Shalghoun v. N. L.A. Cty. Reg'l Ctr., Inc.

317 Cal.Rptr.3d 641

Ali SHALGHOUN, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.NORTH LOS ANGELES COUNTY REGIONAL CENTER, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

B323186

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2.

Filed January 25, 2024

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STCV19756)

Doumanian & Associates, Nancy P. Doumanian; The Arkin Law Firm and Sharon J. Arkin for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Beach Law Group, Thomas E. Beach, Oxnard, and Darryl C. Hottinger for Defendant and Respondent.

HOFFSTADT, J.

* * * * * *

In the Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act (the Lanterman Act or the Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 4500 et seq.),¹ the State of California has undertaken the duty to provide developmentally disabled persons with appropriately tailored services and support. To discharge this duty, the Department of Developmental Services (the Department) uses a network of private, nonprofit entities called "regional centers." (§ 4620.) Regional centers do not themselves provide services; instead, they evaluate the developmentally disabled persons (whom the Act calls "consumers"), develop individually tailored plans for their care, enter into contracts with direct service providers to provide the services and support set forth in the plans, and monitor the implementation of those contracts and the consumers’ plans. (§§ 4642, 4643, 4640.6, subd. (a), 4647, 4648, 4648.1, 4742, 4743.) In this case, a regional center arranged for a developmentally disabled person to be placed in a residential facility, the facility thereafter informed the regional center that it could no longer provide the level of care the person required, and the person—while the regional center was in the midst of lining up a different facility—attacked and injured the facility’s administrator. The administrator sued the regional center for his injuries. His lawsuit presents the following question: Does a regional center have a duty to protect the employees of a residential facility that accepted a developmentally disabled person as a resident when the regional center does not immediately relocate that person as requested by the facility? We conclude that the answer is "no," and accordingly affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for the regional center.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Facts

A. J.C. and his history

J.C. is a man in his early thirties with a "mild intellectual disability" along with autism, an "unspecified" "non-psychotic mental disorder," a "generalized anxiety disorder," and "obsessive compulsive disorder." J. C. engages in self-harming behavior and also has "outbursts of physical violence and aggression" toward others.

J.C. is a client of the North Los Angeles County Regional Center, Inc. (the Region- al Center). The Regional Center developed an individual program plan for J.C., which includes housing him at a residential facility.

Between April 2008 and April 2016, the Regional Center arranged for J.C. to be housed at the Fairview Developmental Center, a residential facility for developmentally disabled persons. While there, J.C. exhibited "dangerous propensities to hurt himself and others."

B. Placement in Hargis Home

On April 21, 2016, J.C. moved into Hargis Home, a licensed adult residential facility owned by People’s Care Los Angeles, LLC. Hargis Home is rated as being able to provide the "highest level" of care for developmentally disabled persons and can accommodate a total of three residents.

The Regional Center had "suggest[ed]" Hargis Home as a possible placement for J.C. after Fairview Developmental Center, but Hargis Home independently conducted its own assessment of whether it could accommodate J.C. given his level of disability. After determining that J.C. was "compatible with other [r]esidents" of the facility as well as Hargis Home’s "program design and service level," Hargis Home signed a contract with the Regional Center accepting J.C. as a resident. In that contract, Hargis Home affirmed that the Regional Center had "provided all available information concerning [J.C.’s] history of dangerous behavior."

The Regional Center contracted with My Life Foundation, Inc. to provide additional staff to attend to J.C. when J.C. would leave Hargis Home on outings.

C. Plaintiff becomes the administrator of Hargis Home, and has concerns about its ability to care for J.C.

Ali Shalghoun (plaintiff) became the administrator of Hargis Home in November 2017. Despite being hired as the facility’s administrator, plaintiff alternatively asserted that he had no idea that any of the facility’s residents exhibited "aggressive or violent behavior," that he "w[as]n’t clear" about the residents’ behavior and the corresponding level of care Hargis Home offered, and that he did know that the residents exhibited such behavior but did not know "the level of the aggression." (Italics added.)

