SG Pequot 200 v. Town of Fairfield

308 A.3d 123

223 Conn.App. 333

SG PEQUOT 200, LLC

v.TOWN OF FAIRFIELD

(AC 45863)

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 8, 2023

Officially Released January 16, 2024

Gary J. Greene, with whom, on the brief, were Michael D. Reiner, Farmington, and Sean V. Patel, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Owen T. Weaver, with whom was Barbara M. Schellenberg, for the appellee (defendant).

Bright, C. J., and Alvord and Moll, Js.

ALVORD, J.

₃₃₅The plaintiff, SG Pequot 200, LLC, appeals from the judgment of dismissal rendered in favor of the defendant, the town of Fairfield (town), by the trial court in this municipal tax appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 12-117a.¹ On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly determined that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's municipal tax appeal on the basis that the plaintiff's petition to the town’s board of assessment appeals (board) was untimely under General Statutes §§ 12-111 (a) (1) and 12-112. We agree and, accordingly, reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On October 1, 2021, the town assessed the plaintiff's property located at 200 Pequot Avenue, Fairfield, and valued it at $2,750,790. The plaintiff mailed its petition to appeal the valuation to the board on Friday, February 18, 2022, via Federal Express (FedEx) standard overnight shipping. The town’s municipal offices were closed Saturday, February 19, 2022, through Monday, February 21, 2022, Washington’s Birthday.² On February 22, 2022, the board received the plaintiff's petition, and on February 23, ₃₃₆2022, the board notified the plaintiff that its petition would not be heard because it was received after the statutory deadline of February 20.

The plaintiff then appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to § 12-117a. In count one of its three count complaint; see footnote 4 of this opinion; the plaintiff alleged that it had been aggrieved by the board under § 12-117a and that its appeal to the board was timely. The town filed an answer and asserted several special defenses, including that the plaintiff's claim was barred under § 12-117a because the plaintiff did not file its petition before the statutory deadline.

On June 28, 2022, the town filed a motion for partial summary judgment, accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law, as to counts one and three of the plaintiff's complaint. See footnote 4 of this opinion. As to count one, the town argued, inter alia, that there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff's appeal to the board was untimely. In support of its motion, the town submitted the affidavit of its tax assessor, Ross Murray, who averred that he receives and processes taxpayer petitions for the board. Murray attested that he received the plaintiff's petition on February 22, 2022, and he notified the plaintiff on February 23, 2022, that the board would not hear its petition because the petition was received after the statutory deadline.

On July 15, 2022, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the town’s motion for partial summary judgment, accompanied by a supporting memorandum of law, wherein it argued, inter alia, that it timely had appealed to the board. In support of its opposition, the plaintiff submitted a copy of the petition’s FedEx tracking information as an exhibit. According to the tracking information, the plaintiff mailed the petition from Buffalo, New ₃₃₇York, on February 18, 2022, via FedEx standard overnight delivery and the board received the petition on February 22, 2022.

The town filed a reply memorandum, wherein it argued, inter alia, that the plaintiff's "late filing was due solely to [its] decision to mail its petition on February 18, 2022." In support of its reply memorandum, the town submitted, inter alia, a supplemental affidavit of Murray. Murray averred that the Office of Policy and Management informed towns that taxpayers were required to file their petitions on or before February 18, 2022, because February 20, 2022, fell on a Sunday, and Monday, February 21, 2022, was Washington’s Birthday.³

On September 14, 2022, the court, Cordani, J., issued a memorandum of decision, in which it dismissed counts one and three of the plaintiff's complaint. Relevant to this appeal, the court determined that "[t]he timing deadlines in §§ 12-111, 12-112 and 12-117a are jurisdictional. The court acquires subject matter jurisdiction over a § 12-117a claim pursuant to the applicable statutes themselves and only upon compliance with the terms of the statutes. A failure to comply with the foregoing enabling statutes undermines the subject matter jurisdiction of the court for such claims. As noted, these statutes provide a two step process. The taxpayer is first required to file an appeal with the [board]. Then, only a taxpayer who is ‘aggrieved by the action’ of the ₃₃₈[board] may file a claim pursuant to § 12-117a in court. Further, as noted, § 12-112 expressly prohibits the [board] from hearing or entertaining an untimely appeal. In this matter, the [board] determined that the plaintiff's appeal was untimely because it was received two days after the deadline. As a result, the [board], in accordance with § 12-112, refused to hear or entertain the appeal." Accordingly, the court dismissed count one of the plaintiff’s complaint.⁴ This appeal followed.

[1–6] Before turning to the plaintiff’s claim on appeal, we set forth the relevant standard of review. "A determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. When … the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts that appear in the record." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 94 Conn. App. 103, 114, 891 A.2d 106 (2006). "[A] claim that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived and must be addressed whenever it is brought to the court’s attention. … Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of the court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented ₃₃₉by the action before it. … [A] court lacks discretion to consider the merits of a case over which it is without jurisdiction …. Accordingly, [t]he subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 116-17, 891 A.2d 106.

[7, 8] "[A] challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is ordinarily raised by way of a motion to dismiss. … Our Supreme Court, however, has held that a motion for summary judgment is also an appropriate means of challenging the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, as the question of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. … Furthermore, once the question of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be resolved before the court addresses the merits of the plaintiff's claims." (Citations omitted.) Sosa v. Robinson, 200 Conn. App. 264, 275-76, 239 A.3d 1228 (2020).

"Practice Book § 17-49 provides in relevant part that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Furthermore, [i]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. … The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle[s] him to a judgment as a matter of law … and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. …

[9] ₃₄₀"Whereas a motion to dismiss is decided only on the allegations in the complaint and the facts implied from those allegations, summary judgment is decided by looking at all of the pleadings, affidavits and documentary evidence presented to the court in support of the motion." (Citation omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, supra, 94 Conn. App at 120, 891 A.2d 106.

[10] We next set forth the applicable legal principles regarding a municipal tax appeal. "When a taxpayer is aggrieved by the assessment of his property, there are statutory procedures in place for the taxpayer to challenge the assessment. [T]he legislature has established two primary methods by which taxpayers may challenge a town’s assessment or revaluation of their property. First, any taxpayer claiming to be aggrieved by an action of an assessor may appeal, pursuant to … §12-111, to the town’s board …. The taxpayer may then appeal, pursuant to … § [12-117a], an adverse decision of the town’s board … to the Superior Court. The second method of challenging an assessment or revaluation is by way of [General Statutes] § 12-119." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tirado v. Torrington, 179 Conn. App. 95, 101-102, 179 A.3d 258 (2018). Section 12-111 (a) (1) provides in relevant part: "Any person … claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of the assessors of such town may appeal therefrom to the board of assessment appeals. Such appeal shall be filed in writing or by electronic mail in a manner prescribed by such board on or before February twentieth. …" Section 12-112 provides in relevant part: "No appeal from the doings of the assessors in any town shall be heard or entertained by the board of assessment appeals … unless written appeal is made on or before February twentieth in accordance with the...