Shak v. Adelphi Univ.

549 F.Supp.3d 267

Erik SHAK on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.ADELPHI UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

20-CV-1951 (WFK)(RML)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed July 15, 2021

Sarah Westcot, Pro Hac Vice, Bursor & Fisher P.A., Miami, FL, Joseph Ignatius Marchese, Bursor & Fisher, P.A., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Hayley Brooke Dryer, James G. Ryan, Cullen and Dykman LLP, Garden City, NY, for Defendant.

DECISION & ORDER

WILLIAM F. KUNTZ, II, United States District Judge:

Erik Shak ("Plaintiff"), an undergraduate student at Adelphi University ("Adelphi" or "Defendant") during the Spring 2020 semester, filed a class action complaint (the "Complaint"), seeking a refund of tuition and fees in connection with Adelphi's suspension of in-person instruction in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff requests relief based on four grounds: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) conversion; and (4) money had and received. Adelphi moved to dismiss the Complaint. ECF No. 18. For the reasons set forth below, Adelphi's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff may pursue his claim for breach of contract solely as to fees. All other claims are hereby DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

Adelphi University ("Adelphi" or "Defendant") is a private university with more than 8,000 students enrolled in both undergraduate and graduate programs. See Amended Complaint, ("Compl."), ECF No. 12 at ¶ 2. Erik Shak ("Plaintiff") was an undergraduate student at Adelphi during the Spring 2020 semester. Id. ¶ 3. Adelphi's Spring 2020 semester commenced on January 23, 2020. Id. at ¶ 8. On March 10, 2020, Adelphi ended in-person classes in response to the coronavirus pandemic. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. Plaintiff, along with other Adelphi students, continued the Spring 2020 semester entirely online. Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff now alleges Adelphi unlawfully retained tuition and fees in violation of its promise to provide in-person instruction and services. Plaintiff files this class action lawsuit "on behalf of all people who paid tuition and fees for the Spring 2020 academic semester at the Adelphi University, and who, because of Adelphi's response to the [coronavirus] pandemic, lost the benefit of the education for which they paid, and/or the educational and related services and facilities for which they paid, without having their tuition and fees refunded to them." Compl. ¶¶ 1, 42. Plaintiff asserts four counts against Adelphi: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) conversion; and (4) money had and received. The basis of all four claims is that the Adelphi has allegedly not "delivered the educational services ... that Plaintiff and the putative class contracted and paid for." Id. ¶ 35. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. ; see also Cox v. Spirit Airlines , 786 Fed. App'x. 283, 284–85 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2019) (summary order). A complaint must be dismissed where, as a matter of law, "the allegations in [the] complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 558, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept all of the non-movant's factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc. , 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). However, the Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (internal quotation marks omitted). But a complaint should be dismissed only where it seems beyond doubt the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Jacobs v. Ramirez , 400 F.3d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The Educational Malpractice Doctrine

Adelphi first argues Plaintiff's suit is barred because New York law prohibits claims of "educational malpractice." Def.’s Mem. of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss ("Def. Mem."), ECF No. 18-6 at 8–10. The doctrine of educational malpractice bars claims "that the school breached its agreement by failing to provide an effective education," on the theory that "courts are an inappropriate forum to test the efficacy of educational programs and pedagogical methods." Paladino v. Adelphi Univ. , 89 A.D.2d 85, 89–90, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (2d Dep't 1982). Most courts considering coronavirus tuition refund suits have found that such suits do not implicate the educational malpractice doctrine. Michel v. Yale University , 20-CV-01080, 2021 WL 2827358, at *5 (D. Conn. July 7, 2021) (Hall, J.) ("[Plaintiff's] claims do not implicate the educational malpractice doctrine. [Plaintiff] has not, as Yale argues, challenged the adequacy of the online instruction he received."); Hassan v. Fordham Univ. , 20-CV-3265, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, ––––, 2021 WL 293255, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021), amended in part , 20-CV-3265, 2021 WL 1263136 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2021) (Wood, J.) ("The Court holds that Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the educational malpractice doctrine, because they are sufficiently grounded in whether an alleged promise for educational services was made and breached."); In re Columbia Tuition Refund Action , 20-CV-3208, ––– F.Supp.3d ––––, –––– & n.5, 2021 WL 790638, at *6 & n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2021) (Furman, J.) ("The Court therefore joins the majority of district courts around the country that have declined to hold, at least on a motion to dismiss (or judgment on the pleadings), that claims arising from universities’ adoption of online instruction in response to the COVID-19 pandemic are barred under the educational malpractice doctrine."). The Court agrees with the weight of authority on this question and, at this stage of the case, concludes that Plaintiff's claims do not implicate the educational malpractice doctrine.

The core of Plaintiff's claims is not that his online education was subpar, but rather that he contracted for a different form of instruction than he received. "To the extent Plaintiff seeks to enforce specific promises made by [Adelphi], those claims ‘are based on provisions of universities’ publications that courts are well-equipped to interpret according to established contractual interpretation principles.’ " Hewitt et al. v. Pratt Institute , 20-CV-2007, 2021 WL 2779286, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2021) (Korman, J.) (citing In re Columbia Tuition Refund , ––– F.Supp.3d at ––––, 2021 WL 790638, at *7.). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the educational malpractice doctrine.

II. Breach of Contract

Defendant next moves to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Under New York law, it is well established that the relationship between an institution of higher education and its students is "contractual in nature." Prusack v. State , 117 A.D.2d 729, 498 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (2d Dep't 1986) ; see also Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ. , 633 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2011). An implied contract "is formed when a university accepts a student for enrollment[.]" Id. That implied contract tasks a student with complying with the university's terms and completing its required courses. Id. In return the student is awarded a degree. Id. Implicit in that contract is a requirement that the university "act in good faith in its dealing with its students." Id. (citing Olsson v. Bd. of Higher Educ. , 49 N.Y.2d 408, 426 N.Y.S.2d 248, 402 N.E.2d 1150 (1980) ).

However, "[t]he application of contract principles to the student-university relationship does not provide judicial recourse for every disgruntled student." Faiaz v. Colgate Univ. , 64 F. Supp. 3d 336, 359 (N.D.N.Y. 2014) (Baxter, Mag.). Instead, "only specific promises ... in a school's bulletins, circulars[,] and handbooks, which are material to the student's relationship with the school," are enforceable. Keefe v. N.Y. Law School , 71 A.D.3d 569, 897 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (1st Dep't 2010). In other words, "[g]eneral policy statements and broad and unspecified procedures and guidelines will not suffice." Doe v. Syracuse Univ. , 440 F. Supp. 3d 158, 175 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (Sannes, J.) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Ford v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst. , 507 F.Supp.3d 406, 413 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (Hurd, J.).

Additionally, "to state a valid claim for a breach of contract" against a university, a student "must state when and how the defendant breached the specific contractual promise." Radin v. Albert Einstein Coll. of Med. of Yeshiva Univ. , 04-CV-704, 2005 WL 1214281, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2005) (Patterson, J.). "The interpretation of a university's catalogue, like the interpretation of any contract, is a matter of law for the Court." Deen v. New Sch. Univ. , 05-CV-7174, 2007 WL 1032295, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2007) (Wood, J.) (citing Alexander & Alexander Servs., Inc. v. These Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London , 136 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1998) ). In this case, Plaintiff claims Adelphi breached an implied contract as to both tuition and fees.

A. Tuition

Plaintiff attempts to tie his claims for relief primarily to Adelphi's Spring Semester 2020 Course Catalogue. The catalogue identified courses offered, instructors, and the times and locations of classes. With...