Shalhout v. Shalhout

Ahlam Shalhout et al, . v. Mohammed Shalhout

No. CV125034147S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven, New Haven

December 14, 2015

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#153)

Robin L. Wilson, J.

FACTS

On February 29, 2012, the plaintiffs, Ahlam Shalhout (Ahlam) and Adil Shalhout (Adil) filed this appeal from the 2012 decree of the Probate Court approving the final accounting of the estate of Fatima Shalhout (decedent) and the 2001 decree of the Probate Court approving and admitting the decedent's will into probate.^[1] The decedent's estate has been the subject of litigation for nearly ten years since approval of the decedent's last will and testament and admission into probate. Given the long history of conflict with the decedent's estate, the following facts are relevant.

Ahlam Adil, and the defendant, Mohmmed Shalhout, are children of the decedent. On August 17, 2000, the decedent signed her last will and testament with witnesses. The decedent named the defendant as executor of her will and made bequeathments of different values and amounts to all of her children. The plaintiffs, in particular, were each bequeathed $10.00. On May 4, 2001, the decedent passed away. On October 5, 2001 the defendant submitted an application to the East Haven Probate Court for approval of the decedent's last will and testament and admission of her last will and testament into probate. On October 31, 2001, the Probate Court, Albis J, held a hearing on the defendant's application and issued a decree approving and admitting the decedent's will into probate. The plaintiffs allege that they were not aware of matters regarding the estate until around 2008 and did not receive notices of probate hearings until 2011.

On October 5, 2011, a final accounting of the decedent's estate was made. On February 1, 2012, the Probate Court Keyes, J, approved the final accounting.^[2] In its decree, the court noted that the conflicts arising from the decedent's estate were numerous and confusing. The court also noted that up until this hearing, the plaintiffs were cooperative and present at all matters regarding the decedent's estate. Furthermore, the court expressed that given the complexities surrounding the probating of the decedent's estate, the issues were more likely to be resolved in Superior Court.

After filing their original complaint in the Superior Court, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 12, 2012. In the first two years of this action in Superior Court, the plaintiffs were self-represented with Ahlam authoring a majority of the pleadings. The plaintiffs seek reversal of the Probate Court's approval of the estate's final accounting and revocation of the admission of the will into probate. The plaintiffs allege that the final accounting is deficient because the defendant fraudulently manipulated the numbers by failing to take into account a number of the estate's debts and including property over which the Connecticut Probate Court had no jurisdiction. The plaintiffs claim due to the defendant's fraudulent conduct, the estate has more assets than it should and appears to have a positive balance when it should have a negative balance. The plaintiffs also allege that based on mistake, fraud and inducement, fraudulent and negligent conduct, obstruction of justice, failure to abide by probate laws, and deprivation of rights, the admission of the will into probate should be revoked.

In addition, the plaintiffs claim that Connecticut does not have jurisdiction over the estate's matters because the majority of the decedent's assets are located in the Virgin Islands; the only asset located in Connecticut is a house in East Haven. Moreover, the decedent spent little time in her East Haven house; she lived abroad or in her home in the Virgin Islands. The plaintiffs request the following relief: reversal of the Probate Court's approval of the estate's final accounting; revocation of the admission of the decedent's will into Connecticut probate; a decree to denounce the authenticity of the decedent's will and to establish that the Virgin Islands probate courts have primary jurisdiction; extradition of the estate's probate to the Virgin Islands; reimbursement of $120, 000 to Adil for expenses related to probate of the estate; reimbursement of $8, 816.74 to Adil and Ahlam for illegally cashing of savings bonds belonging to the estate; and reimbursement of all legal fees incurred by the plaintiffs.

On March 23, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. On September 20, 2014, the court, Wilson, J, denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs' appeal from the February 2012 decree, was timely and that the alleged defects in service of process did not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction under General Statutes § 45a-186.^[3] On May 18, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiffs' challenge to the October 2001 probate decree is barred by the statute of limitations and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Ahlam lacks standing. A memorandum of law accompanied the motion.^[4] On June 3, 2015, and again on June 8, 2015 correcting typographical errors, Ahlam filed an objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, ^[5] accompanied by a memorandum of law and exhibits. On July 8, 2015, the defendant filed an answer and special defenses. The defendant denied all of the plaintiffs' allegations. Furthermore, the defendant set out the following special defenses: the plaintiffs' appeal from the Probate Court's decree is untimely; the decedent's last will and testament was executed while the decedent was of the age of majority and of sound and disposing mind and memory; and the plaintiffs lack standing in that they are not aggrieved. On August 19, 2015, counsel for Ahlam filed an objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment with a memorandum of law and exhibits. The defendant subsequently filed two reply memoranda to each objection to summary judgment on June 8, 2015 and August 21, 2015.

Oral argument was heard on the motion at short calendar on September 14, 2015. All parties were present except Adil.^[6] At short calendar, this court narrowed the court's review of the plaintiffs appeal to issues pertaining to the February 2012 decree. The court also requested the parties to submit supplemental briefs on standing, focusing on aggrievement, tolling of the statute of limitations, and on the propriety of summary judgment in probate appeals. On September 24, 2015, and on October 27, 2015, ^[7] the defendant and the plaintiff filed post-argument supplemental briefs. This case is schedule for trial on March 29, 2016.

DISCUSSION

I ROLE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT IN PROBATE APPEALS

" [A]n appeal from a probate order or decree to the Superior Court is not a civil cause of action. It has no more of the ordinary attributes of a civil action than the original proceedings in the court of probate . . . [A]ppeals from probate are not civil actions because it has always been held that the Superior Court, while hearing appeals from probate sits as a court of probate and not as a constitutional court of general or common-law jurisdiction. It tries the questions presented to it de novo, but in so doing it is exercising a special and limited jurisdiction conferred on it by the statute authorizing appeals from probate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Probate Appeal of Cadle Co., 152 Conn.App. 427, 439, 100 A.3d 30 (2014). " The Superior Court may not consider or adjudicate issues beyond the scope of those proper for determination by the order or decree attacked . . . Inasmuch as the motion for the appeal is made in the Court of Probate and forms a part of the proceedings in that court, no amendment to it may be made in the Superior Court. The Superior Court, therefore, cannot enlarge the scope of the appeal." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 439. Moreover, " [a]n appeal from probate does not vacate the decree appealed from nor does it lift the entire cause from the probate court into the superior court. On the contrary, it leaves the entire matter as it was in the probate court, there to be continued with and completed according to law, presenting in the meanwhile to the superior court for redetermination, after a retrial of the facts, the special and limited issues embraced within the particular decree appealed from." (Emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 440.

In the present case, the plaintiff is appealing from the February 2012 decree, approving the final accounting of the estate, and challenging the admission of the will as entered into probate in the October 2001 decree. The appeal of the February 2012 decree is timely as evidenced by this court's ruling on the defendant's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the plaintiffs challenge to the February 2012 decree is procedurally an appeal. Therefore, the Superior Court must review the plaintiff's complaint regarding this decree as a court of limited jurisdiction.

As to the plaintiffs challenge to the October 2001 probate decree the plaintiff argues that it is an equitable attack on the October 2001 decree. The plaintiff claims that because she raises complex legal questions of fraudulent activities in relation to the administration of the estate, the Superior Court may sit as a court of general jurisdiction and exercise its equitable powers. With regard to the October 2001 decree, the defendant contends that the plaintiff made an appeal over which the Superior Court may not exercise its equitable powers because it is a court of limited...