Segura v. City of La Mesa

647 F.Supp.3d 926

Zeelee SEGURA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LA MESA, et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 21cv565 JM (MDD)

United States District Court, S.D. California

Signed December 23, 2022

Matthew R. Miller, Miller Law Firm, San Diego, CA, Robert Scott Dreher, Dreher Law Firm, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff.

Heather E. Paradis, Mitchell D. Dean, Ricardo Baca, Dean Gazzo Roistacher LLP, Solana Beach, CA, for Defendants City of La Mesa, La Mesa Police Department.

Jennifer Marie Martin, San Diego County Counsel, San Diego, CA, for Defendant County of San Diego.

Ricardo Baca, Dean Gazzo Roistacher LLP, Solana Beach, CA, for Defendants Detective Daniel Garcia, Officer Jack Gaughran, Sergeant Michael Pierce.

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

JEFFREY T. MILLER, United States District Judge

Presently before the court is Defendant County of San Diego's Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 44). Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the court finds the matters presented appropriate for resolution without oral argument. Having considered the Parties' arguments, the evidence, and the law, the court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

The instant case arises from the alleged use of force by law enforcement officers on May 30, 2020 against Plaintiff, a participant in a racial injustice demonstration in La Mesa, California. It is one of a number of cases filed in this District relating to the La Mesa demonstration. See Astorga v. County of San Diego et al., No. 3:21-cv-00463-BEN-KSC; Horton v. County of San Diego et al., 3:21-cv-00400-H-BGS; Woolsey v. County of San Diego et al., 21cv877-BEN-AHG; LaBarge v. City of La Mesa et al., 3:21-cv-1035-RBM-BGS.

Plaintiff makes the following allegations in her Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), which the court assumes to be true for purposes of considering Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

On May 30, 2020, Plaintiff and a friend joined other protestors at a "Black Lives Matter" demonstration in La Mesa, California. TAC at ¶¶ 16-17. The protestors were assembled partly at the entrance of the La Mesa Police Department ("LMPD") headquarters. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19. The entrance of LMPD headquarters was blocked by a "line of uniformed LMPD Officers and San Diego County Sheriff's Department [("SDSD")] deputies," who were later replaced by a "tight phalanx of officers" in "full riot gear." Id. at ¶¶ 18, 20. A second group of officers, including Defendants Detective Daniel Garcia, Officer Jack Gaughran, and Sergeant Michael Pierce, were on the second-floor mezzanine "with rifles, scopes, helmets, and gas masks." Id. at ¶ 21.

In the early evening, law enforcement personnel deployed teargas into the area. Id. at ¶¶ 22-25. In response, Plaintiff joined other protestors in moving away from LMPD headquarters. Id. at ¶ 26. When Plaintiff arrived to within a few yards of the far corner of the La Mesa Post Office, which is described in the TAC as being "more than 40 yards" from the entrance of LMPD headquarters and "nowhere near anyone who was engaging with the LMPD," she paused and turned to locate her friend. Id. at ¶ 30. As she turned, Plaintiff claims she saw a "flash" from the second-floor mezzanine and a projectile "slammed" into her face causing her to be "knocked to a knee on the ground." Id. at ¶ 31. According to the TAC, Plaintiff was struck with a "less than lethal" projectile known as a Kinetic Impact Projectile ("KIP"). Id. at ¶¶ 33-34. Plaintiff claims the impact of the KIP caused her head pain and her lip to swell. Id.

II. Procedural Background

On March 31, 2021, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendants City of La Mesa, the LMPD, and unknown DOE personnel of the City of La Mesa and LMPD. (Doc. No. 1).

On October 12, 2021, the court granted the Parties' Joint Motion to allow Plaintiff to amend her complaint to add Defendant County of San Diego ("County") and certain members of the County's personnel. (Doc. Nos. 15; 16; 18). On May 26, 2022, the court granted the Parties' Joint Motion to allow Plaintiff to amend her complaint a second time to remove certain state law claims for relief. (Doc. Nos. 30; 31; 33).

On July 7, 2022, the County filed a Motion to Dismiss and Strike Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 36). On September 12, 2022, the court granted the Parties' Joint Motion to allow Plaintiff to file a TAC to amend certain allegations against the County in an effort for the Parties reach an agreement on the state of Plaintiff's pleadings without the court's intervention. (Doc. Nos. 41; 42; 43).

Plaintiff's TAC, filed on September 7, 2022,¹ asserts eight causes of action, primarily under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law, against Defendants City of La Mesa, LMPD, the County, Detective Daniel Garcia, Officer Jack Gaughran, Sergeant Michael Pierce, and unknown DOE officers employed by the City of La Mesa, LMPD, and SDSD. (Doc. No. 42). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts federal civil rights causes of action (42 U.S.C. § 1983) for: violation of her First Amendment right to speech and "to seek redress of government grievances" (Count I); violation of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force (Count II); and various Monell claims (Count III). Plaintiff also asserts state law claims for violation of California's Bane Act, Civil Code § 52.1 (Count IV); assault/battery (Count V); negligence (Count VI); intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VII); and violations of Article I, § 2, Article I, § 3, and Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution (Count VIII). Id. at ¶¶ 39-101.

On September 28, 2022, the County filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's TAC. (Doc. No. 44). Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. No. 46) and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. No. 47). The Motion is now fully briefed and ripe for resolution.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that a complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) "tests the legal sufficiency of a claim." Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). The court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek, 519 F.3d at 1031.

On the other hand, the court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor is the court "required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the [c]omplaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). "In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Pleading facts " 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability" fall short of a plausible entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This plausibility review is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Where a complaint does not survive 12(b)(6) analysis, the court will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified contentions " 'consistent with the challenged pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency.' " DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).

ANALYSIS

I. Monell Liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (Third Cause of Action)²

The County moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for municipal liability against the County alone. (See Doc. No. 44-1 at 11-19).

A. Legal Standard

Section 1983 authorizes civil actions for the "deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws" against a party acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Municipal entities, such as the County, "cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Instead, municipalities "can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018.

"The Supreme Court has made clear that policies can include written policies, unwritten customs and practices, failure to train municipal employees on avoiding certain obvious constitutional violations, and, in rare instances, single constitutional violations are so inconsistent with constitutional rights that even such a single instance indicates at least deliberate indifference of the municipality[.]" Benavidez v....