Sequin v. Bedrosian

Mary Sequin v. Haiqanush R. Bedrosian, Chief Judqe of the Family Court of Rhode Island, et al.

Civil No. 12-cv-614-JD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

December 12, 2012

ORDER

Mary Sequin brouqht suit aqainst Rhode Island Family Court judqes and Rhode Island state officials, alleqinq claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal criminal statutes, and state law, arisinq out of a series of orders issued in cases relatinq to custody proceedinqs involvinq Sequin. Sequin filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which was referred to Maqistrate Judqe Landya B. McCafferty. The maqistrate issued a Report and Recommendation concludinq that the motion should be denied. Sequin objected to the maqistrate's recommendation and moved to vacate reference of the motion to the maqistrate. The defendants objected to the motion to vacate reference to the maqistrate, and also moved to dismiss Sequin's amended complaint and to strike the subsequent amended complaints. Sequin objected to the defendants' motions.

Background

This case arises out of child custody proceedings in the Rhode Island Family Court ("Family Court") involving Seguin and her children, including proceedings instituted by Gero Meyersiek, the father of one of Seguin's daughters, naming Seguin as the respondent. See Meyersiek v. Seguin, No. K01-0521M (R.I. Fam. Ct., Kent Cnty.). Divorce and child custody proceedings between Seguin and her ex-husband, Marc Seguin, are also pending in the Family Court. See Seguin v. Seguin, No. K01-10503 (R.I. Fam. Ct., Kent Cnty.). Both of these proceedings are at issue in this case.

Judge Michael Forte of the Family Court granted Meyersiek sole temporary custody of his daughter in an order granting a motion for emergency relief dated January 11, 2010. Thereafter, the Family Court issued a series of orders, in both the Meyersiek and Seguin proceedings, concerning custody, support, and visitation issues. Seguin asserts that the Family Court's orders were generally issued in her absence, without notice, without findings, and without a stenographic record prepared, and were intended to retaliate against Seguin for filing reports with federal authorities regarding misconduct in her Family Court proceedings. Seguin has been, at times, represented by counselin the Family Court proceedings, and counsel has filed objections to certain of the Family Court's orders on Seguin's behalf.

On June 22, 2010, in the child custody proceedings that followed the Seguins' divorce, Judge Stephen Capineri issued an order, which limited Seguin's visitation rights and rights to communicate with her daughter, while granting Marc Seguin temporary sole custody and physical possession of their daughter. Seguin, through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Rhode Island Supreme Court ("Supreme Court") challenging the June 22, 2010, order. In the certiorari petition, Seguin asserted that the Family Court in the Meyersiek proceedings issued a similar order on January 11, 2010, in response to an emergency motion that Seguin's counsel characterized as an abuse of process. The Supreme Court denied Seguin's petition for a writ of certiorari on September 9, 2010. See Seguin v. Seguin, No. SU-2010-22-M.P. (R.I. Sept. 9, 2010) (Ex. G to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Am. Comp. (document no. 62-20)).

After reading news reports about unrelated litigation filed in Rhode Island regarding truancy cases allegedly mishandled by the Family Court, Seguin filed a report with the United States Justice Department regarding those truancy cases in December 2010, and also provided federal authorities with information regarding her child custody proceedings. Then, on December 14,2010, Judge Capineri recused himself from the child custody proceedings involving Marc Seguin and from the Meyersiek proceedings.

After Judge Capineri recused himself, Chief Family Court Judge Haiganush Bedrosian presided over the Meyersiek proceedings. Judge Bedrosian issued a series of restraining orders against Seguin, from January 7, 2011, through March 29, 2011, in a related Family Court proceeding in Providence County. See Meyersiek v. Seguin, No. P11-0026A (R.I. Fam. Ct., Providence Cnty.). On March 29, 2011, all of the Meyersiek proceedings were reassigned from Judge Bedrosian to Judge John McCann. Seguin alleges that Judge Bedrosian recused herself at that time because of the pending Justice Department investigation and that Judge Bedrosian instructed Judge McCann to continue to issue retaliatory orders against Seguin. The Meyersiek proceeding remains pending in the Kent County Family Court before Judge McCann.

