Segreti v. DeIuliis

263 A.3d 441

Anita SEGRETI, Appellant,

v.Luke DEIULIIS, et al., Appellees.

No. 20-PR-562

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted September 15, 2021

Decided November 18, 2021

John E. Reid, Washington, was on the brief for appellant.

Antoinette Witt, pro se.

Before Easterly and McLeese, Associate Judges, and Fisher, Senior Judge.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

Appellant Anita Segreti challenges the trial court's dismissal of her case. We vacate the judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

I.

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts appear to be undisputed. After Marguerite Corsetti's death, her daughters -- Ms. Segreti, appellee Antoinette Witt, and Marie Antoinette Arient -- became the beneficiaries of a trust established by Ms. Corsetti. The trust's only remaining asset is a house in Washington, DC. The trust has spent years in litigation with Ms. Segreti's son, Mario Segreti, who contested the validity of Ms. Corsetti's transfer of the house to the trust and asserted rights as a tenant of the house. As a result of that litigation, the house is subject to attorneys’ liens of over $675,000.

Before Ms. Corsetti's death, Luke DeIuliis (Ms. Corsetti's brother) and Paul Arient (Ms. Corsetti's son-in-law) were appointed trustees of the trust. Mr. DeIuliis and Mr. Arient subsequently resigned as trustees. Since their resignations, Ms. Witt has been acting as a trustee. Ms. Segreti contests the validity of the resignations of the original trustees and Ms. Witt's claim to be a trustee.

In 2015, Ms. Segreti filed the complaint in this case, alleging that Mr. DeIuliis, Mr. Arient, and Ms. Witt breached their fiduciary duties and duties of loyalty by, among other things, using trust assets to engage in extensive litigation against Mr. Segreti and allowing attorneys’ liens on the trust property. The complaint also alleges that the trustees failed to provide annual accountings of trust assets and mismanaged trust assets.

The case proceeded until 2019, when Ms. Segreti filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice, pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(a)(2) ; see also Super. Ct. Prob. R. 1(f) (making Superior Court Civil Rules generally applicable in Probate proceedings). In moving for dismissal, Ms. Segreti noted that the defendants had not filed any counterclaims. Although her motion requested that the case be dismissed, Ms. Segreti also sought substantive relief, asking the court to terminate the trust and distribute the house to the beneficiaries as equal tenants in common. In response, Ms. Witt stated that she did not oppose dismissal but did oppose the requested substantive relief. Mr. Arient also responded to Ms. Segreti's motion, requesting that all claims against him be dismissed with prejudice, that the trust be terminated, and that the trial court order the sale of the house and distribution of the proceeds to the beneficiaries.

In her reply, Ms. Segreti reiterated her request that the trial court distribute the house to her and her sisters as tenants in common. Diverging from the request in her initial motion, however, Ms. Segreti asked the trial court to dismiss her claims against the trustees with prejudice.

Ms. Witt then filed an additional reply, contending that she had been properly appointed as a trustee and explaining her efforts to sell the house. Ms. Witt stated that she expected to secure a contract to sell the house within two months. Ms. Witt asked the trial court to permit her to complete the sale of the house and distribute the proceeds according to the terms of the trust. Ms. Witt also asked that the trial court dismiss the case with prejudice.

The trial court granted Ms. Segreti's motion for voluntary dismissal "in part." Although the trial court noted that Ms. Segreti's reply asked that her claims against the trustees be dismissed with prejudice, the order did not explicitly state whether it was granting Ms. Segreti's motion for dismissal with prejudice or without prejudice. In addition to dismissing the case, the trial court ordered Ms. Witt to sell the house and distribute the proceeds of the sale equally among herself and her sisters.

Ms. Segreti moved for reconsideration, asking the trial court to dissolve the trust, delete the language in the order directing Ms. Witt to sell the house, and dismiss Ms. Segreti's claims without prejudice. Ms. Segreti argued that the terms of the trust did not permit the sale of the house and that Ms. Witt was not a valid trustee. Ms. Segreti also argued that the sale of the house would be prejudicial to her because the house was encumbered by significant attorneys’ liens. Finally, Ms. Segreti argued that the trial court had acted impermissibly by granting Ms. Segreti's motion for voluntary dismissal but at the same time effectively making a substantive ruling in favor of the defendants.

Ms. Witt opposed Ms. Segreti's motion for reconsideration and notified the trial court that the house had been put under contract. Mr. Arient also filed a reply, contending that the dismissal had actually been with prejudice.

The trial court denied Ms. Segreti's motion for reconsideration. The trial court concluded that the terms of the trust did permit the sale of the house and that Ms. Witt was a validly appointed trustee. The trial court also indicated that the dismissal had been with prejudice.

Ms. Segreti then filed a motion seeking to withdraw her motion for voluntary dismissal. Although the motion acknowledged that Ms. Segreti's reply to Mr. Arient had referred to dismissal with prejudice, the motion characterized that request as a typographical error that occurred because Ms. Segreti had not been represented by an attorney when the reply was filed. In support of that explanation, the motion explained that neither Ms. Segreti's original motion nor the attached proposed order had requested dismissal with prejudice. The motion also suggested that any dismissal with prejudice should be limited to Mr. Arient. The motion further reiterated Ms. Segreti's position that the trial court had acted impermissibly by adding terms to its dismissal order that were unacceptable to Ms. Segreti and that operated to her detriment. The trial court denied the motion, declining to credit Ms. Segreti's explanation that the request for dismissal with prejudice was a typographical error.

II.

Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 41(a)(2), "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request ... by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." The central issue in this case is whether the trial court acted permissibly by granting Ms. Segreti's motion to dismiss but at the same time effectively granting affirmative relief to the defendants, ordering Ms. Witt to sell the house and distribute the proceeds. We conclude that the trial court's dismissal order was impermissible, and we therefore vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

"The purpose of the terms and conditions clause of Rule 41(a)(2) is to protect a defendant from any prejudice or inconvenience that may result from a plaintiff's voluntary dismissal." Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Co. , 809 A.2d 1204, 1211 (D.C. 2002) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, for example, a trial court might "condition the voluntary dismissal on the requirement that the plaintiff pay defendant's attorney's fees and costs in order to compensate the defendant for the unnecessary expense that the litigation has caused because the defendant may have to defend again at a...