Selection Healthcare Servs. v. Bliant Specialty Hosp.

SELECTION HEALTHCARE SERVICES, LLC v. BLIANT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL, LLC, ET AL

Civil Action No. 21-1936

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

April 28, 2022

SECTION “B” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is plaintiff's unopposed motion for default judgment (Rec. Doc. 19). For the following reasons IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for default judgment (Rec. Doc. 19) is GRANTED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action was filed on October 21, 2021 against defendants Bliant Specialty Hospital, LLC (“Bliant”) and Juanita B. Bonds (“Bonds”) (hereinafter “defendants”) for violations of Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices Act, La R.S. §§ 51:631 et seq. (“LUTPA”) and for breach of contract. Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff alleges that it provided defendants with over $100, 000.00 of contractually agreed upon medical staffing services, and for nearly two years, defendants have consistently failed to pay invoices for services. Id.

The Clerk of Court record indicates defendant Bonds was served via certified mail with the summons and complaint on December 21, 2021. Rec. Doc. 13. The record further indicates defendant Bliant was served through the Louisiana Secretary of State on December 20, 2021. Rec. Doc. 9. Defendants' responses were due within 21 days of service, on January 11, 2022, and January 10, 2022, respectively.

To date, defendants have not filed an answer or responsive pleadings in this record. On plaintiff's motion, the Clerk of Court entered a default against defendants on February 9, 2022. Rec. Doc. 15. Consequently, plaintiffs filed the instant motion for entry of a default judgment on March 21, 2022.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Default Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 governs the entry of defaults and default judgments. That rule states that “[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 55. The Fifth Circuit has also explained that there are three steps for obtaining a default judgment: (1) default; (2) entry of default; and (3) default judgment. See N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996); Bradford v. Telerecovery, No. CV 16-2933, 2017 WL 2573947 (E.D. La. June 14, 2017). A default occurs when “a defendant has failed to plead or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time required by the Federal Rules.” N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 84 F.3d at 141. The clerk will then enter an entry of default “when the default is established by affidavit or otherwise.” Id. After the clerk's entry of default, “a plaintiff may apply for a judgment based on such default. This is a default judgment.” Id. Default judgements are “a drastic remedy, not favored by the Federal Rules and resorted to by courts only in extreme situations.” Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 767 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Sun Bank of Ocala v. Pelican Homestead and Savings Ass'n., 874 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1989)).

B. Jurisdiction to Enter a Default Judgment

As a preliminary matter, the Court considers whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over this action and personal jurisdiction over Bliant and Bonds. See Bradford v. Telerecovery, No. CV 16-2933, 2017 WL 2573947 (E.D. La. June 14, 2017) (establishing the court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant prior to determining whether entry of default judgment was proper.)

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction on the basis diversity jurisdiction. See Rec. Doc. 1. Plaintiff Selection is a limited liability company, organized pursuant to Mississippi law. Rec. Doc. 1 at pg. 2. All members/owners of Selection are citizens of Mississippi. Id. Thus, plaintiff is a citizen of Mississippi. See Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Capsco Indus., Inc., 934 F.3d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Settlement Funding, L.L.C. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., 851 F.3d 530, 536 (5th Cir. 2017)) (“[t]he citizenship of an LLC is determined by the citizenship of each of its members.”) Likewise, defendant Bliant is a limited liability company, organized under Louisiana law. Id. at pgs. 2-3. Defendant Bonds is the sole owner and member of Bliant, and plaintiff has alleged Bonds is a Louisiana citizen, domiciled in Orleans Parish.^[1]Id. Thus, Bliant and Bonds are Louisiana citizens. See Greenwich, 934 F.3d at 422; MidCap Media Fin. v. Pathway Data, Inc., 929 F.3d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)) (“For individuals, ‘citizenship has the same meaning as domicile,' and ‘the place of residence is prima facie the domicile.'”). Because plaintiff Selection and defendants Bliant and Bonds are diverse parties and plaintiff is seeking more than the jurisdictional amount of $75, 000.00, the Court has diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff also brings a claim under LUTPA. See Rec. Doc. 1. Because the plaintiff's state law claim arises out of the same case and controversy, the Court has supplemental jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).

2. Personal Jurisdiction

In two seminal decisions, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2847, 2853-54 (2011), and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S.Ct. 746, 757 (2014), the United States Supreme Court held that the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over a corporation is justified when the corporation is either incorporated in the forum state or has its principal place of business there. The decisions in Daimler and Goodyear also apply equally to limited liability corporations. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761 (looking to MBUSA's place of incorporation and principal place of business to determine whether general jurisdiction existed, even though MBUSA was an LLC.)

Here, defendant Bliant is a limited liability company with its principal place of business in New Orleans, Louisiana. Rec. Doc. 1. At pgs. 2-3. Therefore, Bliant is at home in Louisiana and this Court has general personal jurisdiction over this defendant. Plaintiff has also stated that defendant Bonds is domiciled in Louisiana, and thus it would seem the Court also has general personal jurisdiction over her. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924; see Daimler, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014) (“For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile....”) Defendants are therefore subject to the general personal jurisdiction of the state of Louisiana and this Court.

However, for the sake of being thorough, the Court must acknowledge the declarations in the record wherein plaintiff's counsel stated that Bonds was served at her “new” residential address in Georgia. Rec. Doc. 13; Rec. Doc. 19. Given the chance that Bonds might be a citizen of Georgia, the Court must determine whether it can nevertheless exercise personal jurisdiction over her as a non-resident defendant.

A court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when: (1) the forum state's long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the forum state's exercise of jurisdiction complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gross v. RSJ Int'l, LLC, No. CIV.A. 11-73, 2012 WL 729955 (E.D. La. Mar. 6, 2012) (citing Latshaw v. Johnston, 167 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir.1999)). Because Louisiana's long-arm statute, La. R.S. § 13:3201, et seq., extends jurisdiction to the full limits of due process, the Court's focus is solely on whether the exercise of its jurisdiction in this case satisfies federal due process requirements. Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.1999) (citing La. R.S. § 13:3201(B)).

The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant satisfies due process when (1) the defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state by establishing “minimum contacts” with that state, and (2) exercising personal jurisdiction over the defendant does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Latshaw, 167 F.3d at 211 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). A Court has specific jurisdiction sufficient to establish minimum contacts when a nonresident defendant “has purposefully directed its activities at the forum state and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities.” Walk Haydel & Assocs., Inc. v. Coastal Power Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 235, 243 (5th Cir.2008).

Here, Bonds' activity clearly satisfies the requirement of minimum contacts with Louisiana. Not only was Bonds domiciled in Louisiana until about July 2021, when she allegedly acquired her new Georgia address, ^[2] but she also started a company in Louisiana, Bliant, which catered to Louisiana citizens. Further, the present litigation directly relates to Bonds' activity within Louisiana, i.e., her operation of an undercapitalized business. The exercise of personal jurisdiction will also not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Although the burden on Bonds would be high, the interest of the plaintiff and the forum state outweigh it. Selection has a greater interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief. Likewise, the forum state has a high level of interest in this case because the contract was executed in this state, the alleged unlawful acts were committed here, and Bliant is a Louisiana company organized through the Louisiana Secretary of State. Thus, even if Bonds is a Georgia citizen, the Court will retain personal jurisdiction over her.

3. Service of Process

The Court must also confirm that the defendants were properly served. For a federal court to exercise personal...