Shabazz v. Dep't of Pub. Safety

261 Md. 355

313 A.3d 613

Mahdi SHABAZZ

v.State of Maryland DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.

No. 1989 September Term, 2022

Appellate Court of Maryland.

April 18, 2024

Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Case No. 469635V, Jill Reid Cummins, Judge.

Argued by Mahdi M. Shabazz of Silver Spring, MD, on brief, for Appellant.

Argued by Michael O. Doyle, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Jessica M. Laws, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Anthony Brown, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Appellee.

Argued before: Nazarian, Leahy, Wright, Alexander, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.^*

Wright, J.

In December 2010, Mahdi Shabazz, Appellant, was convicted, in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, of misdemeanor sex abuse based on allegations that, in May 2010, he bit a female bank employee on the breast while visiting her place of employment. That act, had it been committed in Maryland, would have constituted a fourth-degree sexual offense in violation of § 3-308 of the Criminal Law Article ("CR") of the Maryland Code. Shortly after his conviction, Shabazz, a Maryland resident, began registering as a sex offender in Maryland pursuant to § 11-701, et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Article ("CP") of the Maryland Code. Under that law, which became effective after Shabazz committed the D.C. offense but before he was convicted, individuals convicted of a crime in another jurisdiction that, if committed in Maryland, would constitute a violation of CR § 3-308 were required to register as a sex offender in Maryland. CP § 11-701(o)(3) (2010).

Over the next several years, Shabazz engaged in a campaign to have his name removed from the registry. In 2016, the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the "Department") informed Shabazz that he was no longer required to register.

In 2019, Shabazz filed, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, a civil complaint against the Department and two State employees (collectively "Appellees") alleging, among other things, that requiring him to register as a sex offender in Maryland constituted a violation of CP § 11-701, a violation of the prohibition on ex post facto laws in Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, gross negligence, and invasion of privacy (false light). In 2022, following a bench trial, the court issued the following rulings: 1) on Shabazz’s claim of a violation of CP § 11-701, the court entered judgment in favor of Appellees; 2) on Shabazz’s claim of a violation of Article 17, the court entered judgment in favor of Shabazz against the Department; 3) on Shabazz’s claim of gross negligence, the court entered judgment in favor of Shabazz against the Department; 4) on Shabazz’s claim of invasion of privacy, the court entered judgment in favor of Appellees; and 5) for damages, the court ordered the Department to pay Shabazz $400,000.00.

Shabazz thereafter noted an appeal, and Appellees noted a cross-appeal. In his appeal, Shabazz presents two questions, which we have rephrased for clarity:

1. Did the trial court err in finding that Appellees had not violated CP § 11-701?

2. Did the trial court err in entering judgment in favor of Appellees on Shabazz’s claim of invasion of privacy?

In their cross-appeal, Appellees present three questions, which we have rephrased for clarity:

1. Were Shabazz’s claims barred by res judicata and the applicable statute of limitations?

2. Did the trial court err in entering judgment against the Department on Shabazz’s gross negligence claim?

3. Was the trial court’s award for damages excessive and unsupported by the evidence?

As to Shabazz’s two questions, we hold that the trial court did not err. As to Appellees’ first question, we hold that their res judicata argument was waived and that their statute of limitations argument is without merit. As to Appellees’ second question, we hold that the court erred in entering judgment in favor of Shabazz. We therefore reverse that portion of the court’s judgment, along with its damages award, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Because we reverse, we need not address Appellees’ third question. Otherwise, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Relevant Law

In 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (the "Wetterling Act"), which established guidelines for registering sex offenders. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). Under the Act, a person convicted of certain sexually-based offenses would be required to register with a local law enforcement agency for up to ten years. Id. The Act required each state to establish its own program for registering sex offenders that was consistent with the Act’s guidelines. Id. Failure to comply with the Act would result in the state losing certain federal funding. Id.