Seguin filed a complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court ("Superior Court") against the judges involved in the custody proceedings alleging, among other things, that the various orders interfered with Seguin's parental rights and right to travel, that the judges who issued the orders were biased, that the orders were retaliation for the misconduct reports she filed withthe United States Justice Department, that the Family Court proceedings violated state laws requiring that all proceedings be transcribed or recorded, and that she was deprived of due process of law. See Seguin v. Bedrosian, No. 2012-0124 (R.I. Super. Ct., Providence Cnty.). In August 2012, following a hearing, the Superior Court dismissed the complaint, finding that: (1) the Superior Court lacked authority to review Family Court orders; (2) Seguin's claims asserting violations of federal criminal laws were not based on viable private causes of action; and (3) the Family Court judges were absolutely immune from suit. See id. (Aug. 4, 2012). Judgment was entered on October 4, 2012, and Seguin does not appear to have appealed the dismissal of her Superior Court action to the Supreme Court. Instead, shortly after obtaining the adverse Superior Court decision, but before judgment was entered, Seguin filed the complaint in this action.

Seguin's complaint in this action asserts essentially the same claims as were asserted in the Superior Court action. Her claims are based on alleged constitutional violations, federal criminal statutes, and Rhode Island state law. Seguin seeks injunctive and declaratory relief as to the judicial defendants and other Rhode Island state official defendants, including Peter Kilmartin, the Attorney General of Rhode Island, whom Seguinsuggests were complicit in the judicial defendants' illegal activity. Seguin also seeks monetary damages from Kilmartin.

Discussion

Seguin filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the defendants from presiding over her child custody proceedings, to prohibit the defendants from enforcing or issuing orders, and to declare void prior Family Court orders issued in the child support proceedings. The court referred the motion to the magistrate, who issued a report and recommendation ("R&R") concluding that Seguin's motion should be denied. Seguin objected to the R&R and also moved to vacate the order referring the motion to the magistrate.

After the magistrate issued the R&R, Seguin filed an amended complaint and, subsequently, three additional amended complaints. The defendants have moved to dismiss Seguin's first amended complaint and to strike the subsequent amended complaints.

I. Motion to Vacate Referral Order and Objection to R&R

On October 24, 2012, the magistrate issued an R&R concluding that Seguin's motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied based on Younger abstention. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Seguin filed a timely objection to the R&R and,in the same filing, moved to vacate the reference of the motion to the magistrate.¹ The defendants argue that reference of the motion to the magistrate was proper and that the magistrate correctly found that Younger abstention applies.

A. Motion to Vacate Reference

In support of her motion to vacate reference of the motion for a preliminary injunction to the magistrate, Seguin argues that the magistrate is biased because the R&R did not address Seguin's allegations of racial and gender discrimination in the underlying state proceedings. Seguin contends that there is no plausible explanation for the magistrate's failure to discuss those allegations other than that the magistrate is biased, and that her bias deprived Seguin of due process.

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(4) provides: "[t]he court may . . . under extraordinary circumstances shown by any party, vacate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge under this subsection." See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b)(3). "The'extraordinary circumstances' standard is difficult to satisfy." Zerega Ave. Realty Corp. v. Hornbeck Offshore Transp., LLC, 2011 WL 70593, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011). "Although 'extraordinary circumstances' remain somewhat undefined, courts are clear that unfounded accusations of bias and empty charges of impartiality cannot fall within the definition." McGrath v. Everest Nat. Ins. Co., 2009 WL 4842837, at *9 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 10, 2009) (citing Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 2d 171, 173 (D.D.C. 2003)); see also Gleis v. Buehler, 2012 WL 1379323, at *2 (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2012) ("judges do not vacate referrals whenever bias is alleged but instead require the movant to point to facts satisfying the statute's standard of extraordinary circumstances"). Further, "[b]ecause issues regarding a judge's impartiality must generally arise from 'extrajudicial' factors, 'judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.'" M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. McGill, 2011 WL 2464184, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 21, 2011) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 554 (1994)).

Seguin argues that extraordinary circumstances exist because the magistrate is biased, as evidenced by the R&R's failure to cite to the phrase "because the grandmother does not speak English," which Seguin alleges was the basis for the FamilyCourt's orders depriving her of her...