Shatzer v. Rite Aid Corp.

CATHY SHATZER, Plaintiff, v. RITE AID CORPORATION and RITE AID OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC., Defendants.

Civil Case No. 13-233

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

August 14, 2015

Judge Kim R. Gibson

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

Pending before the Court is a motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 28) filed by Defendants Rite Aid Corporation and Rite Aid of Pennsylvania, Inc., with respect to all claims asserted in Plaintiff Cathy Shatzer's amended complaint filed on October 29, 2013. (ECF No. 5). Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges harassment and discrimination based upon gender and disability, and constructive discharge, under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. ("ADA"). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. Jurisdiction and Venue

The Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

III. Procedural and Factual Background

Plaintiff began employment with Rite Aid in June 2007, and initially worked as a part-time cashier. (ECF Nos. 30 at 1; 35 at 1). Her work schedule at that time was four days per week, six hours per day. (ECF Nos. 30 at 1; 35 at 1). Susan Covert ("Susan") was the manager of the store where Plaintiff worked, and was primarily responsible for setting the store schedule, as well as hiring, evaluating, disciplining, and firing store employees. (ECF Nos. 30 at 2; 35 at 1 - 2). Plaintiff was never disciplined by Susan. (ECF Nos. 30 at 1; 35 at 1). The remaining employees at Plaintiff's store consisted of associates and shift supervisors. (ECF Nos. 30 at 2; 35 at 1 - 2). Plaintiff was briefly employed as a shift supervisor before deciding to return to the position of cashier. (ECF Nos. 30 at 2; 35 at 2). The shift supervisors overseeing Plaintiff's store during her term of employment were Jacquelyn Mortimore ("Jacquelyn") and Penny Beegle ("Penny") - Jacquelyn being the more senior employee. (ECF Nos. 35 at 13; 40 at 2). Jacquelyn was also the only employee, other than Susan, to have full-time status and receive benefits. (ECF Nos. 35 at 13; 40 at 2).

While employed by Rite Aid, Plaintiff suffered physical limitations stemming from fibromyalgia, herniated discs in her neck, and irregular heartbeat. (ECF Nos. 30 at 1, 10; 35 at 1, 11). In 2009, Plaintiff's primary care physician advised Plaintiff that she should restrict her work schedule to no more than four hours per day, three days per week because of her fibromyalgia. (ECF Nos. 30 at 1; 35 at 1). Plaintiff was also to avoid lifting more than ten pounds. (ECF Nos. 30 at 10; 35 at 11). Following receipt of a physician's note, Rite Aid attempted to accommodate Plaintiff's limitations. (ECF Nos. 30 at 1; 35 at 1). Plaintiff's work schedule was altered, and on those occasions when Plaintiff informed her manager that she wasunable to complete tasks due to difficulty using her hands or lifting, another store associate would be directed to step in for Plaintiff. (ECF Nos. 30 at 10; 35 at 12). Plaintiff never provided Rite Aid with a physician's note regarding additional limitations. (ECF Nos. 30 at 10; 35 at 12).

Also while Plaintiff was employed by Rite Aid, Jacquelyn's husband, Alan, would visit Plaintiff's store during Jacquelyn's shifts. (ECF Nos. 30 at 5; 35 at 5). Plaintiff frequently complained to both Jacquelyn and Penny regarding Alan's inappropriate conduct towards her when he was present at the store. (ECF Nos. 30 at 5; 35 at 5). Plaintiff's complaints included allegations of sexually suggestive language and gestures directed at Plaintiff, and, eventually, the nonconsensual touching of Plaintiff's buttocks, ribcage, and breast. (ECF Nos. 30 at 5 - 6, 11; 35 at 5 - 6, 12, 16; 40 at 6). There is no indication that either Jacquelyn or Penny addressed or reported Plaintiff's complaints.

Rite Aid maintains a "no-tolerance" policy with respect to gender or disability-based harassment and discrimination in the workplace. (ECF Nos. 30 at 3; 35 at 2 - 3; 31-3 at 20 - 22). This policy covers harassment by supervisors, co-workers, and customers. (ECF Nos. 30 at 3; 35 at 2 - 3; 31-3 at 23 - 25). Rite Aid's "Anti-Harassment Policy" provides procedures for reporting harassment and discriminatory behavior via several avenues, including anonymous complaints. (ECF Nos. 30 at 3; 35 at 2 - 3; 31-3 at 23 - 25). Plaintiff participated in Rite Aid's computer-based training on harassment in September 2009, as well as training regarding anti-discrimination policies at Rite Aid. (ECF Nos. 30 at 4; 35 at 4).

