Segraves v. Smith

GARY EUGENE SEGRAVES, Petitioner v. B. SMITH, SUPERINTENDENT, PA. SCI HOUTZDALE,PA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents

Civil No. 3:17-cv-0084

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

April 24, 2020

(Judge Mariani)

MEMORANDUM¹

I. Background

Petitioner Gary Eugene Segraves ("Segraves") files the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from the Judgment of Sentence entered on June 30, 2011, in Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County criminal case CP-41-CR-0000548-2009, following convictions for twelve counts of rape of a child less than 13 years old and a multitude of related offenses.

For the reasons set forth below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus, which is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L.No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, April 24, 1996 ("AEDPA"), will be denied.

II. State Court Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant facts and elaborate procedural history set forth below are extracted from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania's February 16, 2016 decision considering the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's appeal of an order granting Segrave's petition pursuant to Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, awarding him a new trial:

On March 12, 2009, Appellee was charged with twelve counts of rape of a child less than thirteen years of age [n.1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121(c)], endangering the welfare of a child, [n.2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4304(a)(1)], and a multitude of other related offenses arising from the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, B.H. (See Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/11, at 1). The abuse occurred over a two-year period, from approximately January 2006 until January 2008, while B.H. was between the ages of eleven and thirteen years old. (See id.). Appellee's wife and B.H.'s mother, M.S., was charged with corruption of a minor and endangering the welfare of a child in connection with the abuse, for failing to take measures to protect B.H. from Appellee after she learned of the allegations. (See PCRA Court Opinion, 6/02/15, at 1).

On August 31, 2010, Appellee and M.S. proceeded to a jury trial as codefendants. (See Trial Ct. Op., 12/13/11, at 1). The jury found both parents guilty of endangering the welfare of child, but was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining charges. (See PCRA Ct. Op., 6/02/15, at 1). The trial court granted a mistrial with respect to the remaining charges. (See id.).

A second jury trial was held on January 19-21, 2011. [n.3 B.H. was sixteen years old at the time of the second trial.] (See N.T. Trial, 1/19/11, at 42)]. (See Trial Ct. Op., 12/13/11, at 1). After jury selection, but before the trial commenced, the Commonwealth nol prossed the remaining corruption of a minor charge against M.S.; therefore, only Appellee proceeded to trial. (See PCRA Ct. Op., 6/02/15, at 1-2). Appellee's defense centered on the theory that B.H. fabricated the rape allegations because she wanted to be removed from his home, and move into the home of her biological father. (See N.T. Trial, 1/19/11, at 91-92, 101-02; PCRA Ct. Op., 1/21/15, at 4). At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellee guilty of twelve counts of rape of a child less thanthirteen years of age; six counts of rape by forcible compulsion; three counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse; seven counts of aggravated indecent assault of a child; one count of unlawful contact with a minor; eighteen counts of statutory sexual assault; one count of corruption of a minor; and twenty-five counts of indecent assault. (See Trial Ct. Op., 12/13/11, at 1-2).

On June 30, 2011, the trial court held a sentencing hearing at which it stated that the evidence of Appellee's guilt was "overwhelming" and noted as significant the:

undisputed [medical expert] testimony that [B.H.] had suffered a penetrating wound to her hymen [and] that this could only have happened the way she alleged it to happen. It couldn't have happened through any other way. There wasn't contrary medical evidence, there wasn't contrary evidence of her undergoing some sort of massive injury that would have caused it. There wasn't even contrary evidence that she would have been engaged in an activity that might have caused it....

(N.T. Sentencing, 6/30/11, at 64-65). The court designated Appellee a sexually violent predator (SVP), and sentenced him to an aggregate term of not less than seventy-one nor more than 142 years' incarceration, followed by five years' probation. (See id. at 34; see also Sentencing Order, 6/30/11, at unnumbered page 4).

Appellee filed a direct appeal, and this Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on December 20, 2012. (See Commonwealth v. Segraves, 64 A.3d 29 (Pa.Super.2012) (unpublished judgment order)). Our Supreme Court denied Appellee's petition for allowance of appeal on October 23, 2013. (See Commonwealth v. Segraves, 77 A.3d 1260 (Pa.2013)). The United States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari on April 7, 2014. (See Segraves v. Pennsylvania, 134 S.Ct. 1793 (2014)).

On March 12, 2014, Appellee filed the instant PCRA petition. [n.4 Appellee filed his PCRA petition while his direct appeal was pending before the United States Supreme Court and, thus, the petition was premature. See Commonwealth v. Leslie, 757 A.2d 984, 985 (Pa.Super.2000) (noting "[a] PCRA petition may only be filed after [a petitioner] has waived or exhausted his direct appeal rights") (citation and emphasis omitted). Nevertheless, because the PCRA court did not act on the petition, other than to appoint counsel, until after Appellee's direct appeal terminated, we decline to vacate the PCRA court's order on this basis.

Cf. id. at 986 (vacating order and remanding for further proceedings where PCRA court improperly proceeded on merits of petition during the pendency of direct appeal).].

***

On January 21, 2015, the PCRA court entered its opinion and order granting Appellee's PCRA petition and awarding him a new trial on all charges, except the endangering the welfare of a child charge, which he was convicted of at the first trial. (See Order, 1/21/15). This timely appeal followed. [n.6 Pursuant to the PCRA court's order, the Commonwealth filed a timely concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on February 13, 2015. See Pa.R.A.P.1925(b). The court entered an opinion on June 2, 2015.].

Com. v. Segraves, No. 181 MDA 2015, 2016 WL 617167, at *1-3 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 2016). The Pennsylvania Superior Court ("Superior Court") concluded that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law by granting Segraves a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at *5). The Superior Court reversed the order and reinstated the Judgment of Sentence. (Id.). Segraves filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court; the court denied the petition on July 7, 2016. (Doc. 9, p. 3; Doc. 16, p. 121).

Thereafter, Segraves filed the instant timely petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

III. Habeas Claims Presented for Review

Segraves seeks habeas relief based on the following grounds:

A. Ground One: Did the state court err by denying the defence's [sic] motion to dismiss juror #11 from the jury panel, expecially [sic] after engaging in blatant juror misconduct by making contact with a witness, thus denying the Petitioner a fair and impartial trial?

B. Ground Two: Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to call witness M.M. to the stand and the appellate court erred by overturning the lower court's decision for a new trial?

C. Ground Three: Trial counsel was ineffective for not submitting a pre-trial motion for the testimony of Ken[t] Baldwin, stating the prosecution breached 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945 and actively used the relationship with the alleged victim to further the aims of their case?²

D. Ground Four: Did the state deny the Petitioner's right to due process when it denied a motion for a mistrial prior to the commencement of trial, as Petitioner was unfairly prejudiced during jury selection?

E. Ground Five: Did the state court abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a mistrial as a result of statements made by the Assistant District Attorney during closing arguments?

F. Ground Six: The Commonwealth erred by denying the defendant to fully present his case and defense by:

a) Denying admittance of videos to support Petitioner's defense, as prejudicial and cumulative, thereby denying the opportunity of presenting his case;

b) Denying the Petitioner from presenting character witnesses to testify to the Petitioner's truthfulness, thereby denying the opportunity of presenting his case and defense.

(Doc. 1, pp. 8, 9,11, 13, 15, 16).

IV. Legal Standards of Review

A habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is the proper mechanism fora prisoner to challenge the "fact or duration" of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973). 28 U.S.C. § 2254, provides, in pertinent part:

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

...

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Section 2254 sets limits on the power of a federal...