Seo v. Charles Moon Suk OH

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KANG KYU SEO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CHARLES MOON SUK OH, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-785 (RDM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

April 27, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

On October 6, 2022, a jury returned a verdict in favor of all four Plaintiffs in this case, finding that Charles Moon Suk Oh and Wade Road, Inc. failed to pay Plaintiffs overtime as required by both the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and D.C. law. Plaintiffs filed a proposed final order with the Court, in which they sought compensatory damages, liquidated damages, and interest. Dkt 61. In a prior opinion, the Court concluded that Plaintiffs were entitled to compensatory and liquidated damages in amounts set forth in the opinion. See Dkt. 70 at 17.

The Court deferred ruling, however, on the availability of pre-judgment interest pending further briefing. As explained in the last opinion,

According to Plaintiffs, they are each entitled to an additional award of interest “at the rate of 5%” starting on October 6, 2022. Dkt. 61-1 at 1-2. Plaintiffs fail to explain why they are entitled to the payment of interest running from the date of the jury's verdict but rather, merely cite to D.C. Code § 28-3302(c). That provision, however, sets the prevailing interest rate “on judgments and decrees,” id., and is thus seemingly inapposite, since the Court has yet to enter judgment, see Zuniga v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 270 A.3d 897, 902 (D.C. 2022) (holding that “judgment” under that statute is a final appealable order). But because neither party has briefed this issue, and because Plaintiffs have requested the opportunity to [be] heard on the question, Dkt. 61 at 2, the Court will defer ruling on the question of interest at this time.

Id. at 16.

Plaintiffs have since come back with two new theories of pre-judgment interest under D.C. law.^[1] First, they assert that the amount owed in this case constitutes a “liquidated debt,” and, therefore, the Court is required to award pre-judgment interest under D.C. Code § 15-108. See Dkt. 71 at 3. Alternatively, if the Court concludes that this is an unliquidated debt, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should, in its discretion, award pre-judgment interest under D.C. Code § 15109. Id. at 3-6. Plaintiffs have also altered their ask; while they previously sought pre-judgment interest running from the date the jury returned its verdict, Dkt. 61-1 at 1-2, they now request pre-judgment interest going back to 2017, Dkt. 71 at 6. Defendants' response-which spans less than two pages and contains almost no analysis-merely asserts that the award is already punitive, since it includes quadruple damages and attorneys' fees, and that pre-judgment interest is therefore inappropriate. See Dkt. 72. Finally, Plaintiffs also request post-judgment interest, Dkt. 71 at 1, which Defendants do not oppose, Dkt. 72 at 2.

I.

D.C. Code § 15-108 provides that,

In an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to recover a liquidated debt on which interest is payable by contract or by law or usage the judgment for the plaintiff shall include interest on the principal debt from the time when it was due and payable, at the rate fixed by the contract, if any, until paid.

There are therefore two distinct requirements under § 15-108: (1) the debt must be liquidated; and (2) interest must be payable by contract or by law or usage. See Klayman v. Jud. Watch, Inc., No. 06-cv-670, 2019 WL 1244079, at *27 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2019). Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy either requirement.

First, this case does not involve a “liquidated debt” under § 15-108. “For the purposes of this provision, ‘[a] liquidated debt is one which[,] at the time it arose[,] . . . was an easily ascertainable sum certain.'” Irazabal v. 201 Kennedy St. Holdings, LLC, No. 21-cv-1378, 2022 WL 4365736, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2022) (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Steuart Inv. Co. v. The Meyer Group, Ltd., 61 A.3d 1227, 1240 (D.C. 2013)). “Notably, to trigger D.C.'s mandatory prejudgment interest statute, the debt must have been for a ‘sum certain' at the time that it arose, which for purposes of the statute happens only if its size was known to both parties at the time.” CapitalKeys, LLC v. Dem. Rep. Congo, 278 F.Supp.3d 265, 275 (D.D.C. 2017) (emphasis in original) (quoting Wash. Inv. Partners of Del., LLC v. Secs. House, K.S.C.C., 28 A.3d 566, 582 (D.C. 2011)). “Moreover, for a damages award to trigger D.C. Code § 15-108, the plaintiff must have ‘had an immediate right, judicially enforceable[,]' to recover that sum certain at the time that the debt arose.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. District of Columbia, 581 A.2d 1229, 1254 (D.C. 1990)).

