Sentementes v. Lamont

THOMAS SENTEMENTES, Plaintiff, v. GOVERNOR NED LAMONT, STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ET AL. Defendants.

Case No. 3:20cv1826 (MPS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

May 10, 2021

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

The plaintiff, Thomas J. Sentementes, is currently confined at Osborn Correctional Institution in Somers, Connecticut ("Osborn"). He files this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Governor Ned Lamont, Pasqualina Bastone, Bethel Police Chief Jeffrey Finch, Bethel Police Officer Emerson, Bank of America CEO Brian Moyihan, Daniel Sentementes, and Public Defender Thomas Leaf. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the complaint in part.

I. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court must review prisoner civil complaints against governmental actors and "dismiss ... any portion of [a] complaint [that] is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted," or that "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." Id. In undertaking this review, the Court is obligated to "construe" complaints "liberally and interpret[] [them] to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Although detailed allegations are not required under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A complaint that includes only "'labels and conclusions,' 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' or 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement,'" does not meet the facial plausibility standard. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

II. Factual Allegations

On January 28, 2019, Bethel Police Officer Emerson called the plaintiff and requested that he come to the station to discuss a telephone call that his son had made to the Bethel Police Department as well as a statement made by Pasqualina Bastone. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 3 ¶ 3. Officer Emerson inquired as to whether the plaintiff had called his son and threatened him. Id. ¶ 4. The plaintiff informed Emerson that he was in a vehicle with his friend Sid Weston when he spoke to his son via speaker phone. Id.

That evening, the plaintiff traveled with Sid Weston to the Bethel Police station. Id. ¶ 5. Upon their arrival at the station, Weston gave a statement regarding the telephone conversation that he overheard between the plaintiff and his son. Id. Weston indicated that during the conversation, the plaintiff's son had threatened the plaintiff and "violated [the plaintiff] on the restraining order." Id. As of January 25, 2019, Pasqualina Bastone had secured a restraining order against the plaintiff and had made a statement to a Bethel Police officer. Id. at 4 ¶¶ 9-10.

In speaking with the plaintiff at the station, Officer Emerson expressed his dislike of theplaintiff and stated that he did not care that Weston had been a witness to the telephone conversation between the plaintiff and his son because he wanted the plaintiff to go to prison. Id. at 3 ¶ 5. Officer Emerson then arrested the plaintiff for threatening his son and violating a protective order previously granted to Pasqualina Bastone and held him at the station on a $50,000.00 bond. Id. at 2-4 ¶¶ 3, 7. Officer Emerson's dislike of the plaintiff was demonstrated when he falsely testified in another of the plaintiff's criminal cases. Id. at 3 ¶ 6. In that case, the jury reached a not guilty verdict. Id.

A Connecticut Superior Court judge assigned Public Defender Thomas Leaf to represent the plaintiff in the criminal case arising from the plaintiff's arrest on January 28, 2019. Id. ¶ 7. Public Defender Leaf informed the plaintiff that the threats that he had allegedly made to his son on the phone did not constitute criminal activity. Id. Leaf filed only one pretrial motion in defending the plaintiff even though the plaintiff had evidence in the form of a sworn affidavit of a witness who could challenge the basis of the criminal charges filed against the plaintiff. Id. at 4 ¶ 12. When the plaintiff questioned the quality of Leaf's representation, Leaf swore at the plaintiff. Id. at 7 ¶ 32. The plaintiff immediately fired Leaf and represented himself. Id. at 5 ¶ 23; at 7 ¶ 32. After the plaintiff spent a year of confinement in a correctional facility, the State of Connecticut dismissed/nolled the criminal charges for which he had been arrested on January 28, 2019 and released the plaintiff from prison. Id. at 2-5 ¶¶ 7, 11, 19.

The plaintiff was unable to post bond during his one-year period of confinement because his brother, Daniel Sentementes, withheld the plaintiff's inheritance from their mother. Id. at 4 ¶ 14. Bank of America CEO Moyihan did not respond to the plaintiff's letters seeking release of funds that he could have used to post bond. Id. ¶ 13.

III. Discussion

The plaintiff claims that the defendants deprived him of life and liberty, maliciously prosecuted, wrongfully incarcerated, and made false statements about him, subjected him to harassment and cruel and unusual punishment, and engaged in the intentional infliction of emotional distress and breaches of fiduciary duties. Id. at 2. For relief, he seeks at total of $32,000,000.00. Id. at 11.

Section 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any ... person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law." To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant, a person acting under color of state, law deprived him of a federally or constitutionally protected right. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 930 (1982).

A. Governor Lamont

The first defendant listed in the caption of the complaint is "STATE OF CONNECTICUT ET AL NED LAMONT, GOVE[R]NOR." Compl. at 1. To the extent that the plaintiff intended to name the State of Connecticut as a separate defendant, a State is not a person for purposes a section 1983 action. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (state and state agencies not persons within meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Accordingly, all federal claims asserted against the State of Connecticut are dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The complaint is devoid of allegations regarding the conduct of Governor Lamont. Assuch, the plaintiff has not alleged that Lamont violated his federally or constitutionally protected rights. All federal claims asserted against Governor Lamont are dismissed as lacking an arguable legal and factual basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

B. Pasqualina Bastone, Daniel Sentementes, CEO Moyihan

On or before the date of the plaintiff's arrest in January 2019, Bastone allegedly made statements to the police regarding threats made by the plaintiff and sought and was granted a restraining/protective order against the plaintiff. On the date of the plaintiff's arrest and during his year-long confinement in a correctional institution, the plaintiff's brother, Daniel Sentementes, was the executor of their mother's will and Moyihan was the CEO of Bank of America. None of these defendants appears to be a state actor.

A plaintiff may demonstrate that the conduct of a "nominally private entity" constitutes state action under section 1983 in three ways: "(1) the entity acts pursuant to the 'coercive power' of the state or is ' controlled' by the state (the compulsion test); (2) the state provides 'significant encouragement' to the entity, the entity is a 'willful participant in joint activity with the [s]tate,' or the entity's functions are 'entwined' with state policies (the joint action test or close nexus test); or (3) when the entity 'has been delegated a public function by the [s]tate,' (the public function test)." Sybalski v. Indep. Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001)). "The fundamental question under each test is whether the private entity's challenged actions are 'fairly attributable' to the state." Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 207 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).

The plaintiff's allegations raise no inference that any of the private citizen defendantsengaged in conduct that could be fairly attributed to the state. Nor are there allegations that the private citizen defendants conspired with a state actor or state actors. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 920 (1984) ("[A]n otherwise private person acts 'under color of' state law" only if he or she "conspir[es] with state officials to deprive another of federal rights.") (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980)); see also Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir. 2002). ("[C]onclusory, vague, or general allegations that the defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights" are insufficient.). A conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires the plaintiff to show "(1) an agreement between two or more state actors or between a state actor and a private entity, (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury, and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal, causing damages." Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999). The plaintiff has failed to...