Plaintiff never contacted Rite Aid's human resources department to lodge complaints about Alan's conduct. (ECF Nos. 30 at 4, 6 - 7; 35 at 4, 6 - 7). Plaintiff did not know the name of, or contact information for, her local human resources representative. (ECF Nos. 35 at 14; 40at 3). Nor did Plaintiff utilize the Rite Aid employee hotline. (ECF Nos. 30 at 6; 35 at 7). Due to differing schedules, Plaintiff had limited in-person contact with Susan while at work, and she did not have or use Susan's telephone number or email address. (ECF Nos. 35 at 13; 40 at 2 - 3). Plaintiff did not make any direct complaints to Susan regarding Alan's behavior, even during performance reviews. (ECF Nos. 30 at 6; 35 at 8). Plaintiff believed that Jacquelyn and Penny should have reported her complaints to Susan. (ECF Nos. 30 at 4; 35 at 5).

On August 2, 2012, following an instance where Plaintiff claimed she was inappropriately touched on the buttocks and breast by Alan, Plaintiff informed Jacquelyn that she would not allow Alan to touch her again. (ECF Nos. 35 at 17; 40 at 8). Jacquelyn's only response was, "I thought you were over that." (ECF Nos. 35 at 17; 40 at 8). Immediately thereafter, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Susan regarding Alan, and, on August 3, 2012, Susan received that letter. (ECF Nos. 30 at 6, 8; 35 at 7, 9, 17; 40 at 8). Penny initialed the bottom of the letter before Plaintiff submitted it. (ECF Nos. 35 at 17; 40 at 8).

Upon receipt of the letter, Susan informed her general manager about the matter, and he in turn contacted Regional Human Resources Manager, Joshua Buckley ("Joshua"). (ECF Nos. 30 at 8; 35 at 9). Plaintiff continued to work at the store, as scheduled, on August 4 and 5, 2012. (ECF Nos. 35 at 18; 40 at 8). On August 7, 2012, during Plaintiff's time-off, Penny contacted her by telephone to inform Plaintiff that Alan was still visiting the store. (ECF Nos. 35 at 18; 40 at 9). Consequently, Plaintiff mailed a letter of resignation to Susan that same day. (ECF Nos. 30 at 8; 35 at 9). Susan received the letter on August 9, 2012. (ECF Nos. 35 at 18; 40 at 9).

On August 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed a criminal complaint against Alan. (ECF Nos. 35 at 19; 40 at 9). Alan was found guilty of harassment on November 15, 2012. (ECF Nos. 35 at 19; 40 at10). Subsequently, Plaintiff executed a charge against Rite Aid with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on January 23, 2013. (ECF No. 5 at 2). Plaintiff received a Notice of Right to Sue letter from the EEOC on July 18, 2013. (ECF No. 5 at 2).

Plaintiff proceeded to file a complaint in this Court against Rite Aid on October 11, 2013. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on October 29, 2013, alleging that Defendants violated Title VII and the ADA and constructively discharged Plaintiff due to gender and physical disabilities. (ECF No. 5). Defendants filed an answer on December 30, 2013. (ECF No. 7). Following the close of discovery, Defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment on October 29, 2014. (ECF No. 28). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on January 23, 2015. (ECF No. 34). The matter has been fully briefed (ECF Nos. 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41), and is ripe for disposition.

IV. Standard of Review

A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party establishes "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F. 3d 147, 151 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). A genuine issue of material fact is one that could affect the outcome of litigation. Mahoney v. McDonnell, -- F. App'x --, 2015 WL 3875741 at *3 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986)). However, "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial." Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

The initial burden is on the moving party to adduce evidence illustrating a lack of genuine issues. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the non-moving party must present sufficient evidence of a genuine issue, in rebuttal. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587). When considering the parties' arguments, the Court is required to view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. (citing Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F. 3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). Further, the benefit of the doubt will be given to allegations of the non-moving party when in conflict with the moving party's claims. Bialko v. Quaker Oats Co., 434 F. App'x 139, 141 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Valhal Corp. v. Sullivan Assocs., 44 F. 3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 1995)).

Nonetheless, a well-supported motion for summary judgment will not be defeated where the non-moving party merely reasserts factual allegations contained in the pleadings. Id. (citing Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F. 2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)). The non-moving party must resort to affidavits, depositions, admissions, and/or interrogatories to...