Seitz v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters

JAMES EDWARD SEITZ, Plaintiff, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-05442-DMR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

December 22, 2020

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 23

Pro se Plaintiff James E. Seitz filed a complaint for breach of the duty of fair representation against Defendants International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT"), Teamsters Local 986 ("Teamsters 986), and Chris Griswold. Defendants now move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint. [Docket No. 23.] The court held a hearing on December 10, 2020. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Seitz is employed by United Airlines ("United") at San Francisco International Airport. His employment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between his local union, IBT, and United. Compl. 3 ¶ 1.¹ His local union, Teamsters 986, "handle[s] the everyday part of representing him." Griswold, the Principal Officer of Teamsters 986, "is responsible for carrying out the Teamsters mission." Id.

Seitz alleges that on June 10, 2019, he filed a grievance regarding "the Industry Reset calculation that is used to decide if [his] work group receives a raise." Compl. 4 ¶ 2. Seitz and shop steward Paul Burdick signed and submitted the grievance as the first step under the CBA. Following ten days with no response, Burdick moved the grievance to the second step on June 20, 2019. Seitz made multiple attempts to learn the status of his grievance in August, September, and December 2019. Compl. 4 ¶¶ 3-5.

On January 2, 2020, Seitz emailed Chief Union Steward Dale Mitchell asking for an update on the status of the grievance. Compl. 4 ¶ 6; Compl. 10 (Jan. 2, 2020 email). On January 6, 2020, Mitchell told Seitz "the grievance was elevated to business agent level and they will get a resolution by this week." Id. at 4 ¶ 5. However, Burdick later told Seitz that "Mitchell had told him the business agents were just going to close it out and not even look into it or have the hearing." Id. at 4 ¶ 6.

Seitz alleges that Mitchell sent him an email on January 24, 2020² stating that Mitchell, Burdick, and three other individuals "had a meeting on June 25, 2019, and decided amongst themselves to get rid of my grievance," which Seitz alleges "is a violation of the grievance procedures." Compl. 5 ¶ 7. The January 21, 2020 email from Mitchell is attached to the complaint. It states in relevant part:

On June 25, 2019, myself, Fred Wood, Javier Lectora, Mark Desangles and Paul Burdick had a meeting concerning your grievance. We informed Paul that Article 19 [of the CBA] is not the correct process to address your concern. We also told Paul if he needed assistants [sic] writing grievances that he could contact me. The Understanding was that Paul would inform you of our conversations regarding your concern with LOA29, industry re-set. After this meeting was over, Paul informed myself and Fred that he would be resigning as shop Steward. At no time did Paul tell us he would not bring the information discussed back to you. In spite of the fact, the grievance was not valid, I will send you a close letter.

Compl. 13 (Jan. 21, 2020 email) (emphasis added).

On February 10, 2020, Mitchell sent Seitz a letter informing him that his "complaint/grievance was withdrawn," that "[t]here was no violation of the collective bargain [sic] agreement or [Letter of Agreement] #29," and that "[t]his grievance will be closed out." Compl. 5 ¶ 8; Compl. 11 (Feb. 10, 2020 letter).

Seitz alleges that after receiving the February 10, 2020 letter from Mitchell, he "sent multiple emails demanding the Teamsters follow the process," but that "Teamsters never replied to a single one." Compl. 5 ¶ 9. He attached to the complaint what appear to be three emails or excerpts from emails that Seitz sent to Mitchell. Compl. 12, 16. First, on February 24, 2020, Seitz wrote that the union's response to his grievance was "unacceptable and violates the collective bargaining agreement." He continued, "[m]y grievance needs to be processed correctly under the collective bargaining agreement and this email is to serve as your notice to do so." Compl. 12. On March 19, 2020, Seitz sent another email noting that Mitchell had not responded to his previous email. He wrote, "I want to proceed with the grievance process as it is laid out in the CBA" and asked for a response in 30 days. Compl. 16. Finally, on May 28, 2020, Seitz wrote to Mitchell that his email was "to serve as my final attempt to have you follow the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, to enforce the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, and to process my grievance according to the collective bargaining agreement." He asked again for a response within 30 days and wrote that if he did not receive a response, he "will be filing an action in federal court for breach of the duty of fair representation." Compl. 17-18.

On August 4, 2020, Seitz filed the instant complaint alleging a single claim for breach of the duty of fair representation against Defendants pursuant to the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Compl. 6. Defendants now move pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint," Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)(per curiam) (citation omitted), and may dismiss a claim "only where there is no cognizable legal theory" or there is an absence of "sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief." Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) , overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002) .

As a general rule, a court may not consider "any material beyond the pleadings" when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Lee, 250 F.3d at 688 (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, "a court may take judicial notice of 'matters of public record,'" id. at 689 (citing Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)), and may also consider "documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading," without converting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith, 307 F.3d at 1125-26. The court need not accept as true allegations that contradict facts which may be judicially noticed. See Mullis v. U.S. Bankr. Court, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1987).

"A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations . . . when the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint." Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. The Ninth Circuit has held that"where the petitioner is pro se," courts have an obligation, "particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt." Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). "However, a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

III. ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that Seitz's complaint is barred by the six-month statute of limitations applicable to claims for breach of the duty of fair representation under the RLA.

The RLA "authorizes employees in the railroad and airline industries to select a union to act as their exclusive representative for collective bargaining with their employer." Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595, 597 (9th Cir. 2019). "As exclusive bargaining representative, the union assumes a duty to 'represent fairly the interests of all bargaining-unit members during the negotiation, administration, and enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements.'" Id. at 597-98 (quoting Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47 (1979)). A union breaches its duty of fair representation "when its conduct is 'arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,' as, for example, when it 'arbitrarily ignore[s] a meritorious grievance or process[es] it in [a] perfunctory fashion.'" Foust, 442 U.S. at 47 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 191 (1967)). Employees "have a 'judicially implied' cause of action under the RLA against their union for breaching its duty of fair representation." Beckington, 926 F.3d at 600 (quoting Foust, 442 U.S. at 47). Claims for breach of the duty of fair representation under the RLA are...