Seghers v. Hilti, Inc.

DAVID SEGHERS, Plaintiff, v. HILTI, INC., Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:16-CV-0244

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

November 16, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case is before the Court on Defendant Hilti, Inc.'s ("Defendant" or "Hilti") "Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's ADA and TCHRA Claims" [Doc. # 18] ("Motion"). Defendant seeks to dismiss Plaintiff David Seghers' ("Plaintiff" or "Seghers") claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), Tex. Lab. Code § 21.001 et seq. Plaintiff filed a Response [Doc. # 19], to which Defendant filed a Reply [Doc. # 20]. The Motion is now ripe for determination. Having carefully considered the parties' briefing, all matters of record, and the applicable legal authorities, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendant's Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (the "Amended Complaint") [Doc. # 16] alleges that Hilti violated the ADA and the TCHRA by denying him his rights under those Acts, discriminating and retaliating against him, and, ultimately, by terminating Plaintiff's employment. Plaintiff also alleges Hilti violated the Family Leave Medical Act (the "FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2611, et seq. The FMLA claims are not the subject of Defendant's Motion.

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in the Amended Complaint.¹ In May 2011, Seghers became an account manager for Hilti, an Oklahoma corporation in the business of selling heavy-duty tools and accessories in the commercial construction sector. Id. at 2 ¶ 8, 3 ¶ 11. Seghers' responsibilities included fostering business relationships with existing and potential clients. Id. at 3 ¶ 11. Three years into his employment, Seghers faced professional and personal challenges. On approximately January 13, 2014, Hilti's Human Resources department ("HR Department") contacted Seghers regarding alleged irregularities in his November 2013 expense report. Id. at 3 ¶ 13. Additionally, Segherssuffered two health ailments, one of which allegedly was work-related, and one which was not. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 12, 16.

On January 22, 2014, Seghers sent Hilti's Human Resources department ("HR Department") two separate notes regarding disability accommodation (together, the "disability requests"). Id. at 3 ¶ 16. When sending the disability requests to the HR Department, Seghers also requested FMLA paperwork in connection with his medical leave. Id. Seghers received no response from the HR Department. Id. at 4 ¶ 17.

Seghers emailed the HR Department on January 28, 2014, to inquire about his requests. Id. Shortly thereafter, the HR Department notified Seghers that, effective January 16, 2014, his employment was terminated. Id. at 4 ¶ 18. Seghers challenged the retroactive termination. Id. at 4 ¶ 19. In response, the HR Department reissued the notice, identifying January 28, 2014, as the effective date of termination. Id.

B. Procedural History

Seghers filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Texas Workforce Commission Civil Rights Division ("TWC") on July 24, 2014, which was within 180 days of one ofthe acts of which he complains, termination of his employment.² Exh. 1 to Defendant's Motion, Charge of Discrimination [Doc. # 18-2] ("Charge of Discrimination"). One and a half years later, on January 27, 2016, Seghers filed this case with the Court, asserting causes of action under the FMLA. Complaint [Doc. # 1]. Seghers amended the complaint on August 31, 2016, asserting additional causes of action under the ADA and the TCHRA. See Amended Complaint [Doc. # 16]. The EEOC issued Seghers a notice of right to sue (a "Notice") on September 12, 2016. Exh. A to Plaintiff's Response, EEOC Notice of Right to Sue [Doc. # 19-1].

Seghers now asserts claims for interference and retaliation under the FMLA (Count I), and disability discrimination (Count II), failure to accommodate (Count III), and disability retaliation (Count IV) under the ADA and TCHRA. Hilti seeks to dismiss all of Seghers' ADA and TCHRA claims.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted. Turner v. Pleasant, 663 F.3d 770, 775 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009)). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true. Harrington, 563 F.3d at 147. The complaint must, however, contain sufficient factual allegations, as opposed to legal conclusions, to state a claim for relief that is "plausible on its face." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Patrick v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 681 F.3d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 2012). When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should presume they are true, even if doubtful, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the factual allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under a valid legal theory. See McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997).

The court's review on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is limited typically to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v.Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, documents attached to the briefing may be considered by the Court if the documents are sufficiently referenced in the complaint and no party questions their authenticity. Walch v. Adjutant General's Dep't of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004))); see In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007).

B. Rule 12(b)(1) - Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

"A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Smith v. Regional Transit Auth., 756 F.3d 340, 347 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Krim v. pcOrder.com, Inc., 402 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2005)). "In considering a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the district court is 'free to weigh the evidence and resolve factual disputes in order to satisfy itself that it has the power to hear the case.'" Id. When the court's subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing it. See Alabama-Coushatta Tribe of Tex. v. U.S., 757 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2014); Gilbert v. Donahoe, 751 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2014).

A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be granted if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove a plausible set of facts that establish subject matter jurisdiction. Venable v. La. Workers' Comp. Corp., 740 F.3d 937, 941 (5th Cir. 2013). "[U]nder Rule 12(b)(1), the court may find a plausible set of facts by considering any of the following: (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by the undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." In re Mirant Corp, 675 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 557 (5th Cir. 2008)). The Court must "take the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Id.

III. ANALYSIS

Hilti argues that Seghers' claims under the ADA and the TCHRA are, respectively, procedurally defective and time-barred, and moves to dismiss these claims.

A. Effect of Lack of a Notice on the ADA Claims

Hilti urges the Court to dismiss Seghers' claims under the ADA, contending that Seghers failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he filed suitbefore receiving a Notice from the EEOC.³ Seghers admits he received a Notice on September 12, 2016—almost nine months after commencing this suit—but argues that the filing defect is subject to equitable modification and is cured by subsequent receipt of the Notice.⁴

"Employment discrimination plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing claims in federal court." Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2002). The ADA incorporates by reference procedures applicable to actions under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., including its exhaustion requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Lee v. Columbia/HCA of New Orleans, Inc., No. 611 F. App'x 810, 811 (5th Cir. May 20, 2015). Accordingly, "[e]xhaustion occurs when the plaintiff files a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right to sue." Taylor, 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1996)).⁵ The plaintiff must bring suit within ninety days of receiving an EEOC notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).

The Fifth Circuit has held in regard to Title VII claims that "the receipt of a right-to-sue letter is a condition precedent, which on proper occasion may be equitably modified." Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, a Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211, 1218-19 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[T]he receipt of a right-to-sue letter subsequent to the commencement of a Title VII action, but while the action remains pending, satisfies the precondition that a plaintiff obtain statutory notice of the right to sue before filing a civil action under Title VII"). By analogy, this rule applies to ADA...