Shabazz v. Embassy Suites Mgmt.

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SARA A. SHABAZZ, Plaintiff, v. EMBASSY SUITES MANAGEMENT, LLC, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:22-cv-01500-NAD

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

May 25, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND

NICHOLAS A. DANELLA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

For the reasons stated below and on the record in the April 19, 2023 motion hearing, the court GRANTS Plaintiff Sara A. Shabazz's “Motion To Remand” (Doc 11), and REMANDS this case to the Circuit Court for Jefferson County, Alabama. The court will enter a separate remand order.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Shabazz, acting as parent and next friend of deceased minor Jamir Shabazz Hawkins, filed a complaint in Alabama state court against Defendants Embassy Suites Management, LLC Embassy Suites Employer, LLC, Hilton Inns, LLC (collectively the “Removing Defendants”), Jose M. Pereira, and various fictitious defendants. Doc. 1-1 at 2-3. In the complaint, Shabazz alleges claims for negligence and wrongful death based on Hawkins's drowning death during a party at the swimming pool at an Embassy Suites hotel in Birmingham, Alabama. Doc. 1-1 at 3-9.

The Removing Defendants removed the case to this court based on diversity jurisdiction, asserting that Shabazz had fraudulently joined Defendant Pereira-the manager of the hotel and an Alabama citizen. Doc. 1. Shabazz then filed this motion to remand. Doc. 11.

Based on the controlling Eleventh Circuit law, the allegations in the complaint, and the record evidence, and because the court must resolve any uncertainty about Alabama state substantive law in Shabazz's favor, the Removing Defendants have not shown that there is no possibility that Shabazz can establish a claim against Pereira. As a result, the Removing Defendants have not shown that Shabazz fraudulently joined Pereira as a Defendant in this action. Thus, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and must remand the case back to state court.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On October 26, 2022, Plaintiff Shabazz filed her complaint in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Doc. 1-1 at 2-3. On November 28, 2022, the Removing Defendants removed the case based on diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1. The parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. Doc. 15; 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73.

The notice of removal alleges that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, and that Shabazz, who is an Alabama citizen, is completely diverse from the Removing Defendants, all of which are citizens of Delaware and Virginia. Doc. 1 at 3-7.

The notice of removal also alleges that Defendant Pereira, the hotel manager, is a citizen of Alabama (like Shabazz); but the Removing Defendants argue that Shabazz fraudulently joined Pereira as a Defendant in this action, and consequently that the court should disregard Pereira's citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1 at 7-15. Along with the notice of removal, the Removing Defendants filed an affidavit from Pereira. Doc. 1-4.

After removal, Pereira filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. 5. In his motion to dismiss, Pereira argues that Shabazz fraudulently joined him as a Defendant, that Shabazz cannot state a claim against him, and that Shabazz's allegations “impermissibly conflate or lump together all of the Defendants.” Doc. 5 at 3-6.

On December 20, 2022, Shabazz filed this motion to remand. Doc. 11. Along with her motion, Shabazz filed copies of the Alabama State Board of Health regulation governing the construction, maintenance, and operation of hotels (which includes a provision for hotel swimming pools), and of the Jefferson County Department of Health regulations governing the design, construction, and operation of public swimming pools (including pools for hotels). Doc. 11-2; Doc. 11-3.

The Removing Defendants filed a response in opposition to the motion to remand (Doc. 17), and Shabazz filed a reply (Doc. 19). Along with the reply, Shabazz filed a copy of a press release announcing Pereira's appointment as the “General Manager” of the hotel. Doc. 19-1 at 29.

On April 19, 2023, the court held a hearing on the motion to remand. See Minute Entry (Entered: April 19, 2023).

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal jurisdiction (diversity), and removal

Federal courts have a “strict duty to exercise the jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.” Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996); accord Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them”).

In that regard, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Generally speaking, federal subject matter jurisdiction over a civil case requires either a question “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” (28 U.S.C. § 1331), or complete diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332).

With respect to diversity, a federal court has jurisdiction where the matter “is between . . . citizens of different States,” and where the amount “in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

In addition, a defendant generally can remove from state court to federal court “any civil action brought” in state court over which the “district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

“[T]he burden of establishing removal jurisdiction rests with the defendant seeking removal.” Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2013). In this respect, the “removal statutes are construed narrowly”; and, “where [the] plaintiff and [the] defendant clash about jurisdiction, uncertainties are resolved in favor of remand.” Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.

If “at any time” after a defendant has removed a case to federal court but “before final judgment,” it “appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction,” then “the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

Moreover, the plaintiff is “the master of the complaint,” and is “free to avoid federal jurisdiction” by “structuring his case to fall short of a requirement of federal jurisdiction,” so long as “the method of avoidance is not fraudulent.” Scimone, 720 F.3d at 882 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

B. Diversity jurisdiction, and fraudulent joinder

While removal based on diversity jurisdiction typically requires complete diversity of citizenship (see 28 U.S.C. § 1332), an action “may nevertheless be removable,” if the plaintiff fraudulently joins any nondiverse defendants. Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). In this regard, a plaintiff fraudulently joins a nondiverse defendant “when there is no possibility that the plaintiff can prove a cause of action against the resident (non-diverse) defendant.” Id.

So, “[i]n a removal case alleging fraudulent joinder,” the removing defendant “has the burden of proving that . . . there is no possibility the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against the [nondiverse] resident defendant.” Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1380 (11th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); accord Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (“If there is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action against [the] resident defendant[], the federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state court.” (quotation marks omitted)).

With respect to the removing defendant's burden to show fraudulent joinder, the Eleventh Circuit has mandated that the defendant “must make such a showing by clear and convincing evidence.” Henderson v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006).

The Eleventh Circuit also has instructed that a defendant's burden to establish fraudulent joinder is “a heavy one,” such that if the “plaintiff states even a colorable claim against the resident defendant, joinder is proper and the case should be remanded to state court.” Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538 (quotation marks omitted); accord Pacheco de Perez, 139 F.3d at 1380-81 (“In a fraudulent joinder inquiry, ‘federal courts are not to weigh the merits of a plaintiff's claim beyond determining whether it is an arguable one under state law.'” (quoting Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538)).

“The plaintiff need not have a winning case against the allegedly fraudulent defendant; he need only have a possibility of stating a valid cause of action in order for the joinder to be legitimate.” Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287. However, “[t]he potential for legal liability ‘must be reasonable, not merely theoretical.'” Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

In resolving a fraudulent joinder issue on a motion to remand, a court's analysis “must be limited to determining whether [p]laintiffs have even an arguable claim,” and “any ambiguity or doubt about the substantive state law favors remand to state court.” Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1539. For a court resolving a motion to remand “to interpose its judgment” on a “sufficiently substantial question” of state law “would fall short of the scrupulous respect for the institutional equilibrium between the federal and state judiciaries that our federal system demands.” Henderson, 454 F.3d at 1284; accord Crowe, 113 F.3d at 1538 (the court “must resolve any uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff”).

Furthermore in “determining] whether the case should be remanded,” the court “must evaluate the factual allegations in the light most favorable...