Separation of Hinduism from our Schs. v. Chi. Pub. Schs.

SEPARATION OF HINDUISM FROM OUR SCHOOLS, an unincorporated association; CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR URBAN BELIEVERS, an unincorporated association; AMONTAE WILLIAMS, individually and as a representative for all similarly situated persons; DASIA SKINNER, individually and as a representative for all similarly situated persons; and DARRYL WILLIAMS, individually and as a representative for all similarly situated persons, Plaintiffs, v. CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS, City of Chicago School District #299; THE DAVID LYNCH FOUNDATION; and the UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, Defendants.

No. 20 C 4540

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

August 17, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, DISTRICT JUDGE:

On May 21, 2021, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint in part. See generally Separation of Hinduism From Our Schs. v Chicago Pub. Schs., City of Chicago Sch. Dist. #299, No 20 C 4540, 2021 WL 2036536, at *1 (N.D. Ill. May 21, 2021). The plaintiffs now seek leave to amend and have submitted a proposed second amended complaint in an effort to cure the deficiencies in the first amended complaint.

Discussion^[1]

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) "directs courts to freely give leave to amend when justice so requires." Always Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2 F.4th 695, 707 (7th Cir. 2021) (alterations accepted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But leave to amend is not guaranteed. See id. "[C]ourts in their sound discretion may deny a proposed amendment if the moving party has unduly delayed in filing the motion, if the opposing party would suffer undue prejudice, or if the pleading is futile." Soltys v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008).

Delay is not a legitimate basis for denial of leave to amend in this case; plaintiffs acted promptly after the Court dismissed the previous version of their complaint. The real question is futility. An amendment is futile "only if it appears to a certainty that [the] plaintiff cannot state a claim." Barry Aviation Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Mun Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Garcia v. City of Chicago, 24 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[F]utile repleadings include restating the same facts using different language, reasserting claims previously determined, failing to state a valid theory of liability, and the inability to survive a motion to dismiss." (citations omitted)).

As with the previous version of the complaint, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs other than Amontae Williams lack standing and that the repleaded versions of previously dismissed claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may granted. On the latter point, a complaint "must (1) describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and [the] grounds on which it rests and (2) contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Cornielsen v. Infinium Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 916 F.3d 589, 598 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A. Skinner's standing

In the prior opinion, the Court concluded that Dasia Skinner lacked standing to sue because she did not allege an injury in fact under either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. See Separation of Hinduism From Our Schs., 2021 WL 2036536, at *10. Missing from the prior complaint were any allegations that Skinner had "direct involvement" in the Quiet Time program or "any description of how her mere proximity to students participating in Quiet Time would have inhibited her religious beliefs." Id.

The proposed second amended complaint does not cure these deficiencies. See 2d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 84-120. Regarding her Establishment Clause claim, she still does not allege that she actually participated in the Quiet Time program. See Separation of Hinduism From Our Schs., 2021 WL 2036536, at *10. As with the prior complaint, almost everything Skinner alleges about the Quiet Time program-how it was conducted, students' experiences, and parents' reactions-comes secondhand from her conversations with students, parents, and Quiet Time instructors. See id.

Though the plaintiffs argue in their brief that Skinner facilitated the Quiet Time program when she led sessions, their complaint does not allege that. See Pl.'s Reply Br. at 5-6. The complaint only alleges that Skinner felt pressure to "support the 'Quiet Time' program," "encourage CPS students to participate," "evaluate students," and "follow the schedule and facilitate . . . meditation sessions," not that she succumbed to that pressure. 2d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 87, 88, 91, 92. Skinner also alleges that she was told by a staff member "that she was expected to make sure that the students were doing the program." Id. ¶ 89. Declaring one "felt pressure" or was "expected" to participate in an activity is not the same as alleging that one participated in the activity.^[2]Skinner cites no authority to support the proposition that being on the receiving end of unsuccessful exhortations to an adult to participate in a religious activity amounts to an injury that gives rise to standing under Article III.

Skinner still fails to identify what personal injury she suffered "as a consequence of the alleged constitutional error." See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982); see also Separation of Hinduism From Our Schs., 2021 WL 2036536, at *10. The complaint states that Skinner addressed her concerns about the Quiet Time program with various administrators, with a local school council, and with the Board of Education of the City of Chicago. 2nd Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 97-105. Skinner alleges that after she raised her concerns, she was "blocked from receiving or accepting work" within CPS while she was under investigation. Id. ¶¶ 106-115. Skinner never learned the purpose of investigation. Id. ¶ 110.

To the extent the investigation and Skinner's lockout were injuries, they were injuries that resulted from her decision to publicly share her concerns about Quiet Time, not injuries that resulted from her participation in Quiet Time. The plaintiffs' proposed second amended complaint makes that clear. The plaintiffs' allege that "[p]rior to voicing her concerns about the religious elements" of Transcendental Meditation and Quiet Time, Skinner "had not had any difficulty receiving or accepting assignments" and "had not been placed under investigation." Id. ¶¶ 116-117. Thus, these alleged injuries are not related to any of Skinner's claims in this case and are not the direct consequences of the alleged unconstitutional error at the heart of those claims-the purported religious components of the Quiet Time program.^[3]

From Skinner's remaining allegations, one can at most infer that she was injured by observing conduct that she objected to. But the intensity of Skinner's interest in upholding the Establishment Clause "is not a permissible substitute for the showing of injury itself." See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 485. Abstract injuries stemming from the nonobservance of the Constitution by others is not a "species of injury in fact" under the Establishment Clause. See Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Obama, 641 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Regarding her Free Exercise claim, Skinner still has not explained how her religious beliefs were violated-a necessary component for standing. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 n.9 (1963) ("[T]he requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular religious freedoms are infringed."). The proposed second amended complaint is devoid of any explanation of how Skinner's "mere proximity to students participating in Quiet Time would have inhibited her religious beliefs." See Separation of Hinduism From Our Schs., 2021 WL 2036536, at *10.

Finally, Skinner does not have standing to bring a claim under the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). IRFRA creates a right of action against a government, subdivision, or government official that "substantially burden[s] a person's exercise of religion." See 775 ILCS 35/15. Because Skinner has not alleged that she was presented with "a coercive choice of either abandoning [her] religious convictions" or participating in the allegedly unconstitutional conduct," she has not alleged an injury sufficient to confer standing under IRFRA.^[4] See Diggs v. Snyder, 333 Ill.App.3d 189, 194, 775 N.E.2d 40, 44 (2002) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 217-18 (1972)); Students & Parents for Priv. v. Sch. Dirs. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 211, 377 F.Supp.3d 891, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2019).

In sum, Skinner's allegations in the proposed second amended complaint are insufficient to confer standing. The Board's argument regarding Skinner's eligibility as a class representative is therefore moot.

B. Darryl Williams's taxpayer standing

In its prior opinion, the Court concluded...