Sha'Quia G. v. Dep't of Child Safety

251 Ariz. 212

488 P.3d 994

SHA'QUIA G., Matthew W., Appellants,

v.DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.W., S.W., Z.W., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 20-0223

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.

FILED April 27, 2021

As Amended July 8, 2021

Review Denied August 24, 2021

Maricopa County Public Advocate's Office, Mesa By Suzanne Sanchez Counsel for Appellant Sha'quia G.

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley By David W. Bell Counsel for Appellant Matthew W.

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Emily M. Stokes Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

WILLIAMS, Judge:

¶1 Sha'quia G. ("Mother") and Matthew W. ("Father") appeal the juvenile court's order terminating their parental rights to their three children, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"). Because the juvenile court had jurisdiction, the order is affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother moved from California to Arizona with the two older children in 2016. In August of that year, the Arizona Department of Child Safety ("DCS") received a report that, while in California, Mother and Father had been investigated for concerns of domestic violence and that Mother might have obtained an order of protection against Father on behalf of herself and the children. DCS filed a dependency action on September 21, 2016. The juvenile court found the two children dependent as to both Mother and Father and DCS took them into care.

¶3 In 2017, the couple's youngest child was born in Arizona. DCS removed the child from Mother's care, and the juvenile court adjudicated the youngest child dependent as well. Neither of the juvenile court's dependency orders specified the basis for its jurisdiction over the children.

¶4 In 2019, DCS moved to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights. At trial, when asked what month in 2016 she moved to Arizona with the two older children, Mother responded: "January, February -- it was like March. Around March. The end of March." The precise date the three moved to Arizona, however, is not clear. Conflicting evidence suggests that they may have arrived in Arizona later, sometime between May and August of 2016.

¶5 Following trial, the juvenile court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights. In its termination order, the court acknowledged that while it had not previously stated the basis for its jurisdiction in 2016, it had been exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA at the commencement of the dependency because:

(1) the children were present in Arizona and were threatened with abuse due to Mother's mental health and the parents’ domestic violence issues; (2) there were no other child-custody determinations to be enforced; and (3) no court with custody jurisdiction had commenced a child custody proceeding during this period.

¶6 The court also stated that, if Mother's testimony were true, and the family had in fact moved to Arizona in March 2016, "Arizona is the home state and would have [original] child custody jurisdiction" because the children would have resided in Arizona for at least six months before the commencement of the proceedings. See A.R.S. § 25-1002(7)(a). The court noted its termination order was final.

¶7 Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 103(A).

DISCUSSION

¶8 Mother and Father do not challenge the merits of the juvenile court's termination ruling, but argue the court lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to issue the order. Whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to sever Mother's and Father's parental rights is a question of law this court reviews de novo. Angel B. v. Vanessa J. , 234 Ariz. 69, 71, ¶ 6, 316 P.3d 1257 (App. 2014).

¶9 "Promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 1997, the UCCJEA is a uniform act adopted in 49 states, including Arizona, as well as the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam. Compare Interests of A.A.-F. , 310 Kan. 125, 135 (2019) (noting that the UCCJEA has been adopted in 49 states), with Angel B. , 234 Ariz. at 71–72, ¶ 7 (noting, incorrectly, that the UCCJEA has been adopted in all 50 states); see also Unif. Law Comm'n, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act , https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Commun ityKey=4cc1b0be-d6c5-4bc2-b157-16b0baf2c56d (last visited July 1, 2021). Key purposes of the UCCJEA include to ‘create consistency in interstate child custody jurisdiction and enforcement proceedings.’ " Angel B. , 234 Ariz. at 71–72, ¶ 7, 316 P.3d 1257 ; see also A.R.S. § 25-1001 to -1067 (UCCJEA in Arizona). Arizona's version of the UCCJEA grants jurisdiction over child custody proceedings to the child's "home state," defined as the "state in which a child lived with a parent ... for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding, including any period during which [the parent] is temporarily absent from that state." A.R.S. § 25-1002(7)(a). As defined by statute, "child custody proceeding" includes a proceeding for termination of parental rights. A.R.S. § 25-1002(4)(a). Even if Arizona is not a child's home state, however, Arizona may exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is "present in [Arizona] and ... is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." A.R.S. § 25-1034(A). In such a case, the court is authorized to enter temporary custody orders to protect the child. A.R.S. § 25-1034(A) ; Melgar v. Campo , 215 Ariz. 605, 607–08, ¶ 12, 161 P.3d 1269 (App. 2007).

¶10 Mother and Father do not dispute that the juvenile court had the authority to exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction when it found the two older children dependent in October 2016 (as to Mother) and January 2017 (as to Father). Similarly, neither parent offers facts or legal authority to support any contention that the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over their youngest child, who was born in Arizona and immediately taken into custody by DCS. Because Arizona was the youngest child's home state when he was taken into care, see A.R.S. § 25-1002(7)(b), the juvenile court had jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1031 to adjudicate that child dependent and exclusive and continuing jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1032 to terminate parental rights as to that child.

¶11 The parents argue, however, that the court lacked jurisdiction to terminate their rights to the two older children when it ruled in July 2020. We hold, to the contrary, that the juvenile court properly exercised jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when it terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights.

¶12 Mother and Father contend that California was the home state of the two older children when the Arizona dependency proceedings began. Citing A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2), they argue the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the severance motion absent a waiver from California. According to the parents, because California was the children's home state when the Arizona proceedings began, and because the juvenile court did not confer with a California court or obtain California's waiver of jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 25-1031(A)(2), the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to issue the termination order. We disagree.

¶13 Assuming, arguendo , that California was the older children's home state when the proceedings began, that fact did not prevent the juvenile court's exercise of temporary emergency jurisdiction and subsequent termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights. See Arturo D. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 249 Ariz. 20, 24, ¶ 13, 464 P.3d 1286 (App. 2020) (holding that, while California was the child's home state, the Arizona court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the child dependent when there was no prior custody determination made in California). A court exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction is required to confer with the court of another state only if it is "informed that a child custody proceeding has been commenced in, or a child custody determination has been made by, a court of a state having jurisdiction under § 25-1031, 25-1032 or 25-1033." A.R.S. § 25-1034(D). Here, the juvenile court had no notice of any existing child custody determination in California, nor does the record suggest such a determination was ever made by any California court. Accordingly, because no California court had issued any prior child custody determination, the juvenile court was not required to contact California or to obtain California's waiver of jurisdiction before it exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction. See A.R.S. § 25-1034(D) ; Melgar , 215 Ariz. at 608, ¶ 12 n.6, 161 P.3d 1269 ("The court that is taking emergency jurisdiction is required, [only] upon notice of an existing custody order, to contact the issuing court to facilitate modification or retain jurisdiction.").

¶14 The absence of a prior custody order by another state distinguishes this case from the cases Mother and Father cite. In each of those cases, a court of another state had issued a prior custody determination. See Melgar , 215 Ariz. at 605, ¶ 1, 161 P.3d 1269 (finding that where a prior custody determination has been made in a court of another state, the UCCJEA "requires that the [juvenile] court must confer with the judge who issued the out-of-state custody order and/or get the out-of-state court to release its continuing jurisdiction over its custody order before modifying an out-of-state order"); Angel B. , 234 Ariz. at 71, 74, ¶¶ 2, 17, 316 P.3d 1257 (holding that, where an initial child custody determination had been made in California, Arizona lacked jurisdiction to terminate father's parental rights because "California [had not] determined...