Seth v. Dist. of Columbia

MARKELLE SETH, Plaintiff, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 18-1034 (BAH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 28, 2018

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The plaintiff, Markelle Seth, challenges his continued civil confinement "in federal prison despite not having been convicted of any crime," by virtue of the defendants' decision not to assume responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment, Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1, after he was found incompetent to face a federal criminal charge of production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b), id. ¶¶ 32, 34, 37, and was subjected to federal civil commitment proceedings in the Eastern District of North Carolina, where he was being held, id. ¶¶ 40-41. Less than one month after the filing of the instant complaint, the federal civil commitment proceedings concluded with a judicial finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that "as a result of" Seth's current mental condition, "his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another," such that he was ordered civilly committed to the custody and care of the Attorney General, under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. Order, dated May 24, 2018 ("E.D.N.C. Commitment Order") at 1, United States v. Seth, No. 17-hc-2090 (E.D.N.C. filed May 25, 2018). The instant complaint seeks, inter alia, "injunctive relief requiring Defendants" District of Columbia, District of Columbia Department on Disability Services ("DDS"), and Andrew Reese, in his official capacity as Director of DDS (collectively, "defendants"), to "promptly accept physical and legal custody of" Seth, Compl. at 48, based on four alleged violations of federal and local antidiscrimination laws, including Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("RA"), 29 U.S.C. § 794; the District of Columbia Human Rights Act of 1997 ("DCHRA"), D.C. Code § 2-1401.01 et seq.; and the Citizens with Intellectual Disabilities Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2015 ("CIDA"), D.C. Code § 7-1301.01 et seq.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that Seth has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the ADA, RA, DCHRA, or CIDA. See generally Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Pl.'s Compl. ("Defs.' Mot.") at 1, ECF No. 19. Meanwhile, Seth has moved for an order directing the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to permit expert access to Federal Medical Center ("FMC") Butner to interview the plaintiff. See generally Pl.'s Mot. Requesting Order ("Pl.'s Mot."), ECF No. 24. While a discrimination action is a creative effort to bring attention to this troubling situation, the allegations fail to support claims under the antidiscrimination laws and ultimately cannot provide the relief Seth seeks. Thus, for the reasons explained below, the defendants' motion is granted, and Seth's motion is accordingly denied as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

The statutory framework regarding federal competency determinations and civil commitment is discussed first, followed by the factual and procedural history of this case.

A. Statutory Framework

Congress established, in the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 ("IDRA"), Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2057, a "three-stage statutory process pursuant to which competency determinations are made." United States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1991). First, upon motion by either party, "a court may order a competency evaluation committing adefendant for a period not exceeding 30-days if the court has 'reasonable cause' to believe that the individual may be incompetent to stand trial." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). The results of that evaluation are presented at an adversarial hearing, "at which the judge determines whether a preponderance of the evidence indicates that the defendant is incompetent." Id. at 396 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(a), (d)). Second, "upon a finding of incompetency, the court may commit the defendant for a 'reasonable time, not to exceed four months . . . to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the trial to proceed." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(1)). Finally, at the end of that second confinement, "another hearing is held to determine if the defendant is a long-term incompetent and sufficiently dangerous to require indefinite institutionalization." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241(d), 4246). If the court determines that "the defendant's mental condition has not so improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward," the defendant is then "subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and 4248." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d).

Sections 4246 and 4248, in turn, provide for the continuing commitment of a person "in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons whose sentence is about to expire, or who has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d), or against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed solely for reasons related to the mental condition of the person." Id. § 4246(a); see also id. § 4248(a). Under § 4246, if "the director of a facility" in which such a person is hospitalized certifies that the person "is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, and that suitable arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not available," the court for the district in which the person is confined "shall order a hearing to determine whether the person is presently suffering from a mentaldisease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another." Id. § 4246(a).¹

If, after that hearing, "the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, the court shall commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General." Id. § 4246(d). At the same time, the IDRA expresses "a clear preference for state placement, if and when available, of those committed federally." United States v. Volungus, 595 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2010). Specifically, the IDRA provides that the detainee "shall" be released "to the appropriate official of the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried if such State will assume responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment," 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d), and the Attorney General "shall make all reasonable efforts to cause such a State to assume such responsibility," id. See also United States v. Wigren, 641 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 2011) ("Congress presumably thought the States should bear responsibility for the care of mentally ill persons from their jurisdictions, and the IDRA thus imposes a duty on the Attorney General to pursue state placement." (internal citation omitted) (citing S. REP. NO. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 208 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 (1984))).

If the State declines to assume responsibility for the person, "the Attorney General shall hospitalize the person for treatment in a suitable facility" until either (1) the State assumes that responsibility, or (2) the person's medical condition improves such that "his release, or his conditional release under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care ortreatment would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another," whichever happens first. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d)(1)-(2). If no State assumes that responsibility, the Attorney General must "continue periodically to exert all reasonable efforts to cause such a State to assume such responsibility for the person's custody, care, and treatment." Id. § 4246(d).

The IDRA also provides for regular review of and challenges to a person's ongoing federal civil commitment. When a person is federally committed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246, the director of the facility to which that person is committed must "prepare annual reports concerning the mental condition of the person and containing recommendations concerning the need for his continued commitment," which reports are submitted to the court that ordered the commitment. Id. § 4247(e)(B). If the director "determines that the person has recovered from his mental disease or defect to such an extent that his release would no longer create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, he shall promptly file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment." Id. § 4246(e). The court must then "order the discharge of the person or, on the motion of the attorney for the Government or on its own motion," shall "hold a hearing . . . to determine whether he should be released." Id. Upon a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the person could be released or "conditional[ly] released under a prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment" without "creat[ing] a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another," id. § 4246(e)(2), the court "shall" order the person's release, with the appropriate conditions, id. § 4246(e)(2)(A)-(B). In addition, "at any time during such person's commitment," the committed person's counsel or legal guardian may "file with the court that ordered the commitment a motion for a hearing todetermine whether the person should be discharged from such facility," provided that "no such motion may be filed within one...