In 1995, in response to the mandates of the Wetterling Act, the Maryland General Assembly enacted "The Maryland Crimes Against Children and Sexual Offender Registration Law." Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 336-37, 772 A.2d 1225 (2001). That law required "child sexual offenders" to register with the appropriate authorities for a period of ten years. Id. at 337-38, 772 A.2d 1225; see also Article 27, § 692B (1995). The law was later amended to include additional classifications of offenders who were required to register. Graves, 364 Md. at 338, 772 A.2d 1225.

In 2006, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), which is now codified in Title 34, Chapter 209 of the United States Code. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006); see also 34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq. SORNA replaced the previous federal sex-offender registration laws and established a new, comprehensive national system for registering sex offenders. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587. Under the new law, sex offenders were categorized into "tiers" based on the severity of the offense. 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911, 20915. As with the previous sex-offender laws, states were required to establish a similar registration system or risk losing federal funding. 34 U.S.C. § 20927.

In May 2010, when the crime at issue in the instant case was committed, Maryland had yet to adopt the "tier" system of classification established by SORNA. Instead, the Maryland statute required registration for Maryland residents who had been convicted of crimes in another state that, if committed in Maryland, would categorize them as "child sexual offenders" or "offenders" under Maryland law. CP § 11-704(a) (effective October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010). The statute defined "child sexual offender" to include a person who "has been convicted of violating the fourth degree sexual offense statute under § 3-308 of the Criminal Law Article for a crime involving a child under the age of 15 years and has been ordered by the court to register under this subtitle[.]" CP § 11-701(c)(3) (effective October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010). The statute defined "offender" to include a person "who is ordered by a court to register under this subtitle and who … has been convicted of violating … the fourth degree sexual offense statute under § 3-308 of the Criminal Law Article, if the victim is under the age of 18 years[.]" CP § 11-701(h)(2) (effective October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2010). At the time, CR § 3-308 prohibited "sexual contact with another without the consent of the other[.]" CR § 3-308(b)(1) (2010). The statute defined "sexual contact" to include "an intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s genital, anal, or other intimate area for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of either party." CR § 3-301(f)(1). The statute stated further that " ‘[s]exual contact’ includes an act … that can reasonably be construed to be for sexual arousal or gratification, or for the abuse of either party." CR § 3-301(f)(2).

As of October 1, 2010, the General Assembly amended CP § 11-701, et seq. and adopted the "tier" system of classification, as established by SORNA. 2010 Md. Laws ch. 174. The new law required registration for all "Tier I sex offenders," which were defined to include "a person who has been convicted of … conspiring to commit, attempting to commit, or committing a violation of § 3-308 of the Criminal Law Article[.]" CP § 11-701(o)(1) (effective October 1, 2010). The statute further defined Tier I sex offenders to include "a person who has been convicted of … a crime committed in a federal, military, tribal, or other jurisdiction that, if committed in this State, would constitute one of the crimes listed in item (1) or (2) of this subsection[.]" CP § 11-701(o)(3) (effective October 1, 2010). CR § 3-308 was not changed.

In addition to the above changes, the new sex-offender registration statute included a provision that required the law to be applied retroactively to any person who:

(1) is under the custody or supervision of a supervising authority on October 1, 2010;

(2) was subject to registration under this subtitle on September 30, 2010; or

(3) is convicted of any crime on or after October 1, 2010, and has a prior conviction for an offense for which registration as a sex offender is required under this subtitle.

CP § 11-702.1(a) (effective October 1, 2010).

In 2013, our courts decided two seminal cases involving the 2010 revisions to Maryland’s sex-offender registration statute. In Doe v. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123 (2013), the Supreme Court of Maryland considered whether the sex-offender registration law violated the ex post facto provision of Article 17 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. There, the petitioner was convicted in 2006 of child sexual abuse based on acts that occurred over twenty years earlier. Id. at 538-39, 62 A.3d 123. When the sex-offender registration law was amended in 2010, the petitioner was forced to register as a "Tier III" sex offender. Id. at 540-41, 62 A.3d 123. The petitioner subsequently challenged that...