Segreaves v. Officer Mr. Haines

1

ROSS J. SEGREAVES, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER MR. HAINES, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 24-CV-4356

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

December 5, 2024

MEMORANDUM

JOHN MILTON YOUNGE, J.

Plaintiff Ross J. Segreaves, who is currently incarcerated at SCI Phoenix, initiated this civil action by filing a pro se Complaint against four prison employees: Corrections Officers Haines, Tomes, and Laureano, and Unit Manager Fanrall. (ECF No. 2.) In a prior Memorandum and Order, the Court granted Segreaves leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed his Complaint, and granted him leave to amend. (See ECF Nos. 6, 7.) Segreaves filed an Amended Complaint, this time naming as Defendants: Haines Tomes, Laureano, and Security Department Officer Mr. D Hunter. (ECF No. 8.) For the following reasons, the Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint upon screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and grant Segreaves leave to file a second amended complaint.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS^[1]

Segreaves alleges that he was assaulted by other inmates at SCI Phoenix on September 7, 2022, and September 10, 2022. (Am. Compl. at 5.) As to the September 7 incident, Segreaves asserts that he was in the dayroom and “specifically stated to Mr. Haines that inmate Demetrius White was planning to assault [Segreaves] by breaking out of his handcuffs.” (Id. at 5, 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).) He claims that he “was constantly harassed by inmate White as being a ‘snitch'” for reporting on drugs being brought into the cell block. (Id. at 15.) Segreaves asked Haines to move him or to move White “to prevent such assault,” and that Haines did move White to another part of the dayroom in response. (Id. at 13.) He asserts that Haines and Tomes violated “DOC protocol” by not shackling White at his legs. (Id.) He then claims that “officers Haines and Tomes abandoned their post between 2 p.m. and 2:15 p.m. prior to the assault” that occurred sometime between 2:10 and 2:20 p.m., and that Haines and Tomes were instead “hanging out in the bubble/control room” during the assault by White. (Id.) The assault lasted for about three minutes and consisted of White kicking Segreaves in the face, head, and back, “before inmate White ran into his cell and slammed the door.” (Id.)

Segreaves states that he is “not asserting a failure to intervene claim, as many officers rushed out of the control room to assist and protect” him. (Id.) Instead, he claims that Haines's “abandonment of his post constitutes either deliberate indifference or negligence,” and that White could not have assaulted him but for the failure of Haines and Tomes to shackle White's legs. (Id.) He further alleges that “Chaplain Ms. Santana” told him during a visit one year later, in September 2023, that the assault on him “was a set-up.” (Id.)

Regarding the incident on September 10, 2022, Segreaves states that he and fellow inmate Indio Perez were placed in adjacent cages during recreation. (Id. at 15.) He alleges that Perez “is a pal of inmate White” and was angry at Segreaves because White had been disciplined for the assault on September 7. (Id.) After Segreaves had been in the recreation cage for “approximately thirty (30) minutes,” Perez “poured a bottle of alleged hepatitis-C infected bodily fluids (semen, blood and feces)” onto him. (Id. at 15-16.) He asserts that Defendant Laureano was the officer assigned to strip search the inmates “to ensure that no contraband is being taken out to [the] yard,” that Laureano “overlooked” the bottle of fluids, and that Laureano intentionally placed Segreaves in the cage next to Perez “to assist inmate Indio Perez with his agenda” to pour the fluids onto Segreaves. (Id. at 15.) He alleges that it “was rumored that officer Mr. Laureano provides drugs to inmates” on his cell block, and that “White and Perez are known drug users.” (Id.)

Segreaves further asserts that both of the alleged assaults were captured on video surveillance, but his requests for access to the video were denied by Security Department Officer Hunter. (Id. at 12.) Segreaves claims to have suffered a “laceration to [his] ear, lacerations to [his] wrists due to handcuffs, bruises to the face, bruises to the back of [his] head, [and] bruises on [his] back,” as well as unspecified “psychological trauma,” which he supports by reference to numerous grievances attached to his Amended Complaint as exhibits. (Am. Compl. at 5, 14, 1729.) For relief, he seeks $250,000 in damages. (Id. at 5, 14.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court granted Segreaves's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a prior Order. (See ECF No. 7.) Accordingly, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to dismiss the Amended Complaint if it fails to state a claim to relief, an inquiry governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). At the screening stage, the Court will accept the facts alleged in the pro se Complaint as true, draw all reasonable inferences in Segreaves's favor, and “ask only whether that complaint, liberally construed, contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.” Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021) (cleaned up), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Fisher v. Hollingsworth, 115 F.4th 197 (3d Cir. 2024); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Conclusory allegations do not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. As Segreaves is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his allegations liberally. Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013)). The Court will “apply the relevant legal principle even when the complaint has failed to name it.” Id. However, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Id. (quoting Mala, 704 F.

3d at 245). An unrepresented litigant “cannot flout procedural rules-they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Segreaves brings claims against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the vehicle by which federal constitutional claims may be brought in federal court. (See Compl. at 3.) “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

A. Failure to Protect

Because Segreaves expressly states that he is not pursuing any claims for failure to intervene (see Am. Compl. at 13), the Court construes his individual-capacity claims against Haines, Tomes, and Laureano to allege that these Defendants failed to protect him from the assaults by White and Perez. Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In that regard, prison officials have a duty “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). However, not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim's safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

To state a plausible failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conditions in which he was incarcerated posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to that substantial risk of serious harm; and (3) the officials' deliberate indifference caused harm. See id.; Hamilton, 117 F.3d at 746. Deliberate indifference is a subjective standard. Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must allege that the prison officials “knew or were aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to [his] health or safety.” Id. at 135. “[I]t is not sufficient that the official should have been aware” of the excessive risk. Id. at 125.

Segreaves's allegations as to the two assaults fail to state a claim for failure to protect. As to the September 7 incident in the dayroom, Segreaves asserts that Haines handcuffed and moved White after Segreaves told Haines about the threat and asked that he or White be moved to avoid the assault. He states that Haines and Tomes “abandoned their post” and instead were in the “bubble/control room,” but he does not specify what that other post was or how their presence there would have prevented the assault. (Am. Compl. at 13.) Moreover, Segreaves's own pleading demonstrates the inadequacy of his factual allegations by noting that the failure to shackle White's legs and the absence from a particular post may have been negligence rather than deliberate indifference. (See id.) “It is well established that merely negligent misconduct will not give rise to a claim under § 1983; the state defendant must act with a higher degree of intent.” Burton v Kindle, 401 Fed.Appx. 635, 637 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)). Even assuming that Haines and Tomes left some unspecified post momentarily, failed to “finger-gauge” or tighten White's cuffs, or failed to employ leg shackles contrary to prison policy, Segreaves's allegations do not support a reasonable inference that Hanes and Tomes were deliberately indifferent to any risk to Segreaves. The deliberate indifference standard requires “that the defendant acted or failed to act despite having knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, would subject the...