Serena T. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

561 F.Supp.3d 370

SERENA T., Plaintiff,

v.COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

6:20-CV-06416 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed September 22, 2021

Amy C. Chambers, Kenneth R. Hiller, Law Offices of Kenneth Hiller, PPLC, Amherst, NY, for Plaintiff.

Heetano Shamsoondar, Social Security Administration Office of General Counsel, New York, NY, Kathryn L. Smith, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, Chief Judge

INTRODUCTION

Represented by counsel, Plaintiff Serena T. ("Plaintiff") brings this action pursuant to Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act (the "Act"), seeking review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner," or "Defendant") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). (Dkt. 1). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Dkt. 11; Dkt. 15), and Plaintiff's reply (Dkt. 16). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 11) is granted in part, the Commissioner's motion (Dkt. 15) is denied, and the matter is remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings consistent with this Decision and Order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on April 6, 2016. (Dkt. 9 at 61, 133-34).¹ In her applications, Plaintiff alleged disability beginning July 19, 2011, due to the following impairments: scoliosis ; bulging disc; flat feet, uneven balance and bunions ; sciatica; congenital PS plantis right and left foot; xerosis cutis ; and hallux valgus. (Id. at 61, 135-36, 147-48).

Plaintiff's applications were initially denied on June 14, 2016. (Id. at 16, 159-66). At Plaintiff's request, a hearing was held before administrative law judge ("ALJ") Connor O'Brien in Rochester, New York, on October 12, 2018. (Id. at 61, 78-125). On March 26, 2019, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. (Id. at 61-72). Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review; her request was denied on April 20, 2020, making the ALJ's determination the Commissioner's final decision. (Id. at 5-8). This action followed.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. District Court Review

"In reviewing a final decision of the [Social Security Administration ("SSA")], this Court is limited to determining whether the SSA's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence in the record and were based on a correct legal standard." Talavera v. Astrue , 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Act holds that a decision by the Commissioner is "conclusive" if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Moran v. Astrue , 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). It is not the Court's function to "determine de novo whether [the claimant] is disabled." Schaal v. Apfel , 134 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see also Wagner v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs. , 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that review of the Secretary's decision is not de novo and that the Secretary's findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence). However, "[t]he deferential standard of review for substantial evidence does not apply to the Commissioner's conclusions of law." Byam v. Barnhart , 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Townley v. Heckler , 748 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1984) ).

II. Disability Determination

An ALJ follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act. See Parker v. City of New York , 476 U.S. 467, 470-71, 106 S.Ct. 2022, 90 L.Ed.2d 462 (1986). At step one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful work activity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has an impairment, or combination of impairments, that is "severe" within the meaning of the Act, in that it imposes significant restrictions on the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the analysis concludes with a finding of "not disabled." If the claimant does have at least one severe impairment, the ALJ continues to step three.

At step three, the ALJ examines whether a claimant's impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Regulation No. 4 (the "Listings"). Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or medically equals the criteria of a Listing and meets the durational requirement (id. §§ 404.1509, 416.909), the claimant is disabled. If not, the ALJ determines the claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), which is the ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for the collective impairments. See id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

The ALJ then proceeds to step four and determines whether the claimant's RFC permits the claimant to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If the claimant can perform such requirements, then he or she is not disabled. If he or she cannot, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step, wherein the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). To do so, the Commissioner must present evidence to demonstrate that the claimant "retains a residual functional capacity to perform alternative substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy" in light of the claimant's age, education, and work experience. Rosa v. Callahan , 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c).

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ's Decision

In determining whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. Initially, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Act on September 30, 2020. (Dkt. 9 at 63). At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful work activity since July 19, 2011, the alleged onset date. (Id. ).

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of: "h/o scoliosis since age 10, aggravated by a motor vehicle accident in 2011; degenerative changes in cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine; bunions on feet; and intermittent migraine headaches." (Id. ). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments of affective disorder and anxiety disorder were non-severe. (Id. at 64-65).

At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any Listing. (Id. at 65). The ALJ particularly considered the criteria of Listing 1.04 in reaching her conclusion. (Id. ).

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), with the following limitations:

She requires a sit/stand option that allows for changing position every 60 minutes for up to 5 minutes. She cannot climb a rope, ladder or scaffold; cannot balance on narrow, slippery, or moving surface; and cannot crawl. She can occasionally reach overhead. She can occasionally stoop; crouch; climb stairs or ramps; kneel. She can tolerate only occasional exposure to bright (brighter than office) light, and moderate noise, as defined in the DOT (Office, grocery, light traffic). She requires three, additional, short, less-than-five-minute breaks in addition to regularly scheduled breaks. She can fulfill daily quotas or expectations, but cannot maintain a fast-paced, automated, production line pace. She can adjust to occasional changes in work setting and make simple work-related decisions.

(Id. at 66). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Id. at 71).

At step five, the ALJ relied on the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE") to conclude that, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, including the representative occupations of telephone quotation clerk and charge account clerk. (Id. at 71-72). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Act. (Id. at 72).

II. Remand of this Matter for Further Proceedings is Necessary

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse or, in the alternative, remand this matter to the Commissioner, arguing that (1) the ALJ rejected medical opinions in the record, creating an evidentiary gap requiring further development of the record, and (2) the ALJ did not conduct a proper credibility evaluation. (Dkt. 11-1 at 16-30). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in evaluating the opinion evidence offered by Plaintiff's treating physician, and this error necessitates remand for further administrative proceedings.

A. Evaluation of Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff's first argument is that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions offered by Plaintiff's treating physician, Laura Gift, D.O. (Dkt. 11-1 at 16). In response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ thoroughly examined all the opinions offered by Dr. Gift, considered them in developing the RFC, and gave good reasons for the opinions she declined to adopt. (Dkt. 15-1 at 7-8).

Because Plaintiff's claim was filed...