds obtained from the City's planning and zoning commission in December 1995. (See Seeds' exhibits 1 and 8.) The special exception expressly permits Mr. Seeds to use the Seeds property as an automobile storage yard.

Defendants Anthony and Kathy VanderVossen ("VanderVossens") live and reside on the property adjacent to the Seeds Property. (See VanderVossens' exhibit 1.) In addition to being neighbors, the VanderVossens and the Seeds are relatives and business competitors: Mr. Seeds and Ms. VanderVossen are siblings, and the VanderVossens own three towing businesses and an automobile storage yard in the City proper. (See Seeds' exhibit 2.) The property upon which the VanderVossens' businesses are located is also not zoned for such use. However, the VanderVossens are able to operate each business on the property as a prior nonconforming use.

On September 9, 1998, the VanderVossens, through their attorney, made a written complaint to the City regarding the Seeds Property. (See Seeds' exhibit 9.) The VanderVossens claimed the Seeds were violating the City's zoning ordinances by using the Seeds Property as an automobile storage yard, by operating a hunting and guide business from the property, and by placing an accessory structure on the property that was not set-back far enough from the property line. As a result of the VanderVossens' complaint, the City sent the Seeds four cease and desist letters over the course of two days. The letters asserted the same alleged zoning violations detailed in the VanderVossens' written complaint and in their earlier oral complaints.

On September 10, 1998, Marvin Vigil, who is the director of the City's planning department, sent a letter to Ms. Seeds demanding that she cease storing towed vehicles on the Seeds Property. (See Seeds' exhibit 11.) Mr. Vigil claims that before sending the demand letter he investigated whether Ms. Seeds was storing towed vehicles on the Seeds Property. (See VanderVossens' exhibit 41.) Ms. Seeds admits that she did store towed vehicles on the Seeds Property in September 1998, but she claims that it was legal for her to do because the Seeds had an agreement allowing her to utilize Mr. Seeds' special exception. (See VanderVossens' exhibit 20.)

Also on September 10, 1998, Mr. Vigil sent two letters to Mr. Seeds. In one letter, Mr. Vigil demanded that Mr. Seeds cease conducting his hunting and guide business if, as the City had been informed, he was operating the business from the Seeds Property. (See Seeds' exhibit 12.) Mr. Vigil has stated that before sending the letter he investigated whether Mr. Seeds was operating the business from the Seeds Property. (See VanderVossens' exhibit 41.) The City subsequently demanded that Mr. Seeds obtain a home occupation license for his hunting and guide business. (See Seeds' exhibit 19.) That demand was made upon Mr. Seeds even though, prior to the demand, Mr. Seeds claims he was told by Mr. Vigil that he did not need to obtain such a license. (See VanderVossens' exhibit 48.) Mr. Vigil denies that he told Mr. Seeds any such thing.

In another letter, Mr. Vigil alleged that Mr. Seeds violated City ordinances by placing a prefabricated storage shed on the Seeds Property without obtaining the necessary permits to do so. (See Seeds' exhibit 13.) The City demanded that Mr. Seeds obtain a zoning permit and possibly a building permit for the storage shed. Those demands were made upon Mr. Seeds even though, prior to the placement of the storage shed on the Seeds Property, Mr. Seeds claims he was told by the City's planning department that he did not need to obtain any such permits. (See Seeds' exhibit 1.) Mr. Vigil denies that he told Mr. Seeds any such thing. (See VanderVossens' exhibit 41.)

On September 11, 1998, Mr. Vigil sent a letter to Mr. Seeds alleging that his storage yard violated City ordinances despite the special exception he had obtained in December 1995. (See Seeds' exhibit 14.) According to the letter, while the storage yard was "technically authorized" by Mr. Seeds' special exception, it violated a home occupation ordinance barring any "change to the outside appearance of the building or premises." (Id.) The City demanded that Mr. Seeds screen his property from adjacent properties. Mr. Seeds complied with the City's demand by erecting a wooden fence around the Seeds Property. (See Seeds' exhibit 1.)

On September 24, 1998, Mr. Vigil sent a memorandum to the manager and assistant manager of the City stating that Ms. Seeds was not storing towed vehicles on the Seeds Property. (See Seeds' exhibit 15.) Based on that finding, Mr. Vigil requested that Ms. Seeds' towing business be removed from the City's towing rotation list, because every towing business that appears on the towing list is required to have an approved storage lot within the City. (See id.) The towing list accounts for a substantial portion of Ms. Seeds' towing business. (See Seeds' exhibit 18.)

Soon thereafter, Mr. Vigil filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Seeds, alleging that she "has [allowed] or is allowing vehicles to be stored" at the Seeds Property. (See Seeds' exhibit 16.) The complaint was sent to the wrong address, so Ms. Seeds did not appear in municipal court to answer the charges and an order to show cause was issued. Due to the lack of notice, the municipal court dismissed the complaint on the motion of Ms. Seeds' attorney.

On October 16, 1998, the VanderVossens filed a petition with the City in which they requested that Mr. Seeds' special exception be declared illegal, null, and void. (See Seeds' exhibits 20 and 21.) In support of their petition, the VanderVossens argued inter alia that they were entitled to receive notice of the December 1995 meeting on the special exception, that they did not receive such notice, that they would have opposed the granting of the special exception if they had received notice, and that they were unaware that a special exception had been granted until shortly before they filed their petition in October 1998. (See id.)

On December 1, 1998, the City Council heard the VanderVossens' petition requesting the nullification of Mr. Seeds' special exception. (See VanderVossens' exhibit 1.) Defendant Richard Lucero ("Mayor"), who is Mr. VanderVossen's uncle, recused himself from participating in the hearing on the VanderVossens' petition. The City Council denied the VanderVossens' petition as the result of a 4-4 tie vote on a motion to grant the petition.

After the City Council denied the petition, Defendant John Lenssen, who is the attorney for the City, sent a memorandum to the City Councilors advising them that their vote violated the VanderVossens' civil rights. (See Seeds' exhibit 37.) Mr. Lenssen stated that as a result of their vote the City faced liability for monetary damages and attorney fees. Prior to becoming the City's attorney, Mr. Lenssen represented the VanderVossens in two legal matters, one that concluded in 1996 and another one that concluded in 1997. He has been Mr. VanderVossen's friend for more than twenty years. (See id.)

On December 18, 1998, the VanderVossens appealed the City Council's decision to the First Judicial District Court, County of Rio Arriba, State of New Mexico. (See VanderVossens' exhibit 1.) Without specific authorization from the City Council, Mr. Lenssen filed a brief on behalf of the City in which he argued that the City Council's decision violated the VanderVossens' due process rights, including their rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard. (See Seeds' exhibit 37.) The district court ruled in favor of the VanderVossens, concluding that there was no evidence...