Sharma v. Buffaloe

1

SIDDHANTH SHARMA, Petitioner, v. EDDIE M. BUFFALOE, JR. and STEPHEN JACOBS, Respondents.

No. 5:2 1-HC-2065-M

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division

March 29, 2023

ORDER

RICHARD E. MYERS, II CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the court on respondents' motion to dismiss (D.E. 34). Petitioner responded in opposition. Also before the court are petitioner's motion summary judgment (D.E. 30) and amended motion for summary judgment (D.E. 31) and motions "for Change of Address, Exceed Word Count Add Parties, Emergency TRO/Preliminary Injunction, Ruling on the Pleadings, Pre-Trial Conference" (D.E. 52) and "for (More Refined) Response Under Rule 5, Expedition Ruling on Pleadings, Reconsideration, Exceed Word Count, Pre-Trial Conference/Hearing" (D.E. 55).

BACKGROUND

On March 15, 2021, petitioner filed the instant action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that the trial court in his underlying state criminal case violated his due process rights by instructing the jury as follows:

The State and the defendant, [petitioner], have agreed and stipulated that certain facts shall be accepted by you as true without further proof. The agreed facts in this case are as follows: That on 3 March 2016, the defendant was convicted of a felony fn Wake County Superior Court which was committed on 20 May 2015.

(Pet. (D.E. 1) at 21, 26). Plaintiff had been charged with two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. State v. Sharma. No. COA19-591, 2020 WL 7350699, at *1 (Dec. 15, 2020). Because of the alleged error, petitioner contends the prosecutor did not meet his burden of showing petitioner was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all elements of the crime of felon in possession of a firearm as required pursuant to Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). (Pet. (D.E. 1) at 10-29). Specifically, petitioner alleges the prosecutor did not meet its burden to prove petitioner had previously been convicted of a felony. (Id.).

After a period of frivolity review, the court allowed the action to proceed on February 9, 2022. (Feb. 9, 2022, Ord. (D.E. 17)). On April 11, 2022, petitioner filed the instant motion for summary judgment, and on April 12, 2022, petitioner filed the amended motion for summary judgment.

On April 21, 2022, respondents filed the instant motion to dismiss supported by a memorandum in support. Respondents argue petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his claim. (Resp. Mem. in Supp. (D.E. 35) at 5-20). Petitioner filed four separate responses in opposition on the following dates: April 22, 2022, May 2 and 3, 2022, and March 2, 2023.^[1]

On February 17, 2023, petitioner filed his motion “for Change of Address, Exceed Word Count, Add Parties, Emergency TRO/Preliminary Injunction, Ruling on the Pleadings, Pre-Trial Conference.” On March 2, 2023, petitioner filed the instant motion “for (More Refined) Response Under Rule 5, Expedition, Ruling on Pleadings, Reconsideration, Exceed Word Count, Pre-Trial Conference/Hearing.”

COURT'S DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A federal court cannot grant habeas relief in cases where a state court considered a claim on its merits unless the state court decision (1) “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”, or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Federal courts apply a highly deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and (e). Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Moreover, a state court's factual determination is presumed correct, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Sharpe v. Bell, 593 F.3d 372,378 (4th Cir. 2010).

“[A] federal court does not have license to question a state court's finding of procedural default” and “may only inquire into whether cause and prejudice exist to excuse that default, not into whether the state court properly applied its own law.” Barnes v. Thompson. 58 F.3d 971, 974 n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (quotations omitted). Federal courts “are not at liberty to question a state court's application of a state procedural rule because a state court's finding of procedural default is not reviewable if the finding is based upon an adequate and independent state ground.” Burket v. Angelone. 208 F.3d 172, 184 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (“This Court will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the 3 decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.”). A state procedural rule is adequate if it is “firmly established” and regularly and consistently applied. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 348-49 (1984). Generally, “whenever a procedural rule is derived from state statutes and supreme court rules, ... the rule is necessarily “firmly established.” O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1241 (4th Cir. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 151 (1997).

North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a)(2) provides: “A party may not make any portion of the jury charge or omission therefrom the basis of an issue presented on appeal unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict.” “(I]f a party neither lodges a timely objection nor asserts that the trial court's action or inaction constituted plain error, all review of that alleged error, including plain error, has been waived.” State v. Benner, 380 N.C. 621, 638, 869 S.E.2d 199, 210 (2022). “[O]ne who fails to comply with North Carolina's procedural requirements for preserving challenges to jury instructions for direct review is barred from seeking federal habeas corpus relief unless he can show cause for, and prejudice from, his failure to follow the state procedural rules.” Honeycutt v. Mahoney, 698 F.2d 213, 215 (4th Cir. 1983).

To show cause, a petitioner must show that an “external impediment” prevented him from following the state procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier. 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1985). For example, interference by officials, the factual or legal basis for objection not being reasonably available, or ineffective assistance of counsel may demonstrate cause. See id. 488-89. However, a petitioner who waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial cannot demonstrate cause on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (“[A] defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.'”).

To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show the alleged constitutional violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494. “The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Strickler v. Greene. 527 U.S. 263, 289-90 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, absent a showing of cause, the court need not address actual prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (determining actual prejudice was unnecessary where petitioner filed to demonstrate cause); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,131-35 (1982) (barring habeas review on failure to show cause for noncompliance with state court procedural rule without addressing actual prejudice).

“In order to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice to excuse the application of the procedural bar, [petitioner] must show actual innocence.” Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 974 (4th Cir. 1994). To demonstrate actual innocence, a petitioner must: (1) “support allegations of constitutional error with new, reliable evidence that was not proffered at trial;” and (2) “prove that in light of all the evidence, old and new, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Haves v. Carver, 922 F.3d 212, 217 (2019).

B. Analysis

Here, as noted above, respondents argue petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his claim, and the petition must be dismissed. (Def. Mem. in Supp. (D.E. 35) at 5-22). In petitioner's underlying state criminal proceeding, pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(a)(2), the North Carolina Court of Appeals found petitioner procedurally defaulted on his claims regarding the trial court's jury instructions and charge conference because petitioner failed to lodge objections at trial.^[2] Sharma, 2020 WL 7350699, *7-8. Such a determination is not reviewable by this court. See Burket, 208 F.3d at 184; Honeycutt, 698 F.2d at 215. Therefore, petitioner must show either cause and actual prejudice for default or actual innocence.

Petitioner's responses to respondents' motion to dismiss are not the model of clarity. Petitioner argues the following: (1) he has not procedurally defaulted on his claims; (2) he has demonstrated cause and actual prejudice for any default; and (3) he is actually innocent of his underlying criminal conviction. (PetT First Resp. (D.E. 37) at 4-5; Pet'r Third Resp. (D.E. 40) at 11-14...