Sessing v. Beard

NATHAN SESSING, Plaintiff, v. JEFFREY BEARD, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-01684-LJO-MJS (PC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

June 28, 2015

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) FOR SERVICE OF COGNIZABLE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS

2) TO DISMISS REMAINING CLAIMS WITH PREJUDICE

(ECF No. 34)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has declined Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5.)

After the Court issued findings and recommendations (ECF No. 25) to dismiss Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint (ECF No. 18) with prejudice for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff filed objections (ECF No. 32) that clarified the factual basis for his religious claims. As a result, the Court vacated the findings and recommendations and ordered Plaintiff tofile an amended complaint. (ECF No. 33.) Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint (ECF No. 34) is before the Court for screening.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous, malicious," or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 "provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face." Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 667-68.

IV. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff, a prisoner housed at the California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility in Corcoran, California ("CSATF"), is a practitioner of Asatru/Odinism, an "earth-based," polytheistic religion originating in Northern Europe several thousand years ago.

Plaintiff names as Defendants (1) Beard, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") Director, (2) Stainer, CDCR Division of Adult Institutions Director, (3) Sherman, CSATF Warden, and (4) Braggs, CSATF Community Partnership Manager.

According to Plaintiff, "[o]utdoor worship utilizing a fire pit and specific facilities, [including an altar and a circle of stones] is a central part of Asatru, and the religion cannot be practiced without it." Fire plays an important role in the blot, which is a monthly Odinist ceremony in which "food, drink, and/or objects" are sacrificed to the deities.

Plaintiff does not dispute that CSATF has "pagan grounds" designated for outdoor worship and available for his use. (ECF No. 34, at 24.) Pursuant to a 2010 memorandum entitled "Pagan Grounds," signed by Defendant Sherman's predecessor, Ralph Diaz, outdoor worship areas were designated on each yard. (Id., at 25.) This area is not permanently separated from the rest of the yard, but is "zoned off by using orange cones"during times of worship, (Id., at 24.) The pagan grounds are available for use by all "other religious faith groups," including Odinists. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed a grievance outlining his dissatisfaction with the existing pagan grounds and with a 2012 memorandum signed by Defendant Stainer's predecessor, Kathleen Dickinson, which prohibits the establishment of new worship areas. Plaintiff's primary objection to the pagan grounds is that they lack a fire pit, an altar, and a circle of stones.

Plaintiff's grievance was partially granted at the first level by Defendant Braggs' predecessor, Cote, noting that "an outdoor area has previously been designated for religious faith groups to worship outdoors," and that if Plaintiff wished to use "the outside worship area already in place, [he could] do so by making arrangements" with the chaplain. (ECF No. 18, at 11.) At the second and third level of review, reviewers cited the 2012 memorandum prohibiting construction of new religious grounds, and denied Plaintiff's request for a separate worship area.

The Native Americans at CSATF have separate ceremonial worship grounds that include a fire pit. Plaintiff alleges that the Native Americans are "the sole religion which has been granted these accommodations" and that he does not have access to the Native American worship area.

However, Plaintiff objects to sharing an outdoor worship space with other faiths, specifically Native Americans, because "that would transgress against their deities and his deities." (ECF No. 18, at 4). He includes background materials on Asatru which elaborate on the importance of having "sacred land" for outdoor worship that is "secure from trespassers." (ECF No. 18, at 29). The materials claim it is "imperative to Asatru worship that such sacred places be used only by the Asatru worshippers" because "by sharing land, we are creating an environment of confusion and loss of focus for not only ourselves, but those spirits that we are calling upon to partake in the ritual with us." (ECF No. 18, at37.)

Therefore, Plaintiff alleges it is "unfeasible" for him to share the Native Americans' worship ground. Plaintiff specifies that he is suing Defendants in their official capacities and requests a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to construct a separate worship area, including a fire pit, for the exclusive use of Odinists.

Plaintiff's grievance was denied by Cote, Defendant Braggs' predecessor.

V. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his rights under RLUIPA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Equal Protection clause when they refused to construct an exclusive Odinist worship area and denied him access to a fire pit. The Court previously rejected Plaintiff's claims that he was entitled to a separate worship area; however, as he has renewed them in his latest complaint, the Court will reiterate its findings here. The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to link Defendant Beard to any of his claims, and that Plaintiff fails to state a Free Exercise or RLUIPA claim on any basis. However, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately stated an Equal Protection claim against Stainer, Braggs, and Sherman for denial of access to a fire pit.

A. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, as each defendant is only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1235. Supervisors may only be held liable if they "participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations andfailed to act to prevent them." Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to link Defendant Beard to any of his claims. Although he states that "the final level of review of all departmental grievances" is conducted on behalf of Beard, Beard's name does not appear on the third-level administrative appeal decision, and Plaintiff provides no facts suggesting that Beard knew about or was responsible for Plaintiff's alleged religious deprivations. Therefore, the Court will recommend that Defendant Beard be dismissed from this action with prejudice.

B. Free Exercise - First Amendment

Under the Constitution, "reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972); see also O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) ("Inmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion."). However, as with other First Amendment rights in the inmate context, prisoners' rights may be limited...