The Court concludes that the debt owed here was not a “sum certain” because, at the time Defendants violated the wage statutes at issue, the quantum of damages was unknown. To calculate the damages owed in this case, the jury had to find the weeks and hours worked for each of the Plaintiffs. See Dkt. 59. That was no simple task. To be sure, because Defendants admitted certain allegations in their answer, the jury was told the dates Mr. Seo, Ms. Chase, and Ms. Johnson worked. Dkt. 33 at 10. But an admission does not render a debt “liquidated” within the meaning of the statute. As for Ms. Agnew, moreover, the jury was still required to make findings regarding the weeks she worked. Dkt. 59 at 6. Even more to the point, for each of the four Plaintiffs, the jury had to find the average number of hours over forty hours each worked per week during that period.

Even after the jury returned its verdict, moreover, the quantum of damages owed remained unsettled. For each Plaintiff, the Court had to walk through a complicated analysis in an eighteen-page opinion to ascertain the damages owed. See Dkt. 70. For example, the Court had to determine (1) whether Ms. Chase started work in the beginning or the middle of May 2016; (2) when Ms. Johnson started work; and (3) whether Plaintiffs were entitled to liquidated damages, and if so, the amount of those liquidated damages. See id. at 6. In addition, for three of the four Plaintiffs, the Court had to ascertain the appropriate minimum wage, which changed for those three Plaintiffs over the period of their employment.

Accordingly, the Court cannot conclude that, at the time the statutes were violated, any of the parties knew (or could readily have determined) how much Defendants owed each Plaintiff, much less that there was a “sum certain.” Indeed, that sum was not fixed until the Court issued its opinion in January 2023. This case therefore lays in stark contrast to the typical § 15-108 case in which the sum certain is clear from the face of a written agreement. See, e.g., Irazabal, 2022 WL 4365736, at *4 (breached promissory note provided for principal sum and interest); Johnson-Lancaster & Assocs., Inc. v. TB Ballston, LLC, No. 20-cv-1565, 2020 WL 7481040, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2020) (“Here, TB Ballston failed to pay the fixed, ascertainable sums recorded in Johnson-Lancaster's invoices.”).

The cases on which Plaintiffs rely are inapposite. In Bragdon v. Twenty-Five Twelve Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 856 A.2d 1165 (D.C. 2004), the parties did not dispute that the overcharges at issue were a liquidated debt. Id. at 1169. Giant Food, Inc. v. Jack I. Bender & Sons, 399 A.2d 1293 (D.C. 1979), addressed, in a breach of contract case, whether pre-judgment interest was available where an unliquidated counterclaim was asserted against a liquidated claim. Id. at 1299. And District Cablevision Ltd. Partnership v. Bassin, 828 A.2d 714 (D.C. 2003), addressed the availability of pre-judgment interest where the liquidated damages were reduced by an unliquidated amount. Id. at 731. None support Plaintiffs' contention that “[w]ages are, by nature, a ‘liquidated debt.'” Dkt. 71 at 3 (quoting Bragdon, 856 A.2d at 1169 n.6).^[2]

Second, even if the principal amount at issue here was due on a liquidated debt, Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that “interest is payable by contract or by law or usage.” D.C. Code § 15-108; see also Klayman, 2019 WL 1244079, at *27; Bazarian Int'l Fin. Assocs., LLC v. Desarrollos Hotelco, C.A., 342 F.Supp.3d 1, 23-24 (D.D.C. 2018). Strikingly, Plaintiffs make no argument with respect to this requirement; indeed, when quoting the statute, they inexplicably omit this dispositive language through the use of ellipses. Dkt. 71 at 3. Because Plaintiffs do not even argue that this requirement of § 15-108 is met, they have failed to carry their burden.

In any event, even without briefing, it appears that this second requirement is not satisfied. First, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any contract that entitles them to pre-judgment interest. See, e.g., Klayman, 2019 WL 1244079, at *27 (“The parties' Confidential Severance Agreement does not provide for interest on Klayman's personal expenses ....”). Second, they concede that the statutes at issue do not themselves provide for pre-judgement interest. See Dkt. 71 at 2 (“There does not appear to be any binding precedent on the availability or unavailability of pre-judgment interest under D.C. wage laws specifically.”); see also Klayman, 2019 WL 1244079, at *28 (“[O]n the basis of its independent research, the Court shall assume, arguendo, that ‘law' does not expressly require an award of interest under these circumstances.”). That leaves “usage,” which “refers to what is customary or usual under similar of comparable circumstances.” Bazarian, 342 F.Supp.3d at 23 (quoting Aspire Channel, LLC v. Penngood, LLC, 139 F.Supp.3d 382, 389 (D.D.C. 2...