Despite Hargis Home’s initial determination and representation that it could accommodate J.C.’s level of disability, plaintiff felt that its staff was "not trained sufficiently" to handle J.C. Plaintiff did not act on his concerns until much later.²

In February 2018, J.C. had an encounter with plaintiff in which J.C. smeared feces and ripped plaintiff’s clothes.

In April 2018, J.C. assaulted plaintiff and was restrained.

In May 2018, J.C. again assaulted plaintiff by "becoming] aggressive towards [p]laintiff when [p]laintiff told him of [an] upcoming appointment."

D. Hargis Home sends the Regional Center a letter requesting that J.C. be moved to a different facility

On May 16, 2018, Hargis Home sent the Regional Center a letter. In that letter, Hargis Home stated its view that J.C. has "intensive needs," that "his needs exceed [Hargis Home’s] design mandate," and that this mismatch "places [J.C.] and the other residents at risk for injury." Hargis Home was thus "issuing a 30-day notice" to the Regional Center, and "request[ing] help … in finding alternative placement" for J.C. and "extra direct care staffing hours to support [J.C.] 24/7."

In May or June 2018, Hargis Home also initiated eviction proceedings against J.C.

E. The Regional Center takes action

The Regional Center began a statewide search for a new facility to house J.C. By July 6, 2018, it had asked five different residential facilities if they could accommodate J.C.; all had declined. But the Regional Center continued its search.

In the meantime, the Regional Center secured additional funding for additional staffing "in order to keep [J.C.] and staff [at Hargis Home] safe."

F. J.C. attacks and seriously injures plaintiff

On July 27, 2018, J.C. approached plaintiff as plaintiff worked at a desk on the premises of Hargis Home. J.C.—who is around 5 feet 8 inches tall and weighs 265 pounds—picked up plaintiff and threw him backwards against an overhead cabinet. Plaintiff’s head struck the cabinet. Plaintiff suffered a laceration to his head, a "mild concussion" with attendant tinnitus and dizziness, pain in his neck and shoulder, and lost a tooth.

Plaintiff pursued and obtained a workers’ compensation award from People’s Care Los Angeles, LLC.

II. Procedural Background

On June 6, 2019, plaintiff sued the Regional Center for his injuries on two theories—namely, (1) vicarious liability for the negligence of its employees (Gov. Code, § 815.2); and (2) failure to satisfy its mandatory duties to monitor Hargis Home (Gov. Code, § 815.6).³

In March 2022, the Regional Center moved for summary judgment on the grounds, as pertinent here, that (1) it owed plaintiff no legal duty, and (2) plaintiff had assumed the risk of the types of injuries caused by J.C. by accepting a job at Hargis Home. After full briefing and a hearing, the trial court granted the Regional Center’s motion on the first ground. Specifically, the court reasoned that the Regional Center "only owed duties to [J.C.], and not to [p]laintiff," and that this result accords with the purpose of the Act because regional centers "should be concerned with providing adequate resources to consumers for the consumer’s sake, not for potentially unknown third-party employees of a residential facility."

After judgment was entered, plaintiff filed this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to the Regional Center on the ground that the Regional Center did not owe him a duty of care.

[1-4] "Summary judgment is appropriate only ‘where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618, 230 Cal. Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656 (Regents); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To prevail on such a motion, the moving party—here, the Regional Center—must show that the plaintiff "has not established, and reasonably cannot be expected to establish, one or more elements of the cause of action in question." (Patterson v. Domino's Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 500, 177 Cal.Rptr.3d 539, 333 P.3d 723.) In evaluating whether the Regional Center made this showing, we liberally construe the evidence before the trial court in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all doubts concerning that evidence in support of that party. (Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29, 39, 282 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 493 P.3d 212.) We independently review the grant of summary judgment as well as any subsidiary legal questions, such as whether a duty of care or special relationship exists. (California Medical Assn. v. Aetna Health of California Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1075, 1087, 310 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 532 P.3d 250 (summary judgment]; Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213, 276 Cal.Rptr.3d 434, 483 P.3d 159 (Brown) [duty of care]; Regents, at p. 620, 230 Cal.Rptr.3d 415, 413 P.3d 656 [special relationship].)

I. The Lanterman Act

Pursuant to the Lanterman Act, our state has undertaken...