Sharp v. Kean Univ.

153 F.Supp.3d 669

Michele Sharp, Plaintiff,

v.Kean University et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 2:14-423 (WJM)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed December 28, 2015

Timothy J. McIlwain, McIlwain, LLC, Linwood, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Angela Lee Velez, Jennifer J. McGruther, State of New Jersey, Trenton, NJ, David F. Corrigan, Keyport, NJ, Michael W. McTigue, Jr., Jennifer Burke Dempsey, Kathryn E. Deal, Drinker, Biddle & Reath, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Martin W. Aron, Jackson Lewis P.C., Morristown, NJ, for Defendant.

OPINION

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Plaintiff Michelle Sharp accuses Kean University (“Kean”) and some of its current and former employees¹ (collectively “the Kean Defendants”), as well as the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), of sabotaging her reputation and career in violation of state and federal law. She also brings a legal malpractice claim against the law firm of Jackson Lewis, P.C. (“Jackson Lewis”). This matter comes before the Court on (1) a motion to dismiss filed by the NCAA and NCAA investigator Ameen Najjar (collectively, “the NCAA Defendants”), (2) a motion to dismiss filed by the Kean Defendants, and (3) Sharp's motion to dismiss a counterclaim filed by Jackson Lewis. For the reasons stated below, the motions to dismiss filed by the NCAA Defendants and the Kean Defendants will be GRANTED . Moreover, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Sharp's legal malpractice claim against Jackson Lewis and Jackson Lewis' counterclaim for unpaid legal fees against Sharp.

I. BACKGROUND

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are alleged in Sharp's amended complaint.

In 1998, Sharp began her tenure as the coach of the Kean University women's basketball team. Am. Complt. at ¶ 22. Sharp's teams experienced considerable success on the court as Sharp turned a perennial underperformer into a championship contender. Id . at ¶¶ 26-27. Off the court, however, Sharp clashed with other Kean personnel, particularly former Kean athletic director Glenn Hedden. See, e.g., id . at ¶ 33. The amended complaint particularly focuses on a “Travelearn” program in which Sharp planned to organize a trip to Spain for her players. According to Sharp, Hedden sought to sabotage her Travelearn efforts, while taking other actions to besmirch Sharp's reputation. See id at ¶¶ 37-38, 48, 52-53.

Sharp was later entangled in an NCAA investigation concerning Kean's athletic program. Specifically, the NCAA investigated whether some members of Sharp's team were ineligible for competition under NCAA regulations. According to the amended complaint, NCAA investigator Ameen Najjar suggested to Hedden that Sharp should allow the students in question to play. After Hedden relayed the message to Sharp, she agreed to dress those students for competition. However, Najjar and Hedden later launched a “'gotcha' investigation” and a “complete setup” in which they sought to discipline Sharp simply for following their instructions. See id . at ¶¶ 39-40. Sharp similarly claims that Najjar and Hedden “conspired to frame” her in an investigation into Travelearn. Id . at ¶ 57.

With the exception of Hedden, Kean personnel supported Sharp in the face of the NCAA's allegations. However, those individuals later withdrew their support in an effort to avoid further scrutiny from the NCAA. Id . at ¶¶ 53-57. In the spring of 2011, the NCAA brought formal charges against Kean, which included allegations of Sharp engaging in misconduct. In September 2011, Kean concurred with the findings of the NCAA's investigation and agreed to incorporate certain corrective measures proposed by Hedden. Id . at ¶ 62. That same month, Sharp and her attorney, Gregg Clifton of Jackson Lewis, appeared before the NCAA and presented “evidence around her innocence.” Id . at ¶ 63. However, the NCAA published a report concluding that Kean and Sharp had violated NCAA regulations. In response, Kean stripped Sharp of her coaching duties and demoted her to a secondary role at the university. These actions have considerably damaged Sharp's employment prospects and reputation. See id . at ¶¶ 64-65.

On January 21, 2014, Sharp filed her initial complaint, which included claims against only Kean and its employees. On December 8, 2014, this Court dismissed Sharp's complaint without prejudice and granted her leave to amend. Sharp then filed her amended complaint, which for the first time included claims against the NCAA, Najjar, Jackson Lewis, Gregg Clifton,² and a number of other individuals affiliated with Kean University. In response, the NCAA Defendants and the Kean Defendants filed motions to dismiss, while Jackson Lewis filed a counterclaim. Sharp then moved to dismiss the counterclaim against her. Now that the dust has settled, there are three motions presently before the Court: (1) a motion to dismiss filed by the NCAA Defendants, (2) a motion to dismiss filed by the Kean Defendants, and (3) Sharp's motion to dismiss Jackson Lewis' counterclaim.

II. DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated. Hedges v. United States , 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) ; Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc. v. Mirage Resorts Inc. , 140 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir.1998).

Although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff's right to relief above a speculative level, such that it is “plausible on its face.” See id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc. , 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir.2008). A claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement' ... it asks for more than a sheer possibility.” Id.

A. NCAA Defendants

For the reasons stated below, Sharp has failed to state a claim against the NCAA Defendants.

i. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 Claims

Sharp's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim fails because the NCAA Defendants did not act under the color of state law. In order to state a claim under section 1983, the NCAA Defendants must have violated Sharp's rights while acting under the color of state law. See, e.g., Groman v. Township of Manalapan , 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir.1995). A private entity like the NCAA acts under the color state law only where “the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state”; where “the private party has acted with the help of or in concert with state officials”; or where “the State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.” Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc. , 948 F.Supp. 436, 441–442 (E.D.Pa.1996) (citations and quotations omitted). In National Collegiate Association v. Tarkanian , the Supreme Court held that private conduct of the NCAA is not transformed into state action simply because a public university disciplines an employee in direct response to an NCAA investigation. 488 U.S. 179, 109 S.Ct. 454, 102 L.Ed.2d 469 (1988). The Court emphasized that in such a scenario, it is ultimately up to the public university as to whether it should discipline the employee, even though institutional pressure from the NCAA may influence the university's decision. In other words, the state action of the university cannot be imputed to the NCAA. Id . at 195–96, 109 S.Ct. 454. Here, it was Kean, not the NCAA, who stripped Sharp of her coaching duties. Indeed, it appears that the NCAA does not even possess the authority to take disciplinary action against Sharp; rather, its enforcement authority extends only to the university itself. Because the NCAA did not act under the color of state law, Sharp's section 1983 claim against the NCAA Defendants must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE . Moreover, because Sharp's section 1985 claim is premised on a violation of the equal protection clause, it too is subject to the state action requirement. United Broth. o f Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 610, AFL – CIO v. Scott , 463 U.S. 825, 831–33, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983). Consequently, the section 1985 claim against the NCAA Defendants must also be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE .

ii. Title IX Claims

The Title IX Claims against the NCAA Defendants also fail. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance....” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). First, individuals are not subject to Title IX claims, which means the Title IX claim against Najjar must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE . Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm ., 555 U.S. 246, 257, 129 S.Ct. 788, 172 L.Ed.2d 582 (2009) (Title IX “has consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit against school